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This project examines the relationships between the Chickasaw Indians and the 
Mississippi River between 1735 and 1795. Chickasaws imagined, managed, and 
manipulated the river in a number of ways. For them, the Mississippi was a 
metaphysical and physical boundary as well as a conduit. Its presence marked both time 
and place in their history. As the water flowed past Chickasaw Country it differentiated 
historical eras and demarcated the western bounds of their territory. More generally, 
waterways constituted a central place in the worldviews of Southeastern Native 
Americans. This influenced how they related to the riverine landscape and other peoples 
within that space. Environmental factors also determined when, where, and how 
Chickasaws interacted with the Mississippi River. Seasonal variation and weather 
conditions affected water levels, which in turn, altered resource availability and travel 
patterns. These became particularly important factors in the eighteenth century when 
colonial competition brought new people, products, and would-be empires to the 
Mississippi Valley. Those who built social, political, and economic relationships with 
the Chickasaws travelled the river unencumbered. However, Chickasaw warriors 
limited the mobility of their enemies, particularly at the Chickasaw Bluffs where 
topography and geography favored them. The Chickasaw Nation held a powerful place 
along the Mississippi River and used that position to its advantage. This made them 
valuable allies or influential adversaries for France, Britain, Spain, and the United 
States. Beginning to understand the connections between Chickasaw history, the 
riverine environment, and geopolitics gives new insight to the world in which 





 “Days turned into weeks, weeks into months, and months into years,” as the 
legend is told, until one day just as the sun was settling on the horizon, the Indians 
“came upon a scene beyond their imagination. It was a great river, the likes of which 
they had never seen before, and the unexpected sight overwhelmed them.” Recounting 
the Chickasaw migration legend, respected elder Reverend Jesse Humes continued, 
“For a long time the astonished people stood on the riverbank and stared in awe at the 
mighty watercourse….The homeless people saw that the kohta falaya [the sacred pole] 
still leaned toward the east, and they knew that ‘home’ was somewhere on the other side 
of the wide, wide river before them.” 1 They eventually managed to cross the expansive 
waterway and the people found their homeland. The migrants settled just to the east of 
the Mississippi River, and there they became Chickasaws. As Humes recited the tale in 
the mid-twentieth century, crossing the Mississippi proved a watershed moment for the 
Chickasaw people. The river symbolized the boundary between what once was and 
what was to be. It offered a new beginning, hope for the future, and a definitive physical 
landmark denoting their transformation. In crossing to the other side, the Chickasaws 
arrived home. 
 In late 1796 esteemed headman Ugulayacabé told a story of another kind. Since 
their migration the Chickasaw people had called the Mississippi Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’, 
                                                          
1 Reverend Jess J. Humes, as told to Robert Kingsberry, “The Legend of the Big White Dog and the 
Sacred Pole,” The Chickasaw Nation, https://www.chickasaw.net/Our-
Nation/Culture/Beliefs/Legends.aspx (accessed 6/16/2014). 
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“meaning scored bluff waterway,” after the rock walls of the Chickasaw Bluffs.2 There, 
on a portion of that ground, the Chickasaw Nation had recently consented to a Spanish 
fort in the expectation Spain would safeguard the river and Chickasaw lands. However, 
Spain quickly transferred its title to the United States. According to the report of a 
Massachusetts newspaper, Ugulayacabé berated Spanish officials exclaiming: 
we had received [that land] from our fathers, and had sworn to them to preserve in the 
state in which the Master of breath had given it to them, and to preserve which we have 
shed our blood against the French, which we often refused to the English, which we had 
given to you over persuaded by your promises of keeping it, not only for the advantage 
accruing to yourselves, but as we also thereby secured to ourselves the possession of the 
rest and a supply of our wants, which our own industry was incapable of furnishing. 
 
In attempting to resist the worst manifestations of colonialism they had ceded 
part of that all-important place to the Spanish, only to be betrayed. The 
Americans now possessed it, and Ugulayacabé contended, “we could perceive in 
them the cunning of the rattlesnake, who caresses the squirrel he intends to 
destroy.”3The Fourth Chickasaw Bluff had been a Chickasaw stronghold along 
the Mississippi River, but that would not continue.  
The events described in these narratives bookend a transformative era in 
Chickasaw history. In the intervening period the Mississippi River had come to play a 
critical role in Chickasaw lives. People have always mythologized, identified with, and 
ascribed meaning to waterways.4  The Chickasaws, and other Native American polities, 
                                                          
2 John P. Dyson, “Chickasaw Village Names From Contact to Removal: 1540-1835,” Mississippi 
Archeology 38:2 (2003), 118; John P. Dyson, The Early Chickasaw Homeland (Ada, OK: Chickasaw 
Press, 2014), 7, 99, 154. 
3 "The Talk of the Chickasaw Chiefs, At the Bluffs, represented by Ugalayacabe," MASSACHUSETTS 
SPY, OR WORCESTER GAZETTE, 1 November 1797, 2-3. For a different translation of this speech see 
Charles A. Weeks, “Of Rattlesnakes, Wolves, and Tigers: A Harangue at the Chickasaw Bluffs, 1796,” 
William and Mary Quarterly vol. 67, no. 3 (July, 2010), 511-513.  
4 Christof Mauch and Thomas Zeller, eds., Rivers in History: Perspectives on Waterways in Europe and 
North America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 1-10.  
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were no different in this regard.  Rivers were simultaneously boundaries, paths, 
resource bases, dangers, and forces unto themselves.5 The Mississippi assumed all these 
roles at once. Laying near the center of North America it twists, turns, and doubles-back 
over the course of 2,320 miles while its voluminous currents gradually gather speed as 
they travel southward.6 For Chickasaws it divided past from present, split West from 
East, and linked disparate peoples and environments. In the eighteenth century these 
connections metaphorically bound Chickasaws to one another and their homeland. In a 
literal sense, the Mississippi also linked Natives and non-Natives from one end of the 
Mississippi Valley to the other. 
Migration legends, like the one told by Rev. Humes, demonstrate the Mississippi 
River oriented Chickasaws in both place and time. As the tale unfolds an unspecified 
people travel from west to east and become Chickasaws after crossing the river and 
entering their preordained land. From that point on, the Mississippi served as the 
western boundary of their territory. It also marked a historical moment, a break between 
eras, not unlike Christ’s birth separates 1 BC from 1 AD in Western History. The 
foreignness of the Chickasaws’ past resided in the West and gave way to the familiar 
modern age of the East at the Mississippi River. Each time a storyteller recited the 
                                                          
5 Lisa Tanya Brooks, The Common Pot: The Recovery of Native Space in the Northeast (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 1-50; Robert Paulett demonstrates how the Savannah River 
functioned “both as an idea and as a physical presence” for Indians, Europeans, and African Americans 
during the eighteenth century. See Robert Paulett, An Empire of Small Places: Mapping the Southeastern 
Anglo-Indian Trade, 1732-1795 (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2012), 49-77. 
6 The Mississippi’s length has varied with time based on the river’s shifting course. The length given is 
based on a current assessment from the National Park Service. See National Park Service, “Mississippi 
River Facts,” http://www.nps.gov/miss/riverfacts.htm (accessed 7/11/2014). 
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legend he or she reinforced these ideas underlying Chickasaw concepts of sovereignty, 
chronology, and geography.     
More generally, rivers constituted a central place in the worldviews of 
Southeastern peoples. In a complex and interrelated belief system, they thought of the 
cosmos as having three parts: an Upper World, This World, and an Under World. 
Water, the fundamental element in the Under World, literally underlaid This World and 
the Upper World.7 Bodies of water could be transcendent, acting as a conduit between 
This World and the Under World. Animals, people, and animated beings that crossed 
between them were both valued and feared.8 Snakes possessed this capacity and were 
often associated with rivers and the Under World. This must have been important to 
Southeastern Native Americans given that they decorated pottery and other material 
goods with serpentine designs and patterns. 9 The theoretical implications of traveling 
on a body of water as large as the Mississippi help to further inform our understanding 
of the river as a cultural space.  
While the waters of the Mississippi may have posed a metaphysical hazard, they 
certainly presented tangible dangers as well. Traveling by water entailed risk. The threat 
of being swept downstream, losing one’s belongings, capsizing, or even drowning 
loomed large. Weather conditions had to be analyzed. Seasonal changes affected annual 
flood stages, and storms could swell water levels and send whole trees careening 
                                                          
7 Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 122-
131. 
8 Mary C. Churchill, “The Oppositional Paradigm of Purity versus Pollution in Charles Hudson’s: ‘The 
Southeastern Indians,’” American Indian Quarterly 20, no. 3 (Summer-Autumn, 1996): 582-584. 
9 F. Kent Reilly III, “The Great Serpent in the Lower Mississippi Valley,” in Visualizing the Sacred: 
Cosmic Visions, Regionalism, and the Art of the Mississippian World, eds. George E. Lankford, F. Kent 
Reilly, and James F. Garber (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 118-134.  
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downstream at any time.10 All river travel shared these perils, but they were particularly 
acute on the mighty Mississippi. Given the sheer volume of muddy water, keen 
knowledge and sturdy equipment were essentials. Although the Chickasaws did not 
consider themselves a nation “on the great River Mississippi,” they acquired the skills 
necessary for successful waterway navigation.11 Men and women routinely traversed 
the Mississippi from St. Louis to New Orleans in addition to plying the Ohio, 
Tennessee, Yazoo, and other rivers. 
In addition to knowing where it led, navigating the Mississippi required an 
understanding of how the land bent the river and the river shaped the land. Natural 
changes in the waterway necessitated perpetual assessment in order to set a safe course. 
The depths of the current hid supernatural forces, but water near the surface moved in 
predictable ways. Chickasaws studied these and positioned their pirogues in the river 
accordingly. Their ability to do so, combined with a collective mental map of the 
Mississippi River System, transformed rivers into paths. 
This became an important factor in the eighteenth century when colonial 
competition brought new people, products, and would-be empires to the region. As a 
contested space no one enjoyed unencumbered navigation of the Mississippi River. 
Native and non-Native polities, as well as individuals, took a keen interest in 
                                                          
10Le Page du Pratz, An Account of Louisiana Exhibiting a Compendious Sketch of its Political and 
Natural History and Topography(Newbern: Franklin & Garrow, 1804), 116; Nancy M. Miller Surrey, 
The Commerce of Louisiana During the French Regime, 1699-1763 (New York, 1916), 42-49; Frances 
Elle Coughlin, "Spanish Galleys on the Mississippi: 1792-1797" (Master's thesis, Claremont Graduate 
School, 1945), 47-51.  
11 John T. Juricek, ed., Georgia and Florida Treaties, 1763-1776. Vol. 12 of Early American Documents: 
Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of 
America, 2002), 301.  
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monitoring and curbing its use. In this regard the Chickasaws were no different from 
their neighbors. Even though their village life centered on Coonewah Creek and Town 
Creek located more than a hundred miles east of the river (near present-day Tupelo, 
MS) they remained cognizant of events up and down the river.12 With the skills to 
traverse the Mississippi and the capacity to limit others’ abilities, the Chickasaw Nation 
exerted power well beyond the water’s edge.   
At Sakti Lhafa’, the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff—in today’s Memphis, TN—these 
dynamics converged. Chickasaws used practical naming conventions and their term for 
the Mississippi followed suit. The scored bluff defined the watercourse linguistically, in 
part, because it did so physically. In the Central Mississippi Valley, between Cairo, IL 
and Vicksburg, MS, the Chickasaw Bluffs were the only steep cliffs bordering the river. 
The sheer heights of the Fourth Bluff towered over the river and reached into the sky. 
An island also narrowed the Mississippi’s channel creating a whirling effect in the 
current.13 This water hazard forced pirogues and other boats traveling north-south to 
pass near the shore at the base of Sakti Lhafa’. There Chickasaw warriors gained a 
military advantage allowing them to intercept watercraft. Martial benefits along with 
social, political, and religious connotations made the heights and the Mississippi River 
invaluable to the Chickasaws. Foreign travelers passing through this space infringed on 
Chickasaw territory and threatened Chickasaw cultural constructs. For “outsiders” 
gaining access required entering into a reciprocal relationship which entailed ceremony, 
gift-giving, and an acknowledgement of certain rights and responsibilities. Once 
                                                          
12 Wendy Cegielski and Brad R. Lieb, “Hina' Falaa, 'The Long Path': An Analysis of Chickasaw 
Settlement Using GIS in Northeast Mississippi, 1650-1840,” Native South 4 (2011): 24-54.  
13 D.C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives Relating to Tennessee and 
the Old Southwest,” East Tennessee Historical Society 9-49 (1937-1977), 32 (1960), 88.  
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“outsiders” became “insiders”, integrated into the social relations which overlay Sakti 
Lhafa’ and Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’, they could travel the river freely. Allies moved easily 
along the waterway, those who had not forged similar bonds suffered the consequences.  
This dynamic was significant considering the Chickasaws inhabited a pivotal 
geopolitical locale and had done so for a long time. They lived in the southeastern 
portion of what Stephen Aron has labeled the “confluence region.” Here the Missouri 
and Ohio rivers emptied their contents into the Mississippi River.14 During the 
Mississippian Period (900 C.E. to 1700 C.E.) these river systems brought exotic trade 
goods, diverse ideas, and various American Indian peoples into the Lower Mississippi 
Valley.15 This trade network, combined with maize agriculture, supported an urban 
chiefdom at Cahokia, near present-day St Louis. Smaller polities strategically aligned 
themselves along the Mississippi to participate in this canoe-based trade.16 The Chicaza, 
ancestors of the historical Chickasaws, were part of this world when they confronted 
Hernando de Soto during his march (1539-1542) through the Southeast Culture Area. In 
the aftermath Mississippian society changed drastically: hundreds perhaps thousands of 
individuals died, entire chiefdoms disappeared, and the practice of mound building was 
abandoned. Far less hierarchical “coalescent societies” formed in their wake as 
survivors merged their cultures and languages producing new polities in the process. 
Much had changed by the time Europeans returned to the Southeast, well over a century 
                                                          
14 Stephen Aron, American Confluence: The Missouri Frontier from Borderland to Border State 
(Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2006), xiii-xxi.  
15 Marvin D. Jeter, “From Prehistory through Protohistory to Ethnohistory in and near the Northern 
Lower Mississippi Valley” in The Transformation of the Southeastern Indians, 1540-1760, eds. Robbie 
Ethridge and Charles Hudson (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2002), 177-223. 
16 Mark Joseph Hartman, “The Development of Watercraft in the Prehistoric Southeastern United States,” 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Texas A&M University, 1996), 136.  
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later. Between 1542-1682 the Chicaza reconstituted themselves moving north along the 
Tombigbee River, into what is currently northeastern Mississippi, where they became 
known as the Chickasaws.17        
When French and British colonies gained footholds in Louisiana and Carolina, 
respectively, a new array of cargo, belief systems, and peoples infiltrated the 
continent.18 The Mississippi River System again produced opportunities for cross-
cultural trade and communication, although the waterway also spread new hazards. 
Now situated near the nexus of the Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee rivers, the 
Chickasaws took advantage of their station. Anthropologist Robbie Ethridge astutely 
observes, “there is little question that the Chickasaws understood this place to be a 
strategic economic and political location.”19 They found France and Britain willing 
trade partners. By the start of the eighteenth century glass beads, blankets, bolts of 
cloth, metal tools, and most importantly, guns, entered Chickasaw Country in exchange 
for Indian slaves and deerskins.20 The rise of the Native slave trade and the spread of 
European diseases “shattered” Native communities, and in the fallout, access to guns 
                                                          
17 Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 89-115; Jay K. Johnson, “The Chickasaws” in Indians of the 
Greater Southeast: Historical Archaeology and Ethnohistory, edited by Bonnie G. McEwan (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 2000), 85-121; James R. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People: The 
Chickasaw Indians to Removal (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2004), 1-24; Patricia 
Galloway, Choctaw Genesis: 1500-1700 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 27-74; Ned J. 
Jenkins, “Tracing the Origins of the Early Creeks, 1050-1700 CE” in Mapping the Mississippian Shatter 
Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South, eds. Robbie 
Ethridge and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 188-249. 
18 Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 11-24; Aron, American Confluence, 11-26; Verner W. Crane, 
“The Tennessee River as the Road to Carolina: The Beginnings of Exploration and Trade.” The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 3, no. 1 (Jun., 1916): 3-18. 
19 Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 153.  
20 Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 28; Jay K. Johnson, John W. O’Hear, Robbie Ethridge, 
Brad R. Lieb, Susan L. Scott, and H. Edwin Jackson, “Measuring Chickasaw Adaptation on the Western 
Frontier of the Colonial South: A Correlation of Documentary and Archaeological Data,” Southeast 
Archaeology 27, No. 1 (Summer, 2008): 22. 
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and ammunition became a necessity.21 This put the Chickasaws in a precarious position. 
Despite their limited population, perhaps numbering 5,000-7,000 individuals in 1700, 
their location among North America’s fluid arteries made them particularly valuable 
allies and especially dangerous enemies.22   
Geography helped place Chickasaw warriors at the business end of French gun 
barrels, but location also worked to inspire the allegiance of British colonies huddled 
along the Atlantic coastline. As Jay K. Johnson points out, “Both the English and the 
French recognized the importance of the Chickasaws in their strategic position between 
the French colonies in Louisiana and Illinois and dealt with them accordingly.”23 
Chickasaw slave raids against the Choctaw, Quapaw, Illinois, and other neighboring 
nations created animosity and spurred cycles of escalating violence.24 Flanked by 
French settlements in Louisiana and Illinois, Chickasaw tacticians could not ignore that 
France’s fledgling colonies traded with enemy nations. The Natchez Revolt of 1729 
soured the Chickasaw-French relationship still further as the French suspected 
Chickasaw involvement, and resented their protection of some remnant Natchez.25 As 
                                                          
21 Robbie Ethridge, “Creating the Shatter Zone: Indian Slave Traders and the Collapse of the Southeastern 
Chiefdoms” in Light on the Path: The Anthropology and History of the Southeastern Indians, eds. 
Thomas J. Pluckhahn and Robbie Ethridge (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2006), 208. 
For more on the “shatter zone” see Ethridge and Shuck-Hall, Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone, 1-
62.  
22 Peter H. Wood, “The Changing Population of the Colonial South: An Overview by Race and Region, 
1685-1790,” in Powhatan’s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast, eds. Gregory A. Waselkov, Peter 
H. Wood, and Tom Hatley (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 95; Daniel H. Usner Jr., 
American Indians in the Lower Mississippi Valley: Social and Economic Histories (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1998), 35.  
23 Johnson, “The Chickasaws,” 85. 
24 Christina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 58-67.  
25 Joseph L Peyser., ed. Letters from New France: The Upper Country, 1686-1783 (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1992), 114-115.  
10 
 
relations deteriorated, the French joined their Native allies in opposition to the 
Chickasaws.26  
The Chickasaw Nation held an influential place on the continent and British 
officials wanted them to continue doing so. South Carolina sent traders overland along 
the Lower Trade Path and the Upper Trade Path which both extended east-west from 
the Atlantic to Chickasaw villages and beyond.27 Initially predicated on the Indian slave 
trade, and sustained by exchange of deerskins thereafter, the British-Chickasaw 
partnership developed into a military alliance over time.28 For their part, British officials 
encouraged Chickasaw raids on French river traffic and sent aid when massive French 
and Indian armies threatened to destroy the embattled nation in 1736 and 1739. The duo 
again collaborated during the Seven Years’ War (1754-1763) and to a much lesser 
extent during the American Revolution (1775-1783). Chickasaw historiography and that 
of Southeastern Native Americans traditionally place a great deal of emphasis on the 
endurance of the Chickasaws’ alliance with Britain. 
Geopolitics has played a major role in these discussions, and rightly so. Arrell 
Gibson’s book, The Chickasaws, documents the interplay of Chickasaw relations with 
non-Native nations. One after another, France, Britain, Spain, and the United States 
sought Chickasaw allies, creating competing factions within the nation, which he argues 
“contributed to the subtle conquest of personal and public Chickasaw honor and 
                                                          
26 Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 30-31; Usner, American Indians in the Lower Mississippi 
Valley, 23-32; Gibson, The Chickasaws, 42-57.  
27 Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 153. 
28 For the development of initial Chickasaw-British trade relations see Ethridge, From Chicaza to 
Chickasaw, 167-168; Johnson and others, “Measuring Chickasaw Adaptation,” 4-7; Dawson Phelps, “The 




independence.”29 James Atkinson’s history of the Chickasaws, Splendid Land, Splendid 
People, chronicles the details of these competing interests. Much of Gibson’s overview 
and Atkinson’s narrative focus on the Chickasaws’ location between competing 
European empires.30 The brief articles in Chickasaw Lives, compiled by tribal historian 
Richard Green, often touch on this subject, as well as on the “indivisible” nature of 
Chickasaw culture and religion.31 However, the format does not allow for thematic 
connections to emerge. For her part, Wendy St. Jean adopts a “path-centered analysis” 
to explore the geopolitical realities shaping Chickasaw alliances. She demonstrates how 
intercultural exchange and networking assured “unhindered access to European trade.”32 
These histories all consider the Chickasaws’ position along the Mississippi River and 
certain socio-religious aspects of their lives.  
What has gone unseen are the ways the Chickasaws’ own history and their 
understanding of the Mississippi River helped to shape foreign and domestic 
relationships. As elsewhere in Native North America, land did not function as a 
definitive asset bound to one particular nation. Historian Michael Witgen astutely points 
out, “It was instead a shared resource where use rights were claimed, negotiated, and 
exercised as part of the lived relationships that people forged with one another in the 
process of creating landscape and social identity.”33 Indian polities did not own land or 
                                                          
29 Arrell M. Gibson, The Chickasaws (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), 58.  
30 Situated on the “contested boundaries between colonial domains” the Chickasaws could engage with 
multiple colonial powers. This makes their homeland a quintessential “borderland” although they 
certainly would not have felt that way. Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to 
Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History,” The American 
Historical Review 104, no. 3 (June, 1999): 816.  
31 Richard Green, Chickasaw Lives vols. 1-3 (Ada, OK: Chickasaw Press, 2010): III, 217.  
32 St. Jean, “Trading Paths,” 13.  
33 Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 20.  
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rivers per se, but rather maintained specific sections as their domain. Around the Great 
Lakes, according to Heidi Bohaker, “who had access to which land and to which 
resources, who could pass freely through a given space, and who was subject to taxes or 
tolls was answered by a complex nexus of kinship connections and alliances.”34 These 
same principles applied in the Southwest as well. Native polities defined territorial 
boundaries using rivers and woodlands throughout the region. “Everywhere lay zones 
and lines to be crossed only at great peril,” Juliana Barr states.35 Like street signs, 
environmental features oriented those who could “read” them.  
Rivers delineated bounded spaces in Chickasaw Country as well. The 
Mississippi marked the inception of their nation and its western limits. Having gained 
an intimate appreciation for the river’s seasonality, its movements, and its impact upon 
the land, they were able to defend their claim to the Mississippi River. At times 
Chickasaw warriors policed the waterway, stopping those who did not heed signals 
proclaiming ‘Do Not Enter.’ Yet the Mississippi was not a historical precursor to the 
modern-day border fence. Non-Chickasaws were not barred from its waters. Those who 
built social, political, and economic relationships with the Chickasaws could share the 
riverine landscape. In these cases the Mississippi became a conduit, rather than a 
partition, providing a physical link and an imaginative bond. Chickasaw ancestors 
became one people at the Mississippi and so too might others join with them and share 
in the practice of place making.  
                                                          
34 Heidi Bohaker, “‘Nindoodemag’: The Significance of Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Eastern 
Great Lakes region, 1600-1701. The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), 42.   
35 Juliana Barr, “Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the ‘Borderlands’ of the Early 
Southwest,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan. 2011), 44-45.  
13 
 
The Chickasaw Nation had its claim to the Mississippi River challenged by 
colonial competition. European rivalries spilled into the Mississippi Valley and altered 
Chickasaw actions on the Mississippi. In the 1720s Chickasaw warriors began 
conducting raids, between Louisiana and Illinois, on individual French voyageurs as 
well as official government convoys. Some of these attacks occurred extemporaneously, 
but others were part of coordinated military and diplomatic strategies. Chickasaws 
struck French travelers during periods of discord to impede the delivery of goods and 
weaponry to colonial outposts and their Native nemeses. The use of force also 
reaffirmed Chickasaw authority and provided a means to end hostilities.  
Chickasaws, at times, intentionally captured Frenchmen on the Mississippi 
River and marched them back to Chickasaw villages where the captives were 
ceremoniously spared. Such efforts symbolically transformed the French outsiders into 
insiders. Detainees were often delivered to French officials and acted as proxies for 
Chickasaw headmen. Former captives became cultural mediators bearing specific 
messages from the Chickasaws offering instruction on the reciprocal rights and 
expectations of those who traversed the Mississippi River.36 The return of such 
prisoners marked the initial salvo in a process of relationship building intended to 
restore peace, establish commercial exchanges, and define communal space within the 
riverine landscape.  
People and rivers could transform relationships as might the places associated 
with them. Chickasaw warriors utilized the topographical advantages at Sakti Lhafa’ to 
                                                          
36 My thinking on the subject of go-betweens is greatly indebted to James H. Merrell’s award winning 
book Into the American Woods. See James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the 
Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 28-41. 
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target French pirogues in the 1740s and 1750s after peace overtures failed. When their 
British allies requested the same service during the American Revolution they proved 
hesitant. The strategic benefits of Sakti Lhafa’ might be shared with allies, but they 
served Chickasaw interests first.  Knowing the Bluffs’ military value Spain and the 
United States both vied for Chickasaw allegiance after the war. Factions within the 
Chickasaw Nation exploited this rivalry to receive annual presents and build trade 
relations but neither would agree to part with Sakti Lhafa’. That place lent its name to 
the Mississippi which, in turn, gave definition to their history. Unique environmental 
features there combined water, earth, and sky like no other place in Chickasaw Country, 
and warriors defended the people there. However, in 1795 when events seemed to 
threaten their existence, a majority of the Chickasaw Nation agreed to cede the lower 
portion of Sakti Lhafa’. In doing so they entrusted the Spanish with an invaluable place, 
a portion of their very being, so that it might continue to define their home east of the 
Mississippi River.  
The significance of Native Americans’ place-based histories cannot be 
overstated, and yet they have largely been relegated to cameo appearances in the stories 
we historians tell. For example, Richard White challenged us to appreciate the “cultural 
conventions” at the heart of The Middle Ground. Through “cooperation or consent of 
foreigners” rather than “force,” he argued, people from diverse cultures lived together 
and maintained political relations in the pays d’en haut.37 Since that time historians 
have uncovered, or imagined, middle grounds throughout North America.38 In addition, 
                                                          
37 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-
1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 52-53. 
38 Philip J. Deloria, “What is the Middle Ground, Anyway?” The William and Mary Quarterly vol. 63, no. 
1 (Jan., 2006), 15-22. 
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we have debated The Divided Ground, The Native Ground, and points in between.39 
This discussion has been extremely fruitful for better understanding colonial 
interactions, but in the process we have all too often overlooked the ground itself. Of 
course the work of Alfred Crosby and William Cronon in The Columbian Exchange and 
Changes in the Land, respectively, have made environmental factors a facet in how we 
theorize about colonialism.40 Historians have come to recognize the divergent ways 
Native Americans and Europeans utilized land and natural resources. More recently, in 
Comanche Empire, Pekka Hämäläinen masterfully demonstrated how the grasses of the 
southern plains fueled “a formidable equestrian power,” and James Rice has shown the 
insights to be gained when environmental, Native American, and colonial history are 
considered in unison.41 However, Vine Deloria Jr. and Keith Basso each made it clear 
that it is essential to understand how Native Americans conceptualized the landscapes in 
which they lived. The socio-religious dynamics of Native homelands have yet to be 
fully integrated into Native American, American, or environmental history. Few 
scholars have tried to understand how the “sacred geographies” of Native peoples 
actually effected intercultural relations during the eighteenth century.42 When we do 
                                                          
39 Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American 
Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knope, 2006); Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and 
Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
40 Alfred W. Crosby Jr., The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492, 30th 
Anniversary ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003); William Cronon, Changes in the Land: 
Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England, 20th Anniversary ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2003).   
41 Pekka Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 1; James D. Rice, 
Nature and History in the Potomac Country: From Hunter-Gatherers to the Age of Jefferson (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).  
42 Vine Deloria Jr., God is Red: A Native View of Religion, 30th Anniversary ed. (Golden, CO: Fulcrum 
Publishing, 2003), 121; Keith Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the 
Western Apache (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996). 
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cover this “ground” it becomes apparent that we must consider the importance of water 
as well.43 
With more focus placed on Native Americans’ engagement with their 
landscapes-- how they thought about, created, and utilized places—we can better 
understand “Native perspectives.” This is a daunting task, but by concentrating on a 
distinctive feature or two within a particular people’s homeland, historians can produce 
a fuller vision of these Native worlds. A methodological approach that treats 
environmental dynamics, oral traditions, Native cosmologies, and American Indian 
religions equal to social, political, and economic considerations is necessary to 
accomplish this goal. Though difficult, and gaps are sure to remain, piecing together 
these worldviews will be like discovering a lost trove of documents in the archives. Old 
queries will receive new answers and original questions will arise.   
Therefore, I set out to investigate eighteenth century Chickasaw relations with 
the Mississippi River. Although most Chickasaw villages were clustered around 
modern-day Tupelo, MS, Chickasaws routinely travelled over a hundred miles to the 
waterway. Despite the distance they were skilled canoeists, and the muddy river 
remained a mainstay in the Chickasaw migration legend. Why? To find the answers 
necessitates employing the multidimensional approach described above. The 
Chickasaws have the reputation of being the least documented of the “Five Civilized 
Tribes,” and the primary sources that do exist are written in French, English, and 
                                                          
43 The insights to be gained when we consider water seriously is evident in recent scholarship by Lisa 
Brooks, Matt Bahar, and Joshua Reid. See Brooks, The Common Pot; Matt Bahar, “People of the Dawn, 
People of the Door: Indian Pirates and the Violent Theft of an Atlantic World,” Journal of American 
History vol. 101 no.2 (September 2014), 401-426; Joshua L. Reid, The Sea is My Country: The Maritime 
World of the Makahs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).  
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Spanish. Chickasaws were also reluctant to accept Christian missionaries in their midst, 
so the available records are dominated by economic, political, and military concerns of 
European traders, diplomats, and soldiers. Nevertheless, compiling snippets from these 
sources in addition to serious consideration of Mississippi River hydrology and 
topography, Chickasaw legends, and the cosmological and religious beliefs shared by 
Southeastern Native Americans produces an assemblage of evidence that speaks to 
Chickasaw conceptions of the Mississippi River. This knowledge leads to a richer 
understanding of the Chickasaw homeland and Chickasaw history. Furthermore, the 
fruits of this research demonstrate the advances historians can make when we consider 
the multidimensional relationships Native peoples maintained with their environments, 
and how these too impacted the intercultural exchanges that occurred during colonial 
expansion.   
If we acknowledge the Mississippi River’s place in Chickasaw society, as well 
as the Chickasaws’ position near it, then several different histories emerge. Two 
thematic and two chronological chapters document some of these stories. They are 
meant to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive, to showcase the diverse ways 
Chickasaws imagined, managed, and manipulated the Mississippi River. Therefore, 
chapter one utilizes sources from four centuries to explore the Mississippi’s role in the 
creation of Chickasaw geography and history. This shaped ideas about their own 
distinctiveness and the world(s) in which they lived. Chapter two investigates 
environmental components of the Mississippi, Chickasaw recognition of such, and the 
ways both impacted pirogue travel. In particular, two Chickasaw maps, from 1723 and 
1737 respectively, illustrate these issues and render geopolitical statements about 
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Chickasaw capacity to utilize the Mississippi River System. Chapter three highlights 
two specific instances of Chickasaw river diplomacy. In 1735 and 1743 Chickasaw war 
parties intentionally captured French travelers on the Mississippi River in order to 
redefine the Chickasaw Nation’s relationship with France and, in the process, create a 
shared landscape. While these events took place within a decade, chapter four covers a 
more extensive timeframe. In the second half of the eighteenth century how Chickasaws 
utilized the topographical advantages of Sakti Lhafa’ changed.  Though the threat of 
military force remained, the Chickasaw Bluffs became a bargaining chip as factions 
within the Chickasaw Nation pursued alliances with Britain, Spain, and the United 
States. Eventually the Chickasaws were forced to part with a portion of Sakti Lhafa’ as 
they fought to safeguard their homeland along the Mississippi River. 
As a whole these chapters underscore the importance of the Mississippi to the 
Chickasaws and its multifaceted roles in their history. As James Taylor Carson points 
out, the “native landscape” consisted of more than just bordered space; it was “a 
cultural and a moral space, a place where mythical beings, ancestral spirits, daily life, 
and geopolitical concerns coexisted and interplayed.”44 Chickasaws invested 
significance in a myriad of rivers, rocks, trees, and prairies throughout their country. It 
was the place their ancestors were buried and their memories lingered. For Chickasaws, 
the Mississippi River was a boundary and an intermediary that served as an integral part 
of their cultural geography.  
                                                          
44 James Taylor Carson, “Ethnogeography and the Native American Past,” Ethnohistory, Vol. 49, No. 4 
(Fall 2002), 783. 
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Though visually striking, the riverine landscape was far more than a scenic 
backdrop. Reverend Humes said that upon its discovery “the astonished people stood on 
the riverbank and stared in awe at the mighty watercourse. They called the giant river 
misha sipokoni (beyond all age).” 45 Thereafter, it became an active participant in their 
lives. It influenced how they thought about their ancestors and the world in which they 
lived. They learned how it moved and the course it took, effecting when, where, and 
how they traveled as well as the natural resources available to them. Its distinctive 
environmental features, particularly Sakti Lhafa’, became a part of their place-world 
too. Ugulayacabé even went so far as to declare he and other Chickasaws “love[d] that 
place.” He identified the Mississippi with the Bluffs and all they stood for. 
Encompassing aspects of history, philosophy, geography, theology, potamology, 
politics, economics, and military strategy, there is no doubt the Mississippi River bore 
influence on Chickasaws’ perspectives. Knowing the past Chickasaws shared with Sakti 
Lhafa’ Okhina’ helps us understand their relationship with the Chickasaw homeland. 
This knowledge, in turn, provides new insights into the ways Chickasaws attempted to 




                                                          
45 Humes recounted the Chickasaw people called the Mississippi misha sipokoni, which is translated as 
“beyond all age” in “The Legend of the Big White Dog and the Sacred Pole.” Pamela Munro and 
Catherine Willmond did not include this terminology in Chickasaw: An Analytical Dictionary (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1994). Linguist John Dyson claims the Chickasaw name for the 
Mississippi was Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’ meaning “scored bluff waterway.” See Dyson, “Chickasaw Village 





Figure 1: Chickasaw Nation Map, ca. 18th century. William C. Sturtevant, National 
atlas. Indian tribes, cultures & languages: [United States] / William C. Sturtevant, 
Smithsonian Institution, 1967. Reston, VA: Interior, Geological Survey, 1991. The 
Mississippi River delineated the Chickasaw’s western border and other rivers similarly 
demarcated the extent of Chickasaw Country. The Ohio River bordered the nation to the 
north, the Tennessee River to the east, and the headwaters of the Tombigbee River 
marked their southern terminus. For more on Chickasaw borders see Gibson, The 
Chickasaws, 6; Cegielski and Lieb, “Hina’ Falaa, ‘The Long Path,’” 28-29; Wendy St. 
Jean, “Trading Paths: Chickasaw Diplomacy in the Greater Southeast, 1690s-1790s” 





Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’ 
 
“This Chickasaw legend of The Beginning goes like this,” esteemed elder 
Reverend Jesse Humes began. Although migration legends varied by orator Humes’s 
description of how the Chickasaws came to reside in their northern Mississippi 
homelands is a fairly standard account. As with his telling, the legend typically follows 
a similar format and proceeds something like this: In the primordial past their ancestors 
“lived somewhere in the West.” Under duress “they sought guidance from Ubabeneli, 
The Creator of all things” who “made sacred” a long pole to direct them to “a new 
home where they could find peace and happiness.” Each night when they camped their 
leaders placed the pole erect in the ground. Invariably the next morning, “the long pole 
was closely inspected and found to be leaning toward the east” indicating their course of 
travel. This scene repeated itself for a long time until “one day, just as the sun was 
setting” the people “came upon a scene beyond their imagination. It was a great river 
the likes of which they had never seen before, and the unexpected sight overwhelmed 
them.” They had come to the Mississippi River, or as eighteenth century Chickasaws 
called this river Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’. Still the long pole “leaned toward the east” and 
so the people “knew that ‘home’ was somewhere on the other side of the wide, wide 
river before them.” Soon afterwards “the sacred long pole stood straight as an arrow,” 
signaling “that at last they had found their new homeland and that their long journey 
was at an end.”1  
                                                          
1 Humes, “The Legend of the Big White Dog and the Sacred Pole.” 
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Rev. Humes’ version of the migration legend has been preserved and 
perpetuated by the Chickasaw Nation, although it is not the first or only rendition of this 
journey. Since time immemorable Chickasaw people have told and retold of their 
ancient expedition. It may have once been passed down in a single narrative form, but 
written accounts vary considerably in detail. Nevertheless, these legends share certain 
tenets and are a testament to the endurance of oral traditions. These were not just 
stories. They were Chickasaw truths--their history.  
Chronological time and cultural distance unquestionably obscure far more than 
these legends reveal. Written accounts were individually recorded over the course of the 
last three centuries. Throughout that time authors, in diverse locations, penned versions 
for various audiences. The writers’ personal sentiments, cultural values, and religious 
beliefs undoubtedly colored how they heard and then documented the legend. Language 
barriers also filtered many of the descriptions we are left with. Such critical information 
is all too often missing from the historical record. Driven by their own motivations 
traders, missionaries, settlers, anthropologists, and Chickasaws put pen to paper 
chronicling the tradition. As this process unfolded newer accounts may have been 
influenced by older reports, compounding the problem of transmission. Therefore, 
scholars face serious limitations when employing these legends to envision the past.  
Yet when comprehensively analyzed and utilized in conjunction with other 
sources, Chickasaw migration legends offer exciting new angles from which to view 
history. By comparing these legends to one another it becomes evident they share 
common topographical references, spatial orientation, and cultural themes. The 
consistency with which the Mississippi River is referenced demonstrates the waterway’s 
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importance to the Chickasaw people. Their migration legend contains multiple 
associations layered and submerged within the content. As such, concepts from 
geography, anthropology, linguistics, and astronomy produce diverse insights. It is true 
that records of this legend have not reached the present “untainted” by various means, 
but they are not devoid of value. Enough continuity exists to explain how eighteenth 
century Chickasaws might have related to the Mississippi River.  
Native peoples throughout North America employed physical references in 
storytelling. According to Vine Deloria Jr., Indian nations merge history and geography 
creating “sacred geography” throughout their lands.2 Topographical features were 
ascribed meaning transfiguring the environment into a visual mnemonic. For those who 
knew the stories, the landscape invoked moral tales, social frameworks, triumph, and 
tragedy. As anthropologist Keith Basso contends, “instances of place-making consist in 
an adventitious fleshing out of historical material that culminates in a posited state of 
affairs, a particular universe of objects and events – in short, a place-world – wherein 
portions of the past are brought into being.”3 Southeastern migration legends are not an 
exact historical account—few sources are—but they were central to this production of 
place. 
For the initiated, the landscape merged home and history, the sacred and 
mundane, at once communal and deeply personal. In a sense the people and land 
become one entity. Basso explains, “For Indian men and women, the past lies embedded 
in features of the earth– in canyons and lakes, mountains and arroyos, rocks and vacant 
                                                          
2 Deloria, God is Red, 121. 
3 Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places, 6.  
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fields– which together endow their lands with multiple forms of significance that reach 
into their lives and shape the ways they think. Knowledge of places is therefore closely 
linked to knowledge of the self.”4 Though scholars have overlooked the Mississippi’s 
importance to the Chickasaws, they invested the river with the same kind of historic 
significance Basso identified among the Western Apache people. 
Perpetuating the collective memory of their migration helped define Chickasaw 
homelands relative to the Mississippi. At the same time, it secured political and social 
bonds within the nation. They were not the only Southeastern polity to use oral 
traditions in this way. From the trauma of the sixteenth century arose many migration 
accounts. “As etiological myths pertaining to social entities,” Patricia Galloway argues, 
“the migration legends explaining the formation of southeastern tribes must explain also 
the origins of their political economies, establishing their claims to nationhood through 
cosmological references and claims to land through geographical ones.”5 Angela Pulley 
Hudson has shown Creeks employed such accounts to construct “a mental map that 
combined geography and history and coded the landscape according to their 
experiences within it.”6 The Choctaws similarly followed suit. A mound called Nanih 
Waiya “gave birth to the Choctaws” and, James Carson explains, for them “there is no 
more important place on earth.”7 Throughout the Southeast legends worked to 
demarcate territorial, political, and social boundaries. 
                                                          
4 Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places, 34.  
5 Galloway, Choctaw Genesis, 324-325.  
6 Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads, 14.  
7 James Taylor Carson, Searching for the Bright Path: The Mississippi Choctaws from Prehistory to 
Removal (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 8.  
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Chickasaw migration legends demonstrate the Mississippi situated them in both 
place and time. As the storyteller gradually progresses the river comes to separate West 
from East. Traditionally, once the people crossed the muddy waterway they reached 
lands destined for them. At this point a new era of history began. The Mississippi’s 
rushing currents swept away their old lives, literally and figuratively separating the 
Chickasaws from their past. Ancient history dwelled in the West while the modern age 
unfolded east of the Great River. Thereafter the Mississippi conjoined topography and 
history, creating a Chickasaw place-world.  
Sovereignty and identity were closely related to geography and chronology. 
According to their origin stories the migrants became recognizably “Chickasaw” after 
crossing the Mississippi and settling to its east. As an independent political body they 
established the river as a border. Anthropologists propose socially distinctive clan and 
house names also marked this transition. Likewise, Chickasaw terms differentiating 
segments of the Mississippi outlined their autonomy along the river’s channel. 
Combining insights from the fields of history, ethnography, and linguistics highlights 
the political and social importance of the Mississippi for Chickasaws.   
Each telling of their migration story staked a physical claim to the river, but the 
legend’s implications extended into metaphysics too. In general bodies of water were 
important to the worldview of Southeastern Native Americans. As corridors to the 
Under World, located beneath the earth, they commanded respect. The Great Serpent 
ruled these waterways and could make crossing them untenable. Furthermore, this same 
being reigned over “the white dog’s road” which ushered deceased Chickasaws to the 
hereafter along the Milky Way. Several migration legends claim the Chickasaws lost a 
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white dog in the Mississippi River while trying to pass over. Striking associations link 
this tragedy to the Great Serpent, thereby further embedding spiritual affairs within the 
Mississippi’s muddy waters.  
It is impossible for us to see the past with certainty, but migration legends help 
give shape to Chickasaw constructs centered on the Mississippi River. They provide a 
glimpse of the real and imagined landscapes comprising the homeland of those who 
knew it best. For them, the river split terrain and time, defined places and people, and 
transcended worlds. This imagery adds needed depth and dimension to Chickasaw 
history. From this vantage point, the Chickasaws’ “sacred geography” began on the 
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Thomas Nairne 1708 Chickasaw Y N N 
Bernard Romans 1771 Chickasaw N N N 
James Adair 1775 Chickasaw Y Y N 
Joseph Colbert 
(Chickasaw)/          Joseph 
Bullen 1800 Chickasaw N N N 
Henry Schoolcraft 1851 Chickasaw Y Y Y 
H.B. Cushman 1899 Choctaw Y Y N 
Peter Folsom (Choctaw) 1899 Choctaw N Y N 
Gideon Lincecum 1904 Choctaw Y Y N 
Molly Gunn (Chickasaw)/                 
Cyrus Harris (Chickasaw)  1904 Chickasaw N Y Y* 
T.C. Stewart 1904 Chickasaw Y Y N 
Benjamin Hawkins 1904 Chickasaw N N N 
Charles Carter 
(Chickasaw)/ 
James Malone  1922 Chickasaw Y Y Y 
Zeno McCurtain 
(Chickasaw) 1928 Chickasaw Y Y Y 
Jesse Humes (Chickasaw)/              
Robert Kingsberry 
(Chickasaw)  2003** Chickasaw Y Y Y 
   
   Y = The detail is included. N = The detail is not included.  
   * = The Chickasaws had a large war dog that protected them from the French. 
** = The legend was recorded in the mid-twentieth century. John Paul included it in his                                                             
dissertation on Chickasaw identity in 2003, although without citation. For the present study, 
the version of Humes’ story available on the Chickasaw Nation website was utilized.   
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“This Chickasaw legend of The Beginning goes like this” 
 
 Chickasaw storytellers commonly oriented their migration legends around the 
Mississippi River. In these narratives the waterway transforms lateral movement into 
place. The Mississippi becomes the defining feature allowing listeners to conceptualize 
the migrants’ location. What had been merely directions, west and east, transforms into 
destinations, West and East, after the people reach the river. Imagining the migrants’ 
whereabouts is impractical before this momentous juncture. Recalling their crossing 
also produced chronology, although absent a concrete day, month, or year. 
Organizationally the Mississippi became an unforgettable “date” in history. Their 
passing symbolically denoted the end of one era and the dawn of another. For 
Chickasaws who told and heard the story, the riverine landscape created spatiality and 
marked time. Orality and geography combined to invoke faraway places of bygone eras 
and local haunts in contemporary times. As such the Mississippi River served as both a 
map and historical text. While Chickasaw migration legends varied, in certain regards, 
the river's primacy remained a constant. 
 Chickasaw origin stories are not unlike that of the Creek and Choctaw. These 
Muskogean nations share a common understanding of their migration from west to east 
in another age.8 In some versions the legend relates how the Muskogeans trekked 
eastward as one, only to separate and become individual nations. Explanations of how 
this division occurred diverge widely, but the course of their movement from west to 
                                                          




east is unwavering. Each nation maintains it once lived in the west but moved east 
where they adopted new homelands.  
The cardinal directions generally held great significance for Native Americans 
and the inhabitants of the Southeast were no different. They associated each direction 
with a particular color and certain defining characteristics. For the Cherokee, as other 
Southeastern peoples, blue often represented cold, defeat, and the North. In contrast, 
whiteness, warmth, and peace existed in the South. They also correlated the West with 
blackness, since the souls of their ancestors resided in that direction. Alternatively, the 
color red symbolized the blood of life that sprung from the sun’s rays in the East.9 As 
the point of the sunrise that direction embodied birth, just as the location of the sunset 
represented death. These correlations were common throughout the Southeastern 
cultural area and shared by the Chickasaws. Orienting the migration legends according 
to this directional understanding, Muskogeans left their old lives behind to begin again 
in the East.10 Those who moved towards the sunrise experienced a rebirth along the 
way, assuming new identities as distinct peoples in the process.  
The earliest written records of the Chickasaw migration legend demonstrate the 
Mississippi’s importance to the Chickasaw people. The first description of the 
Chickasaws’ account comes from Thomas Nairne. On April 12, 1708 he wrote in his 
journal, “They (as all others) came over the Missisipi from the N: West and cane give 
                                                          
9 Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 20; John Dyson recently argued the color red associated with the 
east is a lighter “peace red” than the dark red often associated with blood in Muskogean societies. This 
“second redness” represented the sun’s warmth that gave and sustained life on earth. See John Dyson, 
The Early Chickasaw Homeland, 75-77.   
10 Amelia Bell Walker, “The Kasihta Myth,” Anthropology Tomorrow 12 (1979), 56; Dyson, The Early 
Chickasaw Homeland, 35.  
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little more Account of their Originall but have been here a considerable time.”11 
Nairne’s barebones description leaves much to the imagination, yet it reveals what must 
have been considered essential information. The Chickasaws originated from the 
nebulous northwest before crossing the Mississippi River, the sole topographical 
reference in an otherwise Spartan description. 
 Two generations later this form continued to hold true. While living amongst the 
Chickasaws between 1744 and 1768, British trader James Adair heard told how they 
followed a “sanctified rod” moving “towards the sun-rising, till it budded in one night’s 
time” indicating they had reached the right spot. Although he personally doubted the 
story’s legitimacy Adair noted, “the miracle took place after they arrived to this side of 
the Mississippi, on the present land they possess.”12 The land he mentioned, the ground 
on which he and the Chickasaws resided, lay east of the Mississippi River. Another 
eighteenth century account from Bernard Romans recounts, “they [Chickasaws] 
themselves have a tradition that they were a colony from another nation in the West” 
before moving near the Ohio River and on “to their present site.”13 The Chickasaws 
made a brief stop, according to Romans, but the initial move west to east remains the 
same.  
The legend recorded by Henry Schoolcraft in the first half of the nineteenth 
century positioned the Chickasaw similarly. He claimed, “By tradition, they say they 
                                                          
11 Thomas Nairne, Nairne’s Muskhogean Journals: The 1708 Expedition to the Mississippi River, ed.  
Alexander Moore (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1988), 36. 
12 James Adair, The History of the American Indians; Particularly Those Nations adjoining to the 
Missisippi, East and West Florida, Georgia, South and North Carolina, and Virginia (London: Printed 
for Edward and Charles Dilly, 1775), 163.   




came from the West” moving eastward guided by a pole. “They continued their journey 
in this way until they crossed the great Mississippi River,” moving several more times 
until they reached “what is called the Chickasaw Old Fields.”14   All of the stories 
explain how the Chickasaws came to occupy their homelands in present-day 
Mississippi. Three of these legends oriented the listener using the Mississippi River to 
divide west from east, while Romans cited the Ohio, the major tributary of Sakti Lhafa’ 
Okhina’ which formed the northern border of Chickasaw Country. 
Two legends chronicled in the 1820s also place the Chickasaws’ migration on 
either side of the Mississippi River. One of the accounts, derived from “facts” gathered 
by Rev. T.C. Stewart, names the Mississippi as the only landmark during their entire 
trek. Stewart began work as a missionary amongst the Chickasaws in 1821 and 
according to his notary Rev. F. Patton, “tradition says that the Chickasaws and 
Choctaws were once one tribe and lived in the West.” Determining to move, “they 
divided into two parties, under the head of Chickasaw and Choctaw, two brothers. The 
brothers, after crossing the Mississippi River, separated, but settled in contiguous 
territory.”15 In this transitory account the river clearly defines west from east.  
Like Stewart, Gideon Lincecum moved to Mississippi prior to the Indian 
Removal Act (1830) and socialized with Choctaw and Chickasaw individuals. After 
settling in the region around 1818, Lincecum and his family had frequent contact with 
members of both Indian nations. In the early 1820s Lincecum attempted to make a 
                                                          
14 Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Condition and 
Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo and Co. 1851), 309.  
15 Harry Warren, “Chickasaw Traditions, Customs, Etc.” Publications of the Mississippi Historical 
Society, VIII (1904), 547.  
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record of “traditional” Choctaw history as told to him by Chahta Immataha.16 
Lincecum’s informant maintained that the Chickasaws and Choctaws separated in the 
west during their migration eastward. The Choctaws were said to have gone their own 
way while “the Chickashas [sic] diverged widely to the left, found an extremely rough 
and scarce country for some time, but at length emerging from the mountains on to the 
wide spread plains, they found the buffalo and other game plentiful.” They continued 
onward, “until they came to the great river, at the place called by them, sakti ahlopulli” 
where they crossed and continued until finally “the leader’s pole came to stand at a 
place now called Chickasha Old Town in a high and beautiful country.”17 Lincecum’s 
documentation traces the migration west to east specifying only the Mississippi River in 
an otherwise nameless expanse of mountains and prairie grass. Though longer than 
Stewart’s story, this account still depends on the river to provide spatiality.  
 In extended versions of the Chickasaws’ migration legend, the Mississippi River 
frequently serves as the sole reference point in an otherwise formless landscape.  “For 
weeks and months [the Chickasaws and Choctaws] journeyed toward the east,” H.B. 
Cushman relays, “passing over wide extended plains and through forests vast and 
                                                          
16 Greg O’Brian, “Gideon Lincecum (1793-1874): Mississippi Pioneer and Man of Many Talents,” 
Mississippi History Now: An Online Publication of the Mississippi Historical Society (Posted Sept. 2004) 
accessed Jan. 22, 2015 http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/82/gideon-lincecum-1793-1874-
mississippi-pioneer-and-man-of-many-talents. Lincecum’s complete history of the Choctaws often 
drawing doubts about its authenticity. Patricia Galloway has even referred to Lincecum as an 
“accomplished con artist” whose manuscript compares to the “remedies of a medicine-show scam with 
mysterious Indian cures.” However, other historians have been more willing to place faith in Lincecum’s 
work. See Galloway, Choctaw Genesis, 332-333; Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-
1830 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 12-14, 19, 45, 115-116; James Taylor Carson, 
Searching for the Bright Path, 143. 
17 Sakti ahlopulli identifies the place where the Chickasaws crossed the Mississippi River according to 
Lincecum’s informant. The term is discussed in greater detail on p. 54. Gideon Lincecum, “Choctaw 
Traditions and Their Settlement in Mississippi and the Origin of Their Mounds.” Publications of the 
Mississippi Historical Society 8, (1904), 539.  
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abounding with game.” And then unexpectedly, “after many months of wearisome 
travel, suddenly a vast body of flowing water stretched its mighty arm athwart their 
path. With unfeigned astonishment they gathered in groups upon its banks and gazed 
upon it turbid waters. Never before had they even heard of, or in all their wandering 
stumbled upon aught like this.” Having arrived at the Mississippi the people were sure 
they had finally reached their new home. Cushman’s informants tell how the people fell 
“silent and motionless” when the sacred pole directed them across the currents. 
“Whence again was resumed their eastward march” until the sacred pole finally stood 
straight near the Yazoo River.18 The amorphous plains and forests provide a backdrop 
for the migration, but only the Mississippi positions the story in topographical space. 
Ill-defined expanses in the West give way as the people cross the river and find their 
new homeland just to the east.  
 John Swanton’s interpreter Zeno McCurtain transcribed one of the lengthier 
versions of the Chickasaw migration legend while doing fieldwork amongst the nation 
in the first decades of the twentieth century. His rendition of the story begins on “the 
continent of Asia” where the Chickasaws’ ancestors began migrating eastward crossing 
the Bering Strait into North America before settling in “the neighborhood of Montana.” 
McCurtain’s story is clearly influenced by historical and archaeological theories of the 
time concerning the peopling of the Americas during the last Ice Age. However, the 
second half of the legend returns to a more familiar form. Having determined to move 
east the proto-Chickasaws “came to a prairie country” filled with “numerous wild 
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animals.” This nondescript grassland is only broken by an unmistakable geographical 
reference. “When they reached the Mississippi River they camped upon it banks for 
some time,” we are informed, before the people constructed rafts and crossed over. 
Given this cue the listener intuitively locates the prairie environs west of the river. 
Having passed over the waterway, “they kept on…for many days, until finally the pole 
was found standing perfectly erect.”19 The sacred pole directed the Chickasaws to their 
new country, but only reference to the Mississippi situates that territory in the East for 
listeners and readers alike.  
 While certain aspects of the migration legend have changed over time, 
Chickasaw movement in relation to the Mississippi River has remained constant. 
Twentieth century versions told by Charles Carter and Jesse Humes explicitly detail the 
Chickasaws’ arrival at the river. Carter wrote to James Malone informing him that the 
Chickasaws began their trek “west of the Mississippi” and “that when the traveling 
hosts first saw the great river, they were amazed.” Directed by the leader’s pole to cross 
over, the Chickasaws soon found their place. Here in the East the sacred pole “finally 
stood erect, and the medicine men interpreted this as an omen that the promised land 
had been reached.” 20  
Humes also describes the impression the Mississippi made on the people after 
passing through an otherwise characterless landscape. The Chickasaws and Choctaws 
began traveling “in the direction of the rising sun” moving gradually each day “through 
the homelands of other red people” and “foreign domains.” This generic description 
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creates the sense of a lengthy journey through space and time without specifying either. 
“Days turned into weeks, weeks into months, and months into years. And then one day, 
just as the sun was setting, the two parties of Indians came upon a scene beyond their 
imagination. It was a great river, the likes of which they had never seen before, and the 
unexpected sight overwhelmed them,” Humes said. After rafting across and continuing 
east “some weeks later” the Chickasaws split with the Choctaws and found their “place 
in the vicinity of the present-day towns of Pontotoc and Tupelo, Mississippi.”21 Humes 
demarcated the experience of crossing the Mississippi River from all other stream and 
river crossings that, presumably, took place over years of travel. The site of the people’s 
journey only becomes clear on the Mississippi’s muddy banks. As with the other 
legends discussed, this river is the only defining geographical feature separating west 
from east in Humes’ telling.     
In fact, nine of the fourteen migration legends [told over the course of several 
centuries] orient Chickasaw movements via the Mississippi River. This represents a 
great deal of continuity despite the length of time and changing circumstances 
surrounding their collection. As with most forms of storytelling a certain degree of 
variation is expected.22 Joseph Colbert and Molly Gunn, for example, each provide 
exceptionally short accounts of the legend. Neither individual used topographical 
references, but both utilized the cardinal directions to align their versions on the east-
west axis. Peter Folsom, a Choctaw man, named Nanih Waiya Creek as the sole 
landmark in his rendition of the joint Chickasaw-Choctaw migration. Choctaw versions 
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2003), 24.  
36 
 
sometimes use Nanih Waiya, a sacred mound, to ground the story in a particular place.23 
However, most Chickasaw stories rely on the Mississippi River to serve this purpose. 
For over three hundred years, from the eighteenth through the twentieth century, 
Chickasaw storytellers have defined their ancestors’ migration relative to the 
Mississippi River. This is not a historical anomaly.  
Orators create a narrative map while telling the migration legend, but it only 
takes shape after they delineate the Mississippi as a definable place in the landscape. 
From that point on, the Chickasaws’ movements come into focus. The Mississippi River 
is the singular physical landmark and splits the story. In this discourse the waterway is 
aligned between west and east situating Chickasaw Country just right of center. All of 
the initial action occurs west of the river while the story culminates to its east. To the 
west lay their former homelands and the lengthiest portion of their trek. Across the 
river, eastbound, mere days or weeks separate the travelers from their new home. 
Orienting the story via the waterway creates a perceptible space for the listener to 
imaginatively accompany the migrants. The audience then begins to track the people’s 
movements in a way that had been known to the speaker alone. With this mental map 
established, the Chickasaws’ location becomes more defined. It is not a stretch to 
suggest that Native American audiences became part of this legend, in a similar fashion, 
during the protohistoric and colonial era as Chickasaw storytellers explained their 
nation’s place in the Lower Mississippi Valley.  
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to have been far more prevalent among the former. See Green, Chickasaw Lives: I, 2-7.    
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Figure 2: The Mississippi River Defines the Landscape.  
Above: Before the Mississippi is specified west and east are directions in an indistinguishable 
landscape. 
Below: After the Mississippi is introduced West and East become distinct points in space and 
time.  
 




 Muddy Mississippi water served to define time in Chickasaw history as well. 
The river separated them from their ancient past and signaled the beginning of a new 
era. According to the legends, having crossed the waterway the migrants became 
distinct from other peoples. It was only then that they became Chickasaws, officially 
severing the bonds with those they left behind as well as their Choctaw travelling 
companions. As such, the Mississippi River positioned the past just as it oriented them 
spatially. This conflation of space and time was, and continues to be, common in 
American Indian traditions. Vine Deloria Jr. asserts most tribal religions have a “sacred 
center” located at a definable geographical landmark. “This center enables the people to 
look out along the four dimensions and locate their lands, to relate all historical events 
within the confines of this particular land, and to accept responsibility for it.”24 The 
Mississippi may have been part of Chickasaw religious beliefs, but the river 
unquestionably helped Chickasaws measure time.  
 Many accounts of the Chickasaw migration legend commence the history of the 
Chickasaw Nation on the east bank of the Mississippi River. James Adair heard how the 
Chickasaws and Choctaws “came together from the west as one family” before the 
nations split into separate entities.25 While the reason for the division goes unspecified, 
Adair’s writings suggest their division occurred after arriving east of the Mississippi 
River. Rev. T.C. Stewart also fails to mention why this separation transpired. As cited 
earlier, his account states the brothers Chickasaw and Choctaw “settled in contiguous 
territory” with their respective followers “after crossing the Mississippi River.”26 
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Adair’s story reflects Chickasaw, and perhaps Choctaw, explanations for their linguistic 
and cultural similarities. Stewart’s version introduces familial heritage into the national 
geneses. Ancestry structured many aspects of Southeastern Native Americans’ lives 
including foreign affairs. Therefore, Stewart’s account expands Chickasaw-Choctaw 
intertribal affiliations into the realm of kinship and politics. This division is not marked 
by a particular date, but rather by the river itself.  
Unlike these legends, those told by Charles Carter and Jesse Humes 
unequivocally articulate the cause of the Chickasaw-Choctaw division. Carter and 
Humes each attribute the partition to a heated debate over the cosmological directives of 
the sacred pole. According to Carter the pole wobbled and stood erect on the east bank 
of the Mississippi River. “Scouting expeditions were sent out” as the people attempted 
“to ascertain the exact character of country to which the Great Spirit had led them.” 
After a lengthy debate no consensus could be reached as to whether or not they had 
come to the right location. Finally “a vote was taken” and “a large majority” determined 
“no further move was necessary.” In outrage, the leader of one clan declared “‘All those 
who believe the promised land is further towards the rising sun follow me.’ His entire 
clan arose and went with him, but few others….Thus the division of the Choctaws and 
Chickasaws into two separate tribes came about.”27 Near the Mississippi the 
Chickasaws became their own people and a separate nation, as Carter tells it.  
Humes recalled the story somewhat differently although no less dramatically. 
He stated that upon reaching the opposite side of the Mississippi the people continued 
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eastward until they camped at, what would become, Nanih Waiya. In the morning the 
people startlingly found the sacred pole “wobbling around crazily, leaning first in one 
direction and then another” before it finally stood “perfectly straight.” The party had 
split into two groups for traveling, one following chief Chickasaw and the other trailing 
his brother Choctaw. The siblings had always been in agreement but now they could not 
reach a consensus on the meaning of the pole’s quivering. Disgusted with the impasse, 
“Chief Chickasaw pulled the sacred pole from the ground and commanded all those 
who believed the promised land lay further to the east to pick up their packs and follow 
him. That was the beginning of the Chickasaw and Choctaw Indian Nations.” Although 
Humes pinpointed the birth of the Chickasaw Nation at Nanih Waiya, the presence of 
the Mississippi River had already signaled a new beginning for the migrants. When the 
people had arrived on its western bank and saw the sacred pole direct them onward, 
Humes remembered, “they knew that ‘home’ was somewhere on the other side of the 
wide, wide river before them.” 28    
Migration origin stories are clear on the direction of travel and the location of 
Chickasaw lands east of the Mississippi. Less consensus exists over how exactly they 
became a separate nation. Regardless of those details a new era began once their 
ancestors crossed the Mississippi River. This holds true today as the Historic 
Preservation Officer for the Chickasaw Nation, LaDonna Brown, explains. Chickasaw 
ancestors travelled east where they came upon the Mississippi, “once they got to the 
other side of the river that’s when major things began to happen.” The brothers Chata 
(Choctaw) and Chikasa (Chickasaw) quarreled over whether or not the sacred pole 
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stood plumb and decided to separate. “When Chikasa and his group left,” Brown 
contends, “we can think of this as the beginning of Chickasaw history, culture, and 
language because we believe that was the beginning of the Chickasaw people.”29 This is 
not a presentist interpretation. Chickasaw migration legends recorded over the past three 
hundred years employ the Mississippi River to define space and time. Understanding 
this relationship is critical to learning more about eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century Chickasaw worldviews.          
 
“Their Bank of the River Boundary” 
 
Origin stories helped explain geography and chronology as well as Chickasaw 
sovereignty and identity. The Mississippi River not only demarcated West from East 
but also distinguished foreign and domestic lands in turn. It literally divided who they 
were before from the people they became. The collective memory of this event created 
and then remained important to Chickasaw group identity.30 Migration legends worked 
with naming patterns to express these sentiments. Clan and house groups were said to 
have adopted new names in recognition of the occasion. According to anthropologist 
Frank Speck’s findings one such appellation, Insaktaᴌáᵑf, even defined the Mississippi 
as a boundary. Place names, like Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’ and Balbásha’, also identified 
the limits of Chickasaw homelands along the river. These designations for the 
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Mississippi distinguished between familiar and unfamiliar sections north to south. 
Linguistics fused home and history with the landscape, while places and people 
symbiotically defined one another.  
According to tradition, the Chickasaw people received a new set of names in 
recognition that their migration had come to an end. John Swanton recounted custom 
dictated house names “were established just after the Chickasaw had crossed the 
Mississippi from the west and occupied their historic seats.” Although doubting it 
himself, Swanton relayed how Chief Chickasaw visited the peoples’ campsites 
christening “each from some peculiarity he observed connected with the camp or its 
surrounds” while also bestowing their “war names.”31 Names possess cultural, social, 
and personal meanings for groups as well as individuals. Changing a name can 
represent an internal change or public recognition of a transformational event. In the 
eighteenth century Chickasaw children received “names expressive of their tempers, 
outward appearances, and other various circumstances,” according to Adair. After 
proving himself in battle for the first time a young man received a name 
commemorating his transfiguration into a warrior. “When the Indians distinguish 
themselves in war their names are always compounded,” Adair wrote, “drawn from 
certain roots suitable to their intention and expressive of the characters of the persons, 
so that their names, joined together, often convey a clear and distinct idea of several 
circumstances—as of the time and place where the battle was fought, of the number and 
rank of their captives, and the slain.”32 A fresh name celebrated a boy’s transition as he 
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assumed a warrior’s status, or memorialized an established combatant’s deeds. Each 
recitation of that name thereafter marked the time and location of this transformation.   
Indian nations throughout the Southeast observed life changes in this way. 
Choctaw and Creek warriors also assumed a new persona in recognition of their 
deeds.33  If captured and adopted, Indian men and women received names from their 
captors signifying their entry into the foreign culture. The same is true of Europeans and 
Americans adopted into Indian societies.34 Not unlike the Christian names bestowed 
upon individual Native Americans throughout the colonial process, these Native names 
manifest a symbolic conversion reinforcing personal identity and social relationships. 
American Indian names also reveal individual experiences and cultural history. While 
Swanton’s informant(s) probably oversimplified the origin of Chickasaw house and war 
names, their association with the migration legend is no less telling. The interviewee(s) 
denoted the significance of crossing the Mississippi with the application of these 
designations. In this way, the Chickasaw migration legend and Chickasaw names 
reinforced one another and helped tell Chickasaw history as Chickasaws remembered it. 
Therefore the derivation of their house and clan names probably marked place and time 
for the Chickasaws similar to the migration legend itself.  
Such group names held a great deal of cultural significance in Chickasaw 
society. Clan and house associations helped structure the political and social system, 
infusing them with a sense of divinity. Each clan recounted its origin with a shared 
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animal ancestor that served as a totem protecting its members.35 Anthropologist and 
ethnographer Frank G. Speck made a quick study of Chickasaws at the start of the 
twentieth century. He observed, “The Chickasaw social unit is the maternal clan, having 
its own special officials, its place in the tribal encampment, and its rank among the 
other clans.”36 These clans divided themselves into duel moieties consisting of white 
and red segments. Each moiety had divergent social and political obligations serving the 
greater common good. The color “white” designated the white moiety as the peace 
faction. Conversely, “red” symbolized conflict thus delegating matters of war to the red 
moiety. When the moieties assembled, Speck reported, “the various clans had assigned 
places of encampment on each side of an imaginary line running north and south, 
forming all together a square.” The moieties which he called the Imosakicàᵑ and the 
Intcukwaᴌipa, sat opposite one another with the clans of each arranged by social status 
descending from north to south.37 
This social organization in camp or a Chickasaw village created a visual 
representation of society. The Imosakicàᵑ (red moiety) sat on the eastern half while the 
Intcukwaᴌipa (white moiety) figuratively balanced them across the center-line to the 
west. According to Speck the “highest clan” in the Imosakicàᵑ moiety was the 
Insaktaᴌáᵑf which he translated to mean “‘their bank of the river boundary.’” He 
explains, “They are said to be the brightest and bravest of the Chickasaw. Their name 
refers to the Mississippi River, which is called saktaláᵑfa.”38 Given that the red moiety 
                                                          
35 Arrell M. Gibson, "Chickasaw Ethnography: An Ethnohistorical Reconstruction." Ethnohistory, vol. 
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organized military efforts, warriors from the Insaktaᴌáᵑf clan were respected for their 
martial capabilities. Moreover, their name implies they safeguarded Chickasaw Country 
along the Mississippi River.  
As the leading clan of the red moiety their position within the assembly is also 
significant.39 The river physically denoted the western limits of Chickasaw lands, and it 
may have been what symbolically separated the red and white moieties across the 
central divide. This would not have been inconsequential since, as historian James 
Barnett argues, “Village councils observed a strict order of seating and proceeded with 
formal speeches and debate.”40 Evidence from migration legends suggests the 
Mississippi orientated the Chickasaws geographically splitting west from east, so it 
might have metaphorically done the same as they arranged themselves for deliberations. 
With the waterway emblematically dividing the moieties, the Insaktaᴌáᵑf were in 
position along the riverbank to protect the Chickasaw Nation from threats coming 
downriver. 
                                                          
39 John Dyson argues the name attributed to a clan by Speck actually denotes a house or family name. See 
Dyson, The Early Chickasaw Homeland, 98-99.  




Figure 3: Chickasaw Camp Square. Speck, “Notes on Chickasaw Ethnology and 
Folk-Lore,” 53.  
 
 
The number, rank, and designations of Chickasaw clans and houses varied over 
time making it difficult to assess the applicability of Speck’s observations. He collected 
this information while conducting fieldwork in Oklahoma among the Yuchi in 1904 and 
1905. During the removal crisis of the 1820s-30s the Mississippi River took on added 
significance as a borderline for the Chickasaws who struggled to hold their place within 
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the expanding American empire. This experience and the process of reconstituting the 
Chickasaw Nation thereafter, may have led to the creation or elevated the importance of 
the Insaktaᴌáᵑf, at least for Speck’s Chickasaw informant Ca’bítci. Nevertheless, 
measured inferences about the Mississippi’s significance to Chickasaw society in the 
eighteenth century are viable.41  
The translation of the name Insaktaᴌáᵑf bolsters the reliability of Ca’bítci’s 
testimony. Speck deciphered the designation to mean “their bank of the river boundary” 
explaining saktaláᵑfa denoted the Mississippi River.42 “Sakti,” the root word of Speck’s 
term, refers to a bank or hillside.43 This definition corresponds with his translation, and 
the historical Chickasaw name for the Mississippi River is nearly identical. Eighteenth 
century Chickasaws knew the waterway as “Sȧkti łaᵑfa okēna” meaning “‘Chickasaw 
                                                          
41 John Swanton did not record the Insaktaᴌáᵑf in his own collection of moiety and clan names. However, 
Swanton held Speck’s scholarship in the highest regards. In his estimation it contained “valuable material 
which it seems impossible to duplicate out of the memories of the Chickasaw now living.” Swanton 
valued “uncorrupted” knowledge of eighteenth century traditions above all else, judging sources against 
the influence of modernity and acculturation. As such, he respected Speck’s assessments, incorporating 
them with older data and that of his own. Lists of clan and house designations, even the names of the 
moiety divisions, varied considerably amongst observers. That the Insaktaᴌáᵑf did not appear in another 
list is not justification for disregarding it. Swanton attributed deviations in the inventories to the 
conflation of moiety, clan, and house names either by informants or the scribes themselves. In fact, 
Swanton’s study of Chickasaw social units confirmed much of what Speck reported. See Swanton, 
Chickasaw Society and Religion, 18-41. Contemporary scholars have relied on both Swanton and Speck’s 
identifications to inform their understanding of the moiety and clan structures. Arrell Gibson employs 
Swanton and Speck’s works, but relies more heavily on the latter during his discussion of moiety and clan 
divisions, see Gibson, The Chickasaws, 18-19. James Atkinson cites Swanton and Gibson on the matter 
although he completely misses the importance of the moieties and clans to the Chickasaws, see Atkinson, 
Splendid Land, Splendid People, 5. Robbie Ethridge compared Swanton’s information, including Speck’s 
documentation, to that of Thomas Nairne’s observations in her endnotes. Of the twentieth century reports 
on Chickasaw social systems Ethridge concludes, “anthropologists understand kinship to be a structure of 
the longue durée, and I therefore cannot dismiss the possibility that some of the twentieth-century system 
retained elements from the previous 200 years.” See Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 298. James 
Barnett Jr. includes Speck’s record of moiety names along with Swanton’s identification without further 
comment; see Barnett, Mississippi’s American Indians, 99.  Most recently John Dyson concluded most of 
the names collected by Speck and Swanton should be categorized as house or family names. See Dyson, 
The Early Chickasaw Homeland, 98-105.     
42 Speck, “Notes on Chickasaw Ethnology and Folk-Lore,” 51. 
43 Munro and Willmond, Chickasaw, 243, 310, 465.  
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bluff watercourse,’” according to Swanton.44 Linguist John Dyson concurs with this 
assessment in principle, though he pronounces it Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’ and translates the 
name as “scored bluff waterway” or “scored bank river.” According to him the river 
received its label from the bluffs that surround present-day Memphis, Tennessee, which 
the Chickasaws called Sakti Lhafa’.45 Swanton missed the origins of the Mississippi’s 
name, but linked it to the correct location since the heights are known as the Chickasaw 
Bluffs today. Speck accurately correlated Insaktaᴌáᵑf and saktaláᵑfa with the Mississippi 
River. His adaptation of Ca’bítci’s pronunciation is not much different from either 
Swanton or Dyson’s efforts.  
Looking up from the river below, the “scored bluffs” were an imposing sight, 
and the waterway no less impressive from those headlands. Each constituted an 
important place for the Chickasaw people. Their names exhibit this significance, 
helping to further demarcate space in the Chickasaw place-world. Often rivers and 
streams received directional or destination designations. Depending on which way one 
traveled the same watercourse could be known by various names. This matter-of-fact 
convention left little to the imagination. Dyson argues, “with one or two doubtful 
exceptions there is no detectable lyricism in their early place names, nor are there any 
obvious poetic metaphors attaching to those places: locations are called what they seem 
to be and they seem what they are called.”46 For thousands of years the Mississippi’s 
waters thrashed the ground along its course reshaping the landscape as it flowed. Where 
the current eroded the lower portions of the riverbank the earth gave way leaving steep 
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rocky cliffs high above the water’s edge. Logically the Chickasaws termed what is 
today the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff in southwestern Tennessee Sakti Lhafa’ after its 
serrated western face. 
 Given their proclivity for terminus labels, christening the Mississippi River 
after Sakti Lhafa’ speaks volumes about the bluff and waterway. The river’s name 
suggests the heights were a defining point along the watercourse for the Chickasaws. A 
series of four such bluffs line the eastern bank of the Mississippi between the counties 
of Lauderdale and Shelby, Tennessee, all of which fell within the Chickasaw domain. 
These were the only bluffs along the river in the Central Mississippi Valley. As will 
become evident in chapter four, the topography of Sakti Lhafa’ combined with the 
Mississippi’s narrow channel allowed the Chickasaw to inhibit river travel from that 
location. This natural “checkpoint” granted them a tremendous degree of control over 
who passed over the water in either direction. The term Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’ indicates 
the Mississippi functioned as an extension of Sakti Lhafa’. The bluff defined the river, 
and the waterway’s name evoked the cliff. Knowing the Mississippi’s importance as a 
geographical landmark, we can discern the significance Sakti Lhafa’ must have had for 
the Chickasaws. Given the pragmatic nature of their naming patterns the term Sakti 
Lhafa’ Okhina’ invoked a particular sense of place along the watercourse. That location, 
the area around Sakti Lhafa’, may well have been every bit as important as the river 
itself.  
Place names, like migration legends, created space for the Chickasaws along the 
Mississippi River. Those names helped to define locations within their nation, but just 
as importantly delineated those that fell outside. As Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’ flowed 
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southward beyond Sakti Lhafa’ and the rest of Chickasaw Country the river’s name 
changed. According to an eighteenth century observer, Antoine-Simon Le Page du 
Pratz, Indians on the lower portion of the Mississippi called the waterway 
“Balbancha.”47 French governor Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville also noted a similar name 
during his voyages along the river.48 Like the Choctaws and other nations in the Lower 
Mississippi Valley the Chickasaws referred to the final stretch of the Mississippi as 
Balbásha’.49 Although it has several alternative spellings, scholar William A. Read 
concludes the term is from “the Choctaw substantive Balbancha, ‘a place for foreign 
languages.’”50 When Chickasaws spoke of Balbásha’ they acknowledged the southern 
reaches of the Mississippi lay beyond their own nation.  
The lower Mississippi was home to unfamiliar peoples who, after 1700, 
included the French and later the Spanish and Americans too. Exotic languages in this 
region evinced foreignness and a distinctly separate region. Whereas Sakti Lhafa’ 
Okhina’ signaled the river’s familiarity of place, the distant Balbásha’ seems to have 
had an aura of exoticism. The juncture where Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’ became Balbásha’ 
during the Mississippi’s course to the sea is uncertain. Yet the designations demarcate 
space distinguishing the Chickasaws’ locality from others downriver. Thus, the 
Chickasaws split the river north and south just as they used its waters to divide west 
from east. 
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Sakti Lhafa’ seems to have played a critical role in partitioning the Mississippi 
River latitudinally and longitudinally.  The bluffs lent their name to the river in the 
Central Mississippi Valley and, according to one migration legend, even facilitated the 
Chickasaws’ initial crossing. Gideon Lincecum’s informant claimed a party of Choctaw 
hunters came upon a camp of Chickasaws about a generation after each reached their 
eastern homelands. Discovering they spoke similar languages, “The older men amongst 
them being familiar with the traditional history of the journeyings…took much pleasure 
in communicating to each other an account of their travels.” Having split from one 
another in the West the Chickasaws recounted how they continued “until they came to 
the great river.” Arriving “at the place called by them, sakti ahlopulli (bluff crossing),” 
the people “made shift to cross” and soon settled as their leader’s pole directed. Where 
they passed over, Lincecum’s source clarified, “white people call it now Chickasaw 
Bluffs.”51 Deriving its nomenclature sakti, from the bluffs, grounds the location in 
historical geography, while aalhopolli, aalhopolli’, and aa-abaanabli’ are each 
contemporary Chickasaw words for crossings.52 The name sakti ahlopulli is significant 
even if the Chickasaws did not intersect the Mississippi at that location during their 
migration. It suggests the crossing once served as an important corridor for the 
Chickasaws. Whether or not it serviced the first Chickasaws, sakti ahlopulli became a 
passageway spanning the east-west divide created by the Mississippi. 
 
“The White Dog’s Road” 
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Still the Mississippi’s significance rose above spatial orientation or even 
tangible considerations. Since rivers were seen as critical pathways to the Underworld 
they constituted a central place in the minds of Southeastern Indians. The Great Serpent 
controlled the currents and waves that might permit or prohibit water travel. Appearing 
as a constellation at the foot of the Milky Way during summer months, the Great 
Serpent also watched “the white dog’s road” to the afterlife. While crossing the 
Mississippi River, according to some migration legends, the proto-Chickasaws lost a 
white dog. The Great Serpent may have claimed the dog’s life, and stars in the night sky 
might have reminded Chickasaws of this event. If so, the Chickasaw migration legend 
contains references to all three levels of the cosmos conceived of by Southeastern 
Indians. This adds a religious component to the Chickasaws’ relationship with the 
Mississippi River.      
Each portion of the cosmos exhibited different characteristics. The Cherokee, for 
example, conceptualized an Upper World in the sky where “purity, order, and past 
time” reigned. Conversely the Under World coupled “fertility, change, and future time” 
below the earth in a watery expanse. This World, where humans lived, separated the 
other two.53 Many taboos and rituals were meant to help people keep the cosmos in 
balance and avoid disorder. Positive and negative forces coexisted in these worlds, but 
the initiated might neutralize or even harness these powers. This conceptualization of 
the cosmos derived from Mississippian culture and heavily influenced Chickasaws, 
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Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and other Southeastern peoples who shared similar 
understandings.  
Though the three worlds where separate, boundaries between them could be 
crossed. Living between the other worlds, humans received or suffered from the 
powers-that-be above and below. Elevated topographical features helped people 
commune with the Upper World, while the Under World could be reached via rivers, 
streams, lakes, and ponds. Southeastern Indians generally conceptualized This World to 
be floating on the Under World, and so bodies of water served as corridors for sentient 
beings passing between the worlds. The most powerful of these presences was the 
“Great Serpent” who ruled the lower realm. Its capacity for malevolence and prosperity 
earned reverence in Eastern woodland mythology. The ability to churn up river currents 
or pitch waves across lake waters made the Great Serpent influential and aquatic travel 
hazardous.54  
Supernatural powers residing in river depths were not to be trifled with. The 
sheer volume of water flowing down the Mississippi generated sweeping currents and 
clutching undertows, making the river particularly dangerous for travelers. As a 
residence of the Great Serpent, the river commanded respect from Native inhabitants 
seeking to avoid such hazards. New Orleans merchant C.C. Robin seems to have 
interpreted this deference as trepidation. Making one of several voyages up the river at 
the turn of the nineteenth century, Robin could not help but trumpet the improvements 
made by “civilized man.” Clearing the banks of “menacing trees” freed the currents of 
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“tangled logs,” allowing travelers to proceed “everywhere along the river in safety.” He 
heartedly boasted, “Even the Indian, unafraid under our benevolent laws, no longer 
fears the river.” Given our knowledge of Southeastern Indian conceptions of the 
cosmos, it seems Robin conflated their “fears” with respect for the otherworldly forces 
below the water’s surface. Nevertheless, he recognized the river’s influence on the 
mindset of Native inhabitants.55    
The Great Serpent took many forms in eastern North America, but in the 
Southeast snakes were most commonly associated with this Under World. Southeastern 
Indians believed snakes demanded deference so as not to offend the deity and bring 
about human suffering. In one instance James Adair drew the ire of a fellow traveler 
and “astrologer, of twenty years standing among the Indians” for transgressing this 
custom at a key juncture.  Adair scouted for wood to construct a raft in preparation for 
crossing a river through Creek territory in 1768. In the process he “chanced to stand at 
the end of a dry tree, overset by a hurricane, within three feet of a great rattle snake, that 
was coiled, and on his watch of self-defence, under thick herbage.”  Adair quickly 
“killed him” which upset his Native companion who “immediately declared with strong 
asservations” the party’s “imminent danger.”56 Destroying a representation of the Great 
Serpent, particularly before crossing over the watery abyss of the creature’s domain, 
was an ominous sign.  
Snakes living along waterways presented dangers, but spying one could also be 
transformative. According to John Swanton’s Chickasaw informants, “A horned snake 
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called sint-holo (‘sacred snake’) lived along big creeks or in caves. Not all persons 
could see these snakes, but sometimes a boy would get near one of them or even see 
him, and when this happened people said the snake would cause him to be wiser than 
other people.”57 Forces existed throughout each level of the cosmos. These powers 
remained neutral so long as they were properly respected. However, disparagement 
could prompt negative consequences while honorific acts might produce benefits. 
According to the Chickasaws, “These snakes often moved from one stream to another” 
and “would make it rain in order to raise the rivers so that they could leave their hiding 
place with more facility. Such snakes harmed neither people nor cattle.” Hence, 
serpents did not wish ill or blessings on human beings, but they could bestow either.58   
Ethnoastronomical research suggests the Great Serpent and its representatives 
were not restricted to the lower two-thirds of the cosmos. Scholar George Lankford 
theorizes that the constellation Scorpio appeared as the Great Serpent to Native 
Americans east of the Mississippi River. Among his evidence Lankford cites another 
passage from Swanton on Chickasaw beliefs. Swanton reported, “Another big snake 
was called nickin-fitcik (‘eye-star’) because it had a single eye in the middle of its 
forehead. If anything passed in front of its lair the snake would catch it, but none have 
been seen in the western country [present-day Oklahoma].”59 Ostensibly nickin-fitcik 
references the Great Serpent whom the Cherokee knew as Uktena. This horned snake 
had a single jewel on its forehead and powerful medicine, prized by hunters, within its 
horns and scales. Lankford speculates that Antares, the bright reddish star at the “heart” 
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of Scorpio, represented the jeweled eye in the Great Serpent’s head. This master of the 
watery Under World appeared in many guises within tribal traditions across the 
continent, but “ultimately, the complexities of ritual and myth dealing with the Horned 
Serpent make it quite clear that it is a major figure in the religious and cosmological 
understanding of the Woodlands and Plains [peoples].”60  
 
 
Figure 4: Scorpius and the Great Serpent  
 
Looking up on summer nights, Chickasaws would have seen this figure 
suspended in the sky. The earth’s orbit hides the constellation below the horizon in 
winter, but it gradually reappears each spring, becoming most visible in July, before 
fading with the fall. Consequently, its trek through the heavens mirrors the growing 
season. As the primary farmers in Chickasaw society, women planted and tended fields 
near their villages prior to harvest. They may have been able to assess the development 
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of their crops relative to this star pattern overhead.61 During food preparation, women 
may have been reminded of this being’s presence as well. In the Mississippian Period, 
Chickasaw ancestors decorated ceramics with depictions of the cosmos, including the 
Great Serpent.62 Historic-era Chickasaw pottery was far less ornate, though their 
modern artists have adopted Mississippian iconography even incorporating celestial 
symbols into the design of the Chickasaw Cultural Center.63 Representations of the 
Great Serpent in the sky or on land symbolized the watery realm’s ability to take, as 
well as give, life.  
Water begets existence on earth, so the liquidity of the Under World conjured 
reproductive powers. Women too were life givers cultivating corn, beans, and squash to 
feed their families, and their blood flowed through the children they bore. For this 
reason, throughout the Southeast, women were commonly associated with the lower 
level of the cosmos. The faculties of menstruation and childbirth made these moments 
in women’s lives especially potent times. 64 Taboos required Chickasaw women to 
isolate themselves during menstruation and childbirth in order to contain the 
transcendent forces of their bodily fluids.65 Similar concerns prohibited stories of the 
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Under World from being told during summer months. According to Lankford, “The 
explanation that is usually given is that the master of the serpents can overhear any 
disrespect during those months and will communicate his displeasure to his 
representatives who are nearby the erring humans, with dangerous results.”66  
Celestial and subaquatic beings were not isolated in their respective domains. 
Though conceptualized in three parts, the cosmos operated as a network of 
interrelations. Each component could only be understood within this holistic world. 
Thus when Adair killed the rattlesnake prior to crossing a river, his traveling companion 
feared an earthly punishment. The man’s anxiety may have been particularly acute 
given they travelled in May when the Great Serpent’s constellation would have been a 
nightly presence. He feared “imminent danger” and explained his objections based on 
“a combination of second causes in the celestial regions, actuating every kind of 
animals, vegetables, &c. by their subtil and delegated power.” Furthermore, their travel 
had already been slowed “on account of a very uncommon and sudden flow of the river, 
without any rain.” Perhaps snakes had swollen the waterways to facilitate their 
movements or due to some other agitation?  Either way the rivers “swept along with an 
impetuous force,” making travel hazardous even prior to Adair’s faux pas. Though the 
party crossed safely, the Native man did not relent. He “kept pointing to the river, and 
his wet clothes, and to his head,” protesting “the great danger he underwent in crossing 
the water, which gave him so violent a head-ach.” 67 Taboos and rituals were in place to 
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neutralize or win favor from forces emanating throughout the cosmos; they were not to 
be trifled with.  
While prohibitions sought to safeguard people, myths and legends explained the 
universe around them. This assuredly included the stars forming the Great Serpent as it 
did the Milky Way. Viewed from Chickasaw Country, our galaxy arches across the 
heavens following the earth’s rotation. Though the Chickasaw name for the serpentine 
constellation is unknown, they identified the Milky Way as Ofi’ Tohbi’ Ihina,’ meaning 
“the white dog’s road.”68 In Chickasaw, Cherokee, Natchez, Choctaw, and Yuchi 
mythology a dog is said to have created this hazy sight by spilling maize flour along his 
pathway through the sky. However, given the sophistication of Native belief systems 
this description seems meant as lighthearted entertainment rather than serious 
elucidation. More probably, eighteenth century Chickasaws understood the Milky Way 
as the Path of Souls by which the deceased passed into another life.69  
This conceptualization of the galaxy was widely shared by diverse Native 
nations east of the Mississippi. Chickasaws along with their Shawnee, Quapaw, and 
Creek neighbors are among many who seem to have held this belief. Though variations 
abounded, it was generally understood the soul left the body at the time of death and 
travelled west. There the deceased had to transition into the sky and follow the Path of 
Souls to their final destination. Those that failed to ascend properly languished as ghosts 
in the West or perhaps descended into the watery depths of the Under World.70 The 
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location of the Great Serpent constellation at the southern end of the Milky Way seems 
to have been of great significance during the celestial journey. Lankford argues this 
position near the galaxy’s base “makes him the guardian of the entry into the Realm of 
Souls….Thus the Great Serpent is a figure that is present in all levels of the cosmos—a 
permanent part of the life of humans.”71 There is little doubt the master of the Under 
World influenced some of the Chickasaws’ earthly decisions and heavenly 
observations, but did they see this figure as part of the Path of Souls too? Why label the 
Milky Way “the white dog’s road” if it was a corridor for the deceased anchored by the 
Great Serpent?      
  
 
Figure 5: Milky Way and the Great Serpent  
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Returning to the examination of Chickasaw migration legends offers further 
insight into this belief system. Four versions of this story include reference to a dog that 
aided the people at various points along their journey. Two storytellers explicitly note 
the dog, at times known as Panti, was white, while no color is specified by the others. 
The earliest recorded description of this dog comes from Henry Schoolcraft’s 1851 
publication on Chickasaw origins. According to his version, when the people were 
preparing to begin travelling eastward, “they were provided with a large dog as a guard, 
and a pole as guide; the dog would give them notice whenever an enemy was near at 
hand.” Their loyal companion remained vigilant until the people reached the Mississippi 
River and began crossing to the other side. Here “the great dog was lost in the 
Mississippi”; he was thought to have fallen “into a large sink-hole, and there 
remained.”72 In the early twentieth century, Charles Carter gave a succinct rendering of 
this event expressly mentioning the dog’s hue. As he told it, upon arriving at the 
Mississippi, the people constructed watercraft to carry them over. Regretfully, tragedy 
ensued: “when the crossing was finally attempted, the little white dog which had so 
faithfully kept his course toward the rising sun was drowned.”73 Though the size of the 
dog varies in these stories, each specifies the Mississippi River as the site of his demise.  
Two of the lengthiest versions of the legend also mark the waterway as the end 
of the dog’s voyage. Zeno McCurtain stated that the migrants “had a dog who guarded 
their camp every night and kept the wild animals away.” This canine played the role of 
protector and healer. Should one fall victim to a snake bite, “the dog would lick the 
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place and the person would get well.” Having assisted them into North America, those 
who wished to continue east “took the dog Panti with them” for “they loved him dearly” 
as he was obviously “a great help to them.” However, disaster struck in an instant as the 
people attempted to cross the Mississippi. “During the passage their raft came to pieces 
and they lost their faithful dog.” 74 In McCurtain’s version only then did the proto-
Chickasaws resort to using a wooden pole as their guide. This late adoption of the 
sacred pole is an outlier among migration legends, though the story’s fundamental 
elements are comparable with the more standard versions. 
The most extensive story of the people’s relocation also contains the greatest 
elaboration on their canine companion.75 As Reverend Humes told it, the people split 
into two parties, one following Chief Chickasaw the other Chief Choctaw, migrating 
eastward as the sacred pole instructed. “Far in front of this procession of red people 
ranged a large white dog. He darted to the right, then to the left; he was everywhere, 
always on the alert. The people loved the big creature very dearly. He was their faithful 
guard and scout, and it was his duty to sound the alarm should enemies be 
encountered.” Exposure to hardships during the journey took a toll on the people’s 
health though the medicine men did their best. “But when sinti, the snake, struck any 
one of them, the big white dog was quickly summoned and had only to lick the wound 
to make the victim well again.”76 With the aid of their canine companion the people 
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eventually reached the Mississippi River. The travelers fell speechless, nearly 
exhausted, when the long pole directed them to span the waterway. Humes continued:   
The tribesmen hurriedly set about constructing rafts, and soon the crossing was 
underway. Almost immediately a serious mishap occurred which left the Indians very 
sad. The raft carrying their beloved white dog came to pieces in the middle of the river, 
and though all the people were quickly rescued, the big dog, which managed to climb 
onto a piece of broken timber, could not be reached. The people could only watch 
helplessly as he was swept downstream and out of sight. That was the last the Indians 
ever saw of their faithful guard and scout.77    
 
 In these four legends, the Mississippi River marks the terminus of the white 
dog’s journey. He helped protect the people as they travelled from the land of the dead 
in the West towards a rebirth in the East.78 Having crossed the river the migrants 
experienced a new beginning as Chickasaws, while their faithful guardian met his 
demise at the same point. Throughout eastern North America human and animal 
drownings were widely understood as the malicious work of the Great Serpent.79 
Though unrecorded, the Chickasaws’ stories may imply that the master of the Under 
World claimed the dog’s life. He had shielded them and healed their snake bites, but his 
aid did not continue beyond the Mississippi River. On the border of West and East, 
death and life, the white dog metaphorically remained. The dog’s life may have been 
sacrificed to the Great Serpent in the Mississippi to assure the people’s safe passage.  
Yet it is plausible the white dog’s services aided deceased Chickasaws in the 
afterlife. Recall that John Dyson points out that Chickasaw place names eschewed the 
lyrical or poetic for descriptive terms. Their personal names as well as house and clan 
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designations seem to have followed suit.80 Therefore, it is not presumptuous to suggest 
this sensibility would extend skyward. Ofi’ Tohbi’ Ihina’, “the white dog’s road,” might 
have been a direct reference to the white dog of migration legend. Perhaps here on the 
Milky Way, he again protected Chickasaws at a critical juncture on their way to a new 
homeland.81 Souls of the dead had to travel west then ascend into the sky before passing 
the Great Serpent constellation to access the Path of Souls. Many Native American 
nations assigned a role for dogs in this process, including the Cherokees who identified 
Sirius and Antares as “dog stars” guarding either end of the Milky Way.82 
Circumstantial evidence also suggests a connection between the white dog, the 
Mississippi River, and the Great Serpent. In 1736 Chief Paustoobee revealed to John 
Wesley that the Chickasaws “often heard cries and noises near the place where any 
prisoners had been burned,” leading them to believe “the souls of red men walk up and 
down, near the place where they died, or where their bodies lie.”83 Yet these were 
apparently not the only sounds emanating from the departed. Having lost the white dog 
in the river “the Chickasaws said they could hear the dog howl just before the evening 
came,” Schoolcraft reported. In fact, he claimed, “Whenever any of their warriors get 
scalps, they give them to the boys to go and throw them into the sink where the dog 
was.”84 Dismemberment or indecorous burial prevented the soul from achieving life 
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after death. Therefore, disposing enemy scalps in the Mississippi may have been part of 
the physical and spiritual preparation of future warriors.85 Traditionally scalps were 
affixed on rooftops to appease aggrieved souls or tacked to war-poles as a display of 
martial virtue.86 So, if accurate, flushing scalps downstream must have been a new 
phenomenon; as Schoolcraft concluded, “Some of the half-breeds, and nearly all of the 
full-bloods, now believe it.”87  
Enemy scalps may not have been the only sacrifice made to the Great Serpent at 
the Mississippi. In the pays d’en haut, dogs served practical as well as ritualistic 
purposes. Canines were trained for hunting and burden bearing, though their masters 
commonly drowned them in lakes and rivers to assure plentiful harvests or safe water 
travel.88 Nearly all the peoples of the Eastern Woodlands presented gifts of tobacco and 
observed certain taboos to appease the Great Serpent before attempting to cross 
waterways.89 Though it went by many names and took several forms the destructive 
powers of the Under World were widely recognized and offerings such as these were 
designed to offset its vengeance. In this light, the white dog’s disappearance can be 
interpreted as a prophetic sacrifice enabling proto-Chickasaws to traverse the 
Mississippi’s currents safely.   
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Like the migration legend itself, the white dog’s significance goes well beyond 
actual events. His service on earth ushered the people eastwards toward a new life. Yet 
in the Mississippi he vanished. River rapids claimed him, symbolically merging his 
legacy with the Great Serpent’s within the landscape. This interrelationship may have 
been reflected in a cosmic display when the Under World’s master rose as part of the 
White Dog’s Road waiting in the sky to pilot Chickasaw souls to the hereafter. The 
Milky Way splits the night sky as the Mississippi divides the earth, as legend would 
have it.  Each separates the living from the dead.  
Still, not all Chickasaws understood the intricacies of their society’s beliefs 
equally. Occupied by warfare and other pursuits, young men generally knew less than 
their elders. Paustoobee explained to Wesley, “Our old men know more: but all of them 
do not know. There are but a few whom the Beloved One chooses from a child, and is 
in them, and takes care of them, and teaches them.” He patiently elaborated, “They 
know these things; and our old men practice; therefore they know. But I do not practice; 
therefore I know little.”90 Chickasaws shared certain sacred axioms, though personal 
convictions varied. Precise sacrosanct knowledge required study and devotion. 
Religious specialists perpetuated inherited wisdom helping the laity navigate 
metaphysical forces beyond their command. Over time the ravaging effects of 
colonialism undermined this selective transmission process creating philosophical gaps. 
Though the finer points of historic Chickasaw cosmology remain speculative, 
the importance of place in their universe is incontrovertible. Over three hundred years 
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stories of their migration have centered on the Mississippi River. For eighteenth century 
Chickasaws, the waterway physically split West from East. Likewise, its name 
demarcated north and south, domestic and foreign. The Mississippi divided time as 
well. Their crossing eastward marked a new era of history. Socio-cultural themes 
identify the river as important to Chickasaw unity, bonding the people to one another 
and the land to the nation. They passed from a place of darkness and death towards the 
sun’s first light where they experienced a rebirth. Beyond the Mississippi’s channel they 
became Chickasaws in a territory preordained for them. How, exactly, this occurred 
varies by storyteller but where it transpired does not.  
Migration legends infuse the Mississippi with history and religion, producing a 
“sacred geography.” The importance of the Mississippi has been overlooked by 
scholars, and clear interpretations of the past require contextualization within a 
particular place-world.91 Knowing this necessitates a reevaluation of Chickasaw 
activities along the river during colonialism. Contemporary Chickasaw artist and 
historian Jeannie Barbour writes, “The great migration legend…was central in 
explaining the importance of the homelands….The stories of the elders had significance 
in describing tribal history, not in terms of chronological dates, but more in terms of 
how events and locations impacted nature and people.”92 To be sure, events effect 
nature and people, but so too do locations and nature influence people and events. 
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Navigating the Mississippi 
 
Allegoric claims to the Mississippi River did not in themselves give the 
Chickasaws preeminence over the waterway passing their lands. Storytellers educated 
people on the social, religious, and historical significance of the river, yet in many 
ways, this must have been the easy part. Renditions of their migration created a place-
world that would not have existed without the capacity to utilize that space. Asserting 
territorial sovereignty and affecting it are two very different things. Legend of their 
river crossing explained Chickasaw autonomy, but knowledge of the Mississippi 
environment made it possible. Due to their success managing the river’s natural 
liabilities and exploiting its physical advantages, the Mississippi River became part of 
their domain. In short, Chickasaw practical knowhow backed their oratorical assertions. 
If Thomas Nairne’s assessment was accurate, then Chickasaws would not have 
engaged with the Mississippi. “The Chicasaws,” he wrote April 12, 1708, “are no 
Watter people, [they] know nothing what belongs to Canoes.” The Illinois, on the other 
hand, “and the others living on a Bank of the great [Mississippi] river” come “Down 
with the stream” to raid the Chickasaws. They often cross the Tennessee River “and in 
some Creek hide there Canoes,” Nairne reported. “When persued they take them and 
away, but the river stops the Chicasaws from further persuete.”1 Though generally a 
trustworthy observer, he is badly mistaken in this case. Chickasaws were, in fact, 
comfortable navigating the Mississippi and traveling along its banks. They understood 
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its relationship with the land and what that meant for them in practical terms. 
Chickasaw craftsmen built pirogues which men and women piloted. They too stashed 
canoes in slow moving water for safekeeping or quick getaways. Their maps offer a 
visual display of this aquatic acumen, and one even depicts a Chickasaw warrior 
crossing the Ohio River in pursuit of the same Illinois Indians who Nairne believed 
beyond reach. Other factors may have halted the chase in his experience, but an 
aversion to water, unfamiliarity with canoes, or diffidence around the Mississippi and 
its tributaries were not things that troubled the Chickasaws as they pursued their 
enemies. 
Indeed, the waterway had a tremendous impact on Chickasaw society. Historian 
George Pabis argues that throughout history several themes have characterized the lives 
of people along the Mississippi. The environment is first among these as water shapes 
the land, producing dynamic ecosystems supporting human life and a seemingly endless 
variety of plants, animals, insects, and fish. Over time, technological advances and 
economic change have altered how people interacted with the river and, conversely, the 
river’s impact on them. Community ties, ethnic identity, and cultural characteristics also 
frame how individuals and entire societies relate to the water course and other peoples 
near its banks. Though he only mentions them in passing, Pabis’ analysis aptly applies 
to the Chickasaws as well.2  
The river perpetually sustained and altered the land in which they lived, 
affecting their use of both. Chickasaw Country sat at the Mississippi’s midsection, 
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where its waters ran through large sweeping bends in a relatively wide and shallow 
channel. The waterway and its flood plain featured two distinct physiographic regions 
which host a rich tapestry of ecosystems. Each of these supported unique flora and 
fauna offering various foodstuffs, medicines, and supplies. Variable water levels 
accompanied seasonal change and influenced when and where these might be exploited. 
Chickasaws observed weather patterns and monitored the depth of interconnected 
waterways to assess conditions further afield. By doing this they capitalized on the 
available resources and avoided less amenable areas. The sheer volume of the 
Mississippi at flood stage produced routine shape shifting of landforms. Entire channels 
might alter course, outlets often appeared and disappeared, and bends widened or 
narrowed as water and dirt mixed. To exploit the landscape as they did, Chickasaws 
necessarily became “water people.” 
Crafting and plying pirogues was critical for to this lifestyle. The prerequisite 
building materials, cypress or pine trees, grew in abundance about the Chickasaw 
homeland. Generations of maritime experience perfected the manufacture of pirogues, 
known to Chickasaws as piinoshi’, due to their trough-like appearance.3 Difficulty 
transporting these vehicles overland meant they had to be constructed along navigable 
waterways. Geopolitical considerations further restricted where such vessels might be 
fabricated. Boat-builders needed a level of security in order to dedicate the time and 
energy necessary to complete their task. Yet educated on their surroundings and marine 
engineering, Chickasaw craftsmen made traversing the Mississippi River feasible. They 
                                                          
3 Munro and Willmond, Chickasaw, 306.  
71 
 
skillfully constructed watertight pirogues of various sizes capable of repeatedly 
covering vast distances.  
Once afloat, men and women relied on their knowledge of the waterway, and a 
piini’ ishtoobli’ (paddle), to remain upright and pointing in the right direction.4 In the 
river’s straightaways, the currents midstream were generally strongest, and so 
navigating the center increased boat speed but also reduced maneuverability. Calmer 
water near the bank, meanwhile, brought stability at the cost of travel time. Currents 
propelled boats downstream but slowed those going in the opposite direction. The same 
was true within the Mississippi’s many horseshoe bends, although the current operated 
much differently there. Faster water ran along exterior banks, while leisurely streams 
hugged the inside turn. Native men and women “read” these diverse currents, steering 
away from danger as their situation dictated. Even with the necessary equipment and 
skills, setting a course required knowing where one was headed.  
A collective mental map of the Mississippi’s route and its tributaries facilitated 
Chickasaw river usage. For better or worse these waterways bound them to enemies and 
allies far and wide. Chickasaw maps drawn in 1723 and 1737 offer a visual clue to their 
understanding of riverine geography and the political landscape. Situated between the 
Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee rivers, the Chickasaw Nation skewed the depiction of 
its relation to these rivers for British and French audiences, respectively. The first map 
emphasizes the overland paths connecting an embattled Chickasaw Nation to its British 
allies in the East. Though the artists downplay Chickasaw interaction with these rivers, 
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the map contains subtle hints that they were not as removed as the image suggests. 
Meanwhile, the second map highlights France’s Indian allies on the waterway and the 
Chickasaws’ potential to join or disrupt this river-path. Each map focuses on political 
relationships, and yet both include rivers. They are the only natural features that are 
drawn, highlighting both their role as regional “highways” and their bearing on 
geopolitics.  
In all of these ways, Chickasaws navigated the Mississippi River. The place-
world they built around the waterway would not have existed otherwise. Their villages 
stood at a remove, but Chickasaws knew the Mississippi well. They observed its 
patterns and discerned its environmental cues. This expertise enlarged their resource 
base and kept travelers safe. Sound pirogue construction and skillful manipulation of 
the current buoyed men, women, and children as they ascended, descended, and crossed 
the river. Their actions, words, and maps demonstrate they knew the water and the lands 
through which it moved. Nature’s proclivities and sociopolitical networks each 
warranted consideration when maneuvering about the riverine landscape. With a firm 
grasp on these factors, one Chickasaw headman boosted in 1743, “We shall paddle our 
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 Chickasaws relied on a keen understanding of the Mississippi River System to 
maximize its potential. It was not just a social construct but an intimate part of their 
lived environment. Therefore, knowing the river is, in a sense, to learn something of 
Chickasaw lives. Differing terrain altered the river channel, which, in itself, remade the 
land. Both affected ecosystems that relied on cyclical flood patterns, and these too acted 
upon the riverine landscape. Chickasaws discerned between such environmental 
features and recognized the system’s organic interconnectivity. Familiarity with the 
river system increased the natural resources available to them, including cypress and 
pine trees used to make pirogues for water travel.  
 North America’s largest river defies easy categorization. From its headwaters at 
Lake Itasca in present-day Minnesota to its terminus in the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Mississippi River changes dramatically. Along its course, the river drains close to 41% 
of the U.S. mainland, adding water from the Rocky and Appalachian Mountains 
respectively.6 Major tributaries from the Great Plains region such as the Missouri, 
Arkansas and Red River historically carried a proportionally large percentage of 
sediment, creating a muddy mixture. Meanwhile nearly half of the Mississippi’s annual 
discharge originated from the Ohio River, its largest eastern tributary. 7 Adding these 
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rivers over a 2,350 mile journey, the Mississippi experiences major topographical and 
climatic transitions producing a tremendous degree of biodiversity.   
 Given its length, volume, and variability, scholars divide the Mississippi into 
three sections for more precise analysis. The Upper Mississippi River (UMR) begins at 
the river’s inception and gives way to the Middle Mississippi River (MMR) at St. Louis, 
Missouri. Rolling bluffs characterize the river’s northern extent before yielding to 
grassland prairies in central Iowa and Illinois. The UMR has a “definite meandering 
aspect”, although in portions it takes “a braided character” as the channel splits to 
encompass islands and sandbars, rather than bending in S-curves around obstructions.8 
Continuing to meander through the landscape, the MMR passes plains and hardwood 
forests to the mouth of the Ohio River where it ends. Here the Lower Mississippi River 
(LMR) commences the final trek to the sea. It too eschews a linear route, continuing its 
curvaceous pattern for nearly 621 miles before splashing into the Gulf of Mexico. On 
this concluding leg, mild temperatures and lowland forests lead to the subtropical 
conditions of lower Louisiana.    
 Collectively eighteenth-century Chickasaws experienced each of these three 
divisions. As willing travelers or reluctant captives they observed the Mississippi top to 
bottom.9 The majority of Chickasaws would have been most familiar with the river as it 
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passed by their homeland. From the mouth of the Ohio River south to a point opposite 
present-day Helena, Arkansas, the Chickasaw Nation reigned supreme.10 In this span, 
the Mississippi passed through two dissimilar landscapes. Below its confluence with the 
Ohio, the enhanced LMR surged past the Chickasaw Bluffs, standing in stark contrast to 
the flatlands above and below them. For over forty miles, forming the southwest border 
of modern-day Tennessee, water wedged against these heights generally held course.11 
Constrained by geological conditions, currents thrashed against their captors for 
thousands of years working their way vertically into the earth. Landslides brought on by 
this action littered rocks, boulders, earth and trees throughout the riverbed, creating 
eddies. These swirling currents cut against channel flow and into the cliffs that 
dominated the skyline three-stories overhead. Below Memphis these barriers gave way 
to an open valley where the river was freer to choose its course. Following a path of 
least resistance the main channel widened and slowed, as before the Bluffs, looping 
through this basin until it passed out of Chickasaw lands.   
 This area is part of a distinct physiographic region known as the Alluvial Valley. 
The LMR is split between this valley in the north and the Deltaic Plain sprawling below 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Water levels in the former vary as the river winds past the 
Chickasaw Bluffs and subsequent flatlands, known affectionately as “The Delta,” in 
northern Mississippi. Channel depths ran relatively shallow through much of the 
Alluvial Valley before entering the Deltaic Plain. Here the channel narrowed and 
deepened on its final approach to the Gulf, although the river bottom gradient decreases. 
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Water not contained within the main channel splintered into crooked forks depositing 
upstream sediment around the river’s mouth, forming the Mississippi River Delta.12  
 Though they would not have recognized these terms, Chickasaws historically 
divided the Mississippi River into similar sections.13 They too acknowledged distinct 
environmental features in their naming patterns. In their minds the waterway 
transitioned from Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’ into Balbásha’ somewhere within the Alluvial 
Valley and the Deltaic Plain. Boat hazards, like turbulent water or menacing rocks, 
identified particular locations, and other place designations borrowed from the 
landscape as well.14 After all, Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’ is a reference to the sheer rock face 
of the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff. Consequently, Balbásha’ probably communicated 
certain ecological characteristics, perhaps even foreignness, just as it signaled 
sociopolitical difference. For Native peoples, life on the Mississippi required an 
understanding of human and environmental relationships. 
 Southeastern Indians considered ecological dynamics in addition to making 
political calculations. These dynamics caused Spanish officials to reevaluate their 
proposal for a general conference with the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw 
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nations in 1793. Cherokee chiefs wished to meet on the Tombigbee River to avoid 
conflicts with the Creeks. Meanwhile the Chickasaws and Choctaws favored the “Ball 
Ground” near the mouth of the Yazoo or the Spanish post further up the river. Speaking 
on their behalf, Chief Ugulayacabé said the first option was preferable since “the waters 
of the Mississippi are healthier than those of the Yazoo and in this way the illness of the 
Indians will be avoided.”15 Native peoples distinguished ecological factors along rivers 
and made choices accordingly.  
 In the Mississippi River Basin seasonal rhythms gave structure to the ecosystem. 
Today the river valley has been turned into dry land with levees, floodways, dikes, and 
dams which attempt to separate the Mississippi from its floodplain. Extensive 
engineering projects and the rise of commercial farming have limited flood pulses and 
reduced biological diversity. Yet as historian Christopher Morris makes clear, the 
history of “The Big Muddy” is disproportionally wet.16 Prior to the mid-nineteenth 
century, before the land was drained for cotton fields and river cities, the LMR annually 
spilled over its banks saturating the land around it. According to a study by the U.S. 
Department of State, “Cyclical flooding was a fundamental ecosystem process that was 
essential to deliver nutrients to the flood plain, replenish off-channel wetlands, and 
regenerate aging riparian forest galleries.”17 This inundation supported a large variety of 
swamps, marshes, tall grass prairies, and dense woodlands.  
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 Complex riverine ecosystems sustained an assortment of flora and fauna with 
differing amounts of Mississippi water. Within the river itself several distinct aquatic 
habitats existed, while six terrestrial ecoregions filled the LMR basin around it. Fast 
moving water in the depths of the main channel, steep banks, and sandbars each 
provided a haven for unique biotic communities. Slack water in sloughs and isolated 
oxbow lakes provided still more habitats, as did seasonal floodplains and the 
Mississippi’s tributaries.18 On land, dense forests and diverse grasslands thrived 
alongside these water forms. A variety of trees sprung from the landscape to produce 
Central U.S. Hardwood Forests, Ozark Mountain Forests, and Southeastern Mixed 
Forests with tall grass prairies scattered amongst them. Further south Western Gulf 
Coastal Grasslands and Mississippi Lowland Forests supported their own distinctive 
floral compositions and wildlife inhabitants.19  
 Within Chickasaw Country such ecosystems buttressed a wealth of native 
species. Aquatic insects and invertebrate thrived in these riverine environments, 
attracting fresh water fish and waterfowl who preyed on them. James Adair observed 
dense vegetation forming “evergreen thicket[s]” which sheltered “horses, deer, and 
cattle” in winter but attracted “panthers, bears, wolves, wild cats, and foxes” too. 
“Lands of a loose black soil, such as those of the Mississippi” sprawled with “fine grass 
and herbage” covered by “large and high trees of hiccory, ash, white, red, and black 
oaks, great towering poplars, black walnut-trees, sassafras, and vines.” In “low wet 
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lands adjoining the rivers” cypress trees thrived and grew “very large and of a 
prodigious height.”20  
 Wildlife congregated near the river to take advantage of the foliage sprouting on 
the floodplain, and people came too.21 In addition to tending the fields around their 
villages, Chickasaw women gathered natural resources along the river, within wetlands, 
and throughout lowland forests. Men took advantage of the diverse wildlife along the 
river. Spanish officials recognized the Chickasaw Bluffs were important “Hunting 
Grounds” for the Chickasaw Nation.22 Chickasaw men also went “down the 
[Mississippi] River” towards Natchez during their hunts.23 For thousands of years 
Native Americans had come to these bionetworks, timing their activities to harness as 
much energy within the systems as possible.24 In this regard, Chickasaws were no 
different.    
 Before Chickasaws could exploit the Mississippi’s natural resources, however, 
they had to forecast its stages. Local weather conditions had little impact on water 
levels in the main channel compared to contributions made upriver. Along the UMR 
and its tributaries winter months are generally the driest, but what precipitation does 
occur mostly accumulates in the form of snow and ice. Spring thaws release this 
moisture, some of which drains into the river. Regionally this coincides with the wettest 
months of the year when spring and early summer rains find their way into the 
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Mississippi. Snowmelt runoff and thunderstorms in the Upper Mississippi River basin 
raise the LMR each spring causing flooding for six to eight weeks. By mid-summer, 
fewer northerly showers reduce input, and rising temperatures continentally increase 
evaporation rates, thus lowering river stages. Water levels generally remain this way 
until fall rains lash the UMR valley and evaporation decreases. In response the LMR 
raises slightly before the winter freeze up North once again locks precipitation in place 
and reduces the river’s flow until spring. 25  
 Granted, the Mississippi’s depth could vary significantly at any time throughout 
the year, but in principal it followed an annual discharge model. Before significant 
human intervention this sequence caused semiannual flooding in low-lying areas and 
inundated larger expanses during intense episodes.26 These rises in the LMR altered 
water levels in streams far afield. According to ecologist Arthur Brown and associates, 
“The stage of the main channel of the Mississippi River is occasionally high enough to 
impound tributaries and essentially create temporary lakes upstream from the 
confluence of each of them.”27 Using this knowledge Chickasaws could estimate the 
Mississippi’s water level at any given time. Absent local precipitation, swelling 
tributaries signaled a flood in the main channel. Conversely, average flow in subsidiary 
waterways indicated the Mississippi ran at or below par. Experience with the river’s 
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cycles and an understanding of the interconnectivity of drainage systems made the 
Mississippi more predictable.     
 James Adair’s experience living amongst the Chickasaw demonstrates they 
firmly grasp the interrelationship between water, land, and climate. His travels through 
Chickasaw Country in 1747 are a prime example. Leaving Chickasaw villages for 
Charles Town, in spring, Adair easily passed “many of the broad deep creeks” because 
they were “almost dry.” On his return during the early winter these same streams 
“overflowed their banks” running at a “rapid rate” due to successive “frost, snow, hail, 
and heavy rains” throughout the area. “Within forty miles of the Chickasaw, the rivers 
and swamps were dreadful,” forcing him to wade and even swim in several places. Safe 
within their homes Chickasaw villagers knew weather conditions and geography 
conspired to make travel virtually impossible at certain times of the year. “The people 
had been saying, a little before I got home,” Adair wrote, “that should I chance to be on 
the path, it would be near fifty days before I could pass the neighboring deep swamps; 
for, on account of the levelness of the land, the waters contiguous to the Chickasaw, are 
usually in winter so long in emptying, before the swamps become passable.” These 
conversationalists recognized that seasonal conditions, weather events, and topography 
affected drainage networks.28 Experience told them the land was inundated and would 
be for some time. Without venturing forth they could surmise, as Adair put it, that the 
waterways “were unpassable to any but desperate people.”29 
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  At times elevated water levels swamped parts of the Chickasaws’ homeland, 
fundamentally transforming it in the process. Ecologists agree that, “Prior to major 
human modification, many locations in main-stem channels of the Mississippi River 
system were more complex and dynamic, exhibiting substantial planform alignment 
shifts from year to year that resulted in a physically and biologically diverse channel 
and flood-plain structure.”30 Currents whittled away at outer banks of meander loops 
while solidifying their interiors with sediment deposited by slower moving water. As 
these curves widened the Mississippi gradually moved itself horizontally across the 
valley floor. High water flushed from the UMR often overran land formations on the 
inside of these curves straightening, and shortening, the main channel. Left “cut off,” 
former turns became oxbow lakes or backwater swamps trapped behind naturally 
occurring levees. This did not occur within the Chickasaw Bluffs where the 
Mississippi’s currents were held in check, but between Memphis and Vicksburg the 
river methodically dissected the soft loess soil. Here in The Delta the river transformed 
itself and the land as it went. Course changes simultaneously destroyed and created 
channel configurations, landscapes, and microenvironments.31 The river’s course and 
surroundings changed annually, thus utilizing the Mississippi meant staying abreast of 
its alterations.   
 Despite this revisionism, or in some cases because of it, Mississippi waters 
supported trees that made traversing the river possible. Though a plethora of ecoregions 
existed in the LMR basin, forests covered a majority of the region.  Hardwood species 
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of oak, hickory, and birch grew in drier conditions while softwoods like cypress and 
pine preferred the moisture of low lying areas.32 This biological distinction was critical 
to Native American water travel. Depending on which species grew in a given area, 
cypress or pine trees lent themselves to the construction of dugout canoes.33  
 Not all trees in the forest made suitable watercraft, and not every cypress and 
pine sapling sprung forth a boat in waiting. Fashioned from a single log with a trench 
running lengthwise, pirogues constituted the primary form of Native water 
transportation throughout the Southeast. They are still known as piinoshi’ in Chickasaw, 
which can mean both “canoe” and “trough.”34 These boats varied considerably in length 
and width depending on their particular function. A tree’s size determined its potential 
capacity, and only mature trees provided the requisite bulk. Several species of pine 
routinely top fifty feet at maturity and bald cypresses scrap the sky fifty feet above that. 
With girth to support such heights, both species are well proportioned for pirogue 
construction. Cypresses and pines of limited stature simply did not afford the surface 
area for construction or buoyancy to sustain additional weight. Therefore aged trees 
with long thick columns were chosen for manufacturing pirogues. These forest veterans 
had to stand upright without forks, bends, or twists so as not to distort a pirogue’s 
shape. A quick study of the modern Chickasaw language suggests identifying these 
composite parts was quite important. Chickasaws distinguished pine trees (tiyak api’) 
from other species, and differentiated the midsection of a tree trunk (itti’ api’) from the 
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portion nearest the ground (itti’sokbish). They also categorized trees without lower 
limbs (fa’hha’ko) from those with forked branches (falakto).35  
 Chickasaw craftsmen had to consider a tree’s location in addition to its shape. 
Smaller canoes manned by one or two people could be transported overland some 
distance, but larger vessels were unwieldy and could not be carried very far. Crafting a 
mammoth pirogue from a perfectly formed pine deep in the forest made little sense if it 
could not serve its purpose. Consequently, a tree’s proximity to a navigable waterway 
was key. A boat builder’s own safety must have weighed on his or her mind prior to 
beginning construction as well. Trees growing on unstable ground, along cliffs, or in 
hazardous water were probably rejected due to the perilous working conditions. 
Geographic limitations and physical characteristics dictated where a pirogue might be 
fashioned.                
 Having found a tree of requisite size in a suitable location, crafting a serviceable 
boat then entailed a labor intensive process. In lower Louisiana, French carpenter André 
Pénicaut observed Native artisans constructing pirogues in 1699. According to him, 
their method required felling, coring, and shaping a tree in succession. Pénicaut 
explained, they:  
kept a fire burning at the foot of a tree called cypress until the fire burned through the 
trunk and the tree fell; next, they put fire on top of the fallen tree at the length they 
wished to make their boat. When the tree had burned down to the thickness they wanted 
for the depth the boat, they put out the fire with thick mud; then they scraped the tree 
with big cockle shells as thick as a man’s finger; afterward, they washed it with water. 
Thus they cleared it out as smooth as we could have made it with our tools.36  
                                                          
35 Munro and Willmond, Chickasaw, 342, 524, 85, 48.  
36André Pénicaut, Fleur de Lys and Calumet: Being the Pénicaut Narrative of French Adventure in 
Louisiana, ed. and trans Richebourg Gaillard McWilliams (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 




The combination of burning and scrapping was a tried and true method of pirogue 
construction used throughout the Southeast. The introduction of iron tools made the 
process easier, and perhaps less reliant on fire, but these longstanding construction 
methods persisted.37 For that reason a Chickasaw chief requested adzes from American 
officials while treating at the Chickasaw Bluffs in 1801. “We are about to raise cotton,” 
he explained, “we shall want canoes to carry it to market, and adzes are necessary to 
build them.”38  
 A painting by John White, when read closely, demonstrates the vulnerability of 
canoe-makers. The manufacturing process depicted by White necessitate that 
Chickasaw craftsmen remain onsite and potentially exposed. White painted this scene 
while in Virginia and it later served as the model for one of Theodor De Bry’s famous 
engravings. One depiction shows four men hard at work in various stages of pirogue 
construction. In the forefront two men toil to refine a canoe already taking form on 
posts raised above the ground. One man scrapes the charred interior while another tends 
flames burning out the center. Meanwhile behind them, two more men use fire to fell 
trees and prepare them for fabrication. Mature pines range from two to four feet in 
diameter with cypresses bulging between three and six feet. To down a freestanding tree 
of this magnitude necessitated a large blaze or, more likely, a smaller sustained burn. A 
lesser fire would have taken longer but preserved the tree's length. Once on the ground 
flames again licked the trunk searing their way into the tree. This fire-hollowing 
                                                          
37 Barbara A. Purdy, The Art and Archeology of Florida’s Wetlands (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 1991), 279-
283; Hartmann, “The Development of Watercraft,” 29-30.  
38 American State Papers: Indian Affairs, vol. I (Washington, 1832), 651. 
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technique demanded careful tending to ensure the flames did not devour more than their 
share. Large plumes of smoke accompany the men’s labors in De Bry’s depiction. Even 
if he embellished these clouds for effect, smoke generated from construction would 
have hung in the air for inquiring eyes to see or perceptive noses to detect. In addition, 
the sound of cockle shells or steal tools stinging the burnt remnants of the emerging 
vessel(s) would have echoed about as well. Given all of this, it is tempting to suspect 
that the craftsmen’s weapons are leaning against a tree just outside the frame of White’s 
picture.    
 
Figure 6: Theodor de Bry, “Native Americans Making Canoes,” engraving, 1590. 
"Wunderbarliche, doch warhafftige Erklärung, von der Gelegenheit vnd Sitten der Wilden in 
Virginia . . ." [America, pt. 1, German], Frankfort: Theodore De Bry, 1590, p. 59. North 




 The time and energy required of Native boatmakers meant they needed a certain 
degree of security to accomplish their task.39 Major rivers were North America’s 
original interstate system and lesser watercourses served as subsidiary water-roads. 
Such well-travelled routes, and the involved construction process, discouraged 
unwelcome individuals from fashioning a pirogue in enemy territory. Most craftsmen 
necessarily employed their skills along navigable rivers in their own country or those of 
their allies. In fact, the Chickasaw called the northern portion of the Tombigbee River, 
Piini’ aaikbi’, meaning “where dugouts are made.” This segment was navigable by 
pirogue and lay safely inside Chickasaw Country.40 But even within recognized water 
boundaries boatbuilders would have had to remain vigilant. Such waterways ushered ill-
intentioned adversaries just as easily as they buoyed invited guests. The Chickasaw 
Nation in particular sat between the Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee rivers. With 
access to cypress and pine trees, Chickasaw artisans labored over pirogues along their 
banks. Yet at various times in the eighteenth century these rivers conveyed French 
armies, Iroquois raiders, and Cherokee war parties, all of whom threatened Chickasaw 
lives. To ensure their health and work did not suffer, canoe makers must have 
considered the state of geopolitics in addition to a tree’s location and stature.  
 Those considerations notwithstanding, throughout the Southeast Native 
craftsman turned trees into pirogues of several sizes. Pénicaut reported, “These boats 
may be twenty-five feet long. The savages make them of various lengths, some much 
                                                          
39 Research has shown “that a small dugout canoe carved using fire and stone adzes must have taken two 
people a minimum of 20 8-hour days to complete a dugout of about 2 meters in length.” See Hartmann, 
“The Development of Watercraft,” 218.  
40Dyson, The Early Chickasaw Homeland, 15. Spanish documents also pinpoint Cape Girardeau, “where 
there was no danger,” as a favored place for “neighborhood” Indians to make pirogues. See Louis Houck, 
ed., The Spanish Regime in Missouri vol. II (Chicago: R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1909), 61.  
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smaller than others.”41 Short vessels were agile and quick but lacked speed and stability. 
They could be steered by a single person alternating strokes on either side or by two 
oarsmen coordinating their efforts. As a means of solo transportation, or for a small 
party, such craft proved capable of maneuvering the LMR and its congested backwaters. 
In sloughs or swamps, their shallow draft allowed boatmen to steer close to shore while 
avoiding obstructions. 
 Writing between 1803 and 1805, New Orleans merchant and trader C.C. Robin 
observed far larger boats. He noted pirogues on the Mississippi might reach "forty to 
fifty feet long by six feet wide and four to four and a half feet deep.”42 Massive crafts 
like this could seat thirty or more men and transport far more cargo.43 After accelerating 
slowly, these steady behemoths travelled the river rapidly. Friction on the river bottom 
and slight drag from air on the surface slow water at the lowest and highest depths. This 
means water between those levels actually flows faster.44 Since large pirogues sat lower 
in the river they sped along faster after gathering momentum. However, the size and 
velocity of these bulky vessels meant they were more difficult to control.  
 Even before getting into one of these boats, however, Chickasaws had to 
navigate the Mississippi’s topographical and ecological diversity.  They did this, in part, 
by labeling its composite parts according to identifiable environmental features. 
                                                          
41 Pénicaut, Pénicaut Narrative, 9.  
42 Robin, Voyage to Louisiana, 100. 
43 Rusty Fleetwood, Tidecraft: An Introductory Look at the Boats of Lowers South Carolina, Georgia, 
and Northeastern Florida: 1650-1950 (Savannah: Costal Heritage Society, 1982), 43. Abraham Nasatir 
claims, “smaller pirogues could carry a ton, while larger ones, ranging up to forth or fifty feet long and as 
much as five feet wide, could carry fifty tons.  Their passenger capacity ran as high as thirty men, 
although occasionally one meets references to pirogues that could carry fifty.”  See Nasatir, Spanish War 
Vessels on the Mississippi, 1792-1796 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 49. 
44 Raymond Bridge, The Complete Canoeist’s Guide (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978), 159.  
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Detecting factors like water quality and biological variability kept them healthy and 
boosted the number of available resources. Annual flood patterns transformed the land, 
rejuvenating some areas while destroying others. By discerning the seasonal, and 
irregular, inundations of tributaries nearer their villages Chickasaws could estimate 
water levels in the main channel. This impacted hunting and gathering trips as well as 
pirogue construction. Boatmakers had to stay dry when selecting a tree and 
transforming it into a serviceable piinoshi’. This not only took a discerning eye, but 
technical knowhow to char and scrape a log into shape.45 Depending on a pirogue’s 
intended use, craftsmen constructed it to take advantage of differing river currents.  
 
Riding the River  
 
 Pirogues of various sizes kept Native Americans afloat but they did not, by 
themselves, get them where they wanted to go. If left to its own devices a pirogue might 
drift one way and then another, spinning ahead, abeam, or astern as the currents shifted. 
Chickasaw canoeists relied on power generated from within the river and their own 
rowing prowess to reach their destination. Depending on the occasion, free flowing 
central channel waters or variable exterior currents might be employed. Men and 
                                                          
45 Wood, being an organic material, decays quickly making archeological discoveries of Southeastern 
pirogues rare. An identifiably Chickasaw pirogue has yet to be found. Nevertheless, the Chickasaw 
Nation recently celebrated its tradition of boatbuilding and river travel with a yearlong exhibit, “Dugout 
Canoes: Paddling through the Americas,” at the Chickasaw Cultural Center in Sulphur, Oklahoma. It 
featured archeological remains of pirogues and paddles discovered in Florida, not unlike the ones 
Chickasaws made in the eighteenth century. Canoe-making demonstrations also highlighted the labor 
intensive process necessary to craft a piinoshi’. 
90 
 
women, alike, exerted themselves, manipulating their boats over the water and dodging 
obstructions. And when disaster struck and Chickasaws were ejected into the 
Mississippi they swam for their lives. The Under World’s depths posed undeniable 
risks, but also warehoused pirogues not in use. In spite of its power, Chickasaws not 
only observed the Mississippi River; they rode it.   
 The meandering character of the Mississippi River meant Native canoeists had 
to constantly interpret the water’s movements. Shifts in the stream alerted them to 
where smooth and rapid currents ran. In a straightaway, contact with the banks slows 
water on the outer edges of the channel, so the fastest flow occurs midstream where the 
channel is deepest. However, the current simultaneously accelerates and decelerates 
around the Mississippi’s countless bends. Heading into a U-turn, the swifter water 
carries its momentum into the outside of the bow, cutting into the bank before 
boomeranging downriver. Currents running along the interior curve simultaneously 
slow as the central waters rush to navigate the curve. With its motion disrupted these 
sluggish waters cannot continue to carry the sediment jumbled within them. They are 
forced to drop their cargo of soil, reinforcing the inside corner. Over time, a point or 
sand bar forms, pushing still more water to the outside bend where the river is deepest.46  
 Chickasaw canoeists exploited these shifting currents as they plied the 
Mississippi. When traveling southward and time was of the essence they moved into the 
channel to harness the river’s pace. During an impromptu contest with a steamboat in 
1811 more than fifteen Chickasaws maneuvered their pirogue from the shoreline in a 
                                                          
46 Bridge, The Complete Canoeist’s Guide, 162-163.  
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quest for speed. Witnesses aboard the New Orleans reported that below the mouth of 
the Ohio River “a large canoe, fully manned, came out of the woods abreast the 
steamboat.” These Chickasaws gave chase and “there was at once a race!” While “for a 
time the contest was equal,” the Chickasaws’ arms gave out before the New Orleans’ 
boiler, earning it the victory thanks to “the advantage of endurance.” Though they 
utilized different power sources, strong currents ultimately enhanced the velocity of 
both vessels. Those on the steamer reported, “some miles above the mouth of the Ohio, 
the diminished speed of the current indicated a rise in the Mississippi.” A fall flood had 
swollen the Big Muddy and backed up its tributaries, a sign that the Chickasaws would 
have certainly recognized. In fact, “the bottom land on either shore were underwater,” 
but the channel’s swift moving flood waters did not hold the Chickasaws’ back. The 
crew still made a beeline for the steamer.47 Experience with the Mississippi’s flood 
patterns, combined with confidence in both their pirogue and their collective canoeing 
skills, allowed them to abandon safer slower currents near shore.  
 At other times Chickasaw boatmen positioned their pirogues to take advantage 
of leisurely currents along the Mississippi’s banks. In one instance a small squad 
hugged the water's edge going down river only to return in similar fashion. On June 1, 
1741, “seven men passed in a pirogue in open day,” cruising past the French settlement 
of Pointe Coupée.48 Located along the exterior curve of one of the Mississippi’s 
characteristic horseshoe bends, the currents passing Pointe Coupée would have varied. 
“Letting themselves drift with the current of the river” the Chickasaws floated in 
                                                          
47 J.H.B. Latrobe, The First Steamboat Voyage on the Western Waters (Baltimore: Maryland Historical 
Society, 1871), p. 23-25.  
48 Dunbar Rowland and Albert G. Sanders, eds. and trans., Mississippi Provincial Archives: French 
Dominion, vols. I-III (Jackson, Miss.: Department of Archives and History, 1927-32), III: 756.  
92 
 
quicker waters nearest the colony, “even saluting with their heads several inhabitants 
who were at the water’s edge.” However, “when they were below the last plantation 
they went back upstream on the other bank” where the current moved slower.49 The 
waning of the river’s might in summer and their strategic positioning within its channel 
reduced the manpower necessary to travel upriver. Furthermore, this seven-man vessel 
would have displaced less water than the pirogue used to race the New Orleans, making 
its draft shallower and better suited for shoreline travel.  
 In both instances the Chickasaws, by all indications, were knowledgeable and 
accomplished canoeists. Though seven decades and nearly seven hundred river miles 
separated these crews, their actions speak to a shared comfort level.50 Neither party 
shied away from the Mississippi’s power. Rather, each used the river’s anatomy to their 
advantage. The fifteen-plus racers manned a larger pirogue in adverse conditions. As 
the Ohio engorged the Mississippi, embarking on such a jaunt, would have been 
perilous without considerable experience. Together their brawn generated enough 
power to manage the swollen channel and test the New Orleans. Near Pointe Coupée, 
swings in the Mississippi’s path did not shake their self-assured style either. River 
bends presented their own unique challenges, yet the Chickasaws conveyed “in every 
respect the attitude of men who were acquainted [with the river].”51 By interpreting the 
movement of the water they expended little energy while riding the river. These types 
of excursions reflect a larger pattern of Chickasaw river use throughout the eighteenth 
                                                          
49 MPA:FD III, 756. Although Bienville protested these were not Chickasaw boatmen he was mistaken. 
Evidence of this fact will become apparent in chapter three.  
50 The Lower Mississippi begins at the Ohio’s mouth marked at river mile 953.8 while Pointe Coupée is 
mapped at 265.5. See Bragg, Historic Names and Places on the Lower Mississippi River, iii-viii.   
51 MPA:FD III, 756. 
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century. Despite its massive size, Chickasaws navigated the Mississippi trusting in their 
knowledge, watercraft, and skills.  
 River travel was neither a strictly male activity nor a solely Chickasaw 
phenomenon. Chickasaw women and children joined people of many Southeastern 
nations on the river. For example, Pierre George Rousseau commanded a Spanish 
galley, La Fleche, on the Mississippi in 1793. His log of a mission upriver to New 
Madrid testifies to the versatility of Native navigators. Midway between the Yazoo and 
Arkansas rivers on January 23rd, Rousseau documented a common sight. He observed 
“two pirogues loaded with skins, manned by two Indian men and four women,” coming 
down the river. Finding them to be Choctaws, he conversed with a “half-breed who 
spoke very good English” and told him they had “been hunting on the west bank of the 
Mississippi.” Having “crossed the river yesterday morning,” they completed their hunt, 
and planned to return to their village on the opposite side.52 By the late eighteenth 
century, commercial hunting had depleted deer populations east of the Mississippi 
River. This forced hunters, including Chickasaws, to travel across the Mississippi in 
search of game.53 Shifting their focus west, where deer remained abundant, allowed 
them to maintain their role in the deerskin trade and retain access to manufactured 
                                                          
52 Raymond J. Martinez, ed., Pierre George Rousseau, Commanding General of the Galleys of the 
Mississippi, with Sketches of Spanish Governors of Louisiana (1777-1803) and Glimpses of Social Life in 
New Orleans (New Orleans: Hope Publicans, 1964), 49-50. 
53 Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the 
Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 92-94. Chickasaws 
increasingly hunted west of the Mississippi in the late eighteenth century, and they had a long tradition of 
warring on that side of the river too. James Adair explained, “they formerly went to war over the 
Mississippi, because they knew it best, and had disputes with the natives of those parts, when they first 
came from thence.” See Adair, History of the American Indians, 196.  
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goods they had become accustomed to.54 Women commonly accompanied men on 
distant hunting trips, and that tradition brought them over the Mississippi River too.55  
 In order to get there, however, men and women had to ferry their pirogues. This 
basic paddling technique requires setting a canoe at an acute angle against the current 
and rowing upstream to slow the downstream momentum as the boat crosses over. 
Maneuvering in this manner made east-west travel on the Mississippi possible and came 
in handy when aligning to run a particular section or avoid an obstruction.56 The weight 
of the crafts rowed by the party Rousseau encountered would have made it difficult for 
them to ferry across the Mississippi. According to historian Richard White’s 
calculations, in this instance, each pirogue carried between 250 and 350 deerskins or 
about 500-700 pounds.57 Adding additional mass for each passenger’s bodyweight 
means the canoeists had to operate pirogues weighing, conservatively, 800-1,000 
pounds. And that’s before accounting for miscellaneous supplies or even the heft of the 
boat itself! In addition, Rousseau noted “strong” currents coursed through the river the 
day before, which might have hampered their efforts to ferry across. Perhaps this is, at 
least in part, why the English-speaker asked Rousseau “to trade for their pelts.” To 
move such a bulky cargo, it is safe to assume both the men and women “manned” their 
pirogues to make the crossing.58  
                                                          
54 Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 145-146. 
55 Hudson, The Southeastern Indians, 271-272.  
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 Even when not rowing, female passengers often played an important role in 
navigating waterways. Southeastern Indians ranged throughout the LMR and commonly 
employed its expansive tributary network.  On the Ouachita River, near what is today 
central Louisiana, C.C. Robin, a New Orleans trader, encountered a party similar to the 
Choctaws described by Rousseau. “While we were proceeding at a good pace on the 
quiet water,” he wrote, “two fine pirogues decorated with deer heads sporting long 
branched antlers suddenly darted out of a nearby bayou. They were manned by Indian 
families. Women seated nonchalantly near the steersman directed him with comely 
outstretched bare arms, while the men manned the high oars.”59 Both sexes worked in 
tandem on this boat. Females directed male rowers with a grace and confidence that 
could only be gained from a lifetime of experience. Novice travelers, no matter how 
athletic, struggle with their “sea legs,” never mind maintaining the wherewithal to 
command a pirogue. Robin, like Rousseau, only mentions this sight in passing, 
suggesting its frequency. Pirogue travel was not a gender specific task, and so reflecting 
on women’s participation did not warrant much consideration.  
 Like their counterparts throughout the region, Chickasaw women accompanied 
their menfolk on rivers, even braving the harsh winter conditions of the Mississippi. 
Rousseau’s Choctaw informants had “met a party of fifteen Chickasaws with their 
women.” Then, on February 9th just north of the White River, the La Fleche “came 
alongside eleven pirogues filled with Chickasaw and Arkansas savages.” Headed by “a 
Chickasaw half-breed named Thomas,” the Indian convoy paced the warship upstream 
                                                          
59 Robin, Voyage to Louisiana, 128-129. Hunters throughout the Southeast camouflaged themselves using 
a buckskin with the head preserved to lure deer closer. This type of hunting gear probably accounts for 
the pirogue’s decoration. See Romans, Concise Natural History, 66; Bossu, Travels through that part of 
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for an hour before Rousseau ordered his charge ashore “to get dinner.” Landing with the 
Spaniards, the “captain of the party” implored Rousseau to look at “all these women 
and children who are here.” Osage warfare drove them from their homes, the headman 
said, and in order to avoid starvation they had been “forced to hunt deer on the 
Mississippi.” Brutal winter weather recently struck the region, adding to their plight. 
Over the ten previous days, reports of “wind and the snow,” “terrible” conditions, “very 
cold” temperatures, “rain,” and “bad weather” accumulated in Rousseau’s logbook, and 
even on the night of his meeting with the Chickasaws “the weather was disagreeable.”60 
Despite the poor conditions, Chickasaw women piloted the Mississippi River alongside 
their menfolk.   
 Over exposure must have worried Thomas and the others, but river conditions 
surely concerned them as well. Frozen precipitation along the UMR usually lowered 
water levels in the LMR until spring, but Rousseau’s records tell a different story for 
1793. Throughout late January and early February the Mississippi’s depth fluctuated 
wildly. On February 13th near the St. Francis River, “the [Mississippi] river rose two 
feet in twenty-four hours.” Rousseau dutifully reported, “the current is very strong. The 
river still carries ice, which make it very cold for us.” The following day he complained, 
“The river is still filled with much ice and driftwood.” Two days later “the river rose 4 
feet in scarcely 24 hours” and remained “filled with ice.”61 In winter large chunks of ice 
broke away from the banks and careened downstream when the river rose. As they 
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61 Martinez, Pierre George Rousseau, 58-59.   
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pursued the La Fleche, Thomas’ party, men and women alike, must have monitored the 
Mississippi for these frozen projectiles to avoid being dumped into the frigid water.   
 Rising water also swept up logs and tore trees from their banks, adding to the 
danger. These, too, cluttered the channel, posing a threat for Native and non-native 
vessels alike. Boatmen reported “wooden islands” of interlocked debris blocking the 
path or even heading towards them.62 With forests lining its edges, the Mississippi’s 
immense power undercut banks, uprooting entire trees whenever it flooded. One early 
nineteenth-century observer noted “planters” fell into the Mississippi with their roots 
weighted down so they became “fixed and immoveable”—planted—once they settled to 
the bottom, “generally with the heads of the trees pointing down river.” Meanwhile 
“sawyers” bobbed along “entirely submerged by the pressure of the stream,” only to 
have their momentum cause “huge limbs to be lifted above the surface of the river.” 
According to this traveler, the unpredictability of sawyers made them “more dangerous” 
than planters. “The steersman this instant sees all the surface of the river smooth and 
tranquil, and the next he is struck with horror at seeing just before him the sawyer 
raising his terrific arms, and so near that neither strength nor skill can save him from 
destruction. This is not figurative,” he warned, “many boats have been lost in this way, 
and more particularly those descending.”63 Such obstacles would have caused less 
damage to solid Indian pirogues than steamboats and bateaus, but they remained a threat 
to upend canoes and dislodge passengers.  
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63 John Bradbury, The Interior of America, in the Years 1809, 1810, and 1811; Including a Description of 
Upper Louisiana…2nd ed. (London: Sherwood, Neely, and Jones, 1819), 202-203.  
98 
 
 Should some impediment topple their pirogue, Chickasaws could handle 
themselves in the water. Bernard Romans claimed they were “all good swimmers, 
notwithstanding they live[d] so far from waters.” Recognizing its utility, Chickasaws 
taught their youngsters to swim “in clay holes, that are filled in wet seasons by rain.”64 
Like canoeing, this was not a skill reserved for warriors. “Both male and female, above 
the state of infancy, are in the watery element nearly equal to amphibious animals, by 
practice,” Adair asserted. Even if their pirogue upset and Mississippi hazards 
submerged them, Chickasaws were capable of “swimming under water.”65 This gave 
them a chance to escape Under World deities intent on holding them below the water’s 
surface. According to one Arkansas hunter, who dove into the Mississippi’s hard 
charging waters, “the Great Spirit had taught him to swim like a fish” so he could not 
accept a reward for saving a drowning Frenchman. “He could not employ his skill better 
than to save the life of his fellow-creature,” he explained.66 Whether or not Chickasaws 
shared these sentiments, the ability to swim aided those who, literally, found themselves 
in over their heads.67  
                                                          
64 Romans, Concise Natural History, 64-65.  
65 Adair, History of the American Indians, 404.  
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 While travelers attempted to stay out of the water, it was important to keep their 
pirogues in it. For travel, commerce, and warfare, pirogues constituted a valuable 
resource requiring protection. The time and energy invested by boatmakers during 
construction meant canoes were not easily replaced. Therefore, travelers sought to 
safeguard their vessels, particularly when it became necessary to leave them unattended. 
Forested inlets offered the handiest hiding spots for “parked” pirogues. At other times 
voyagers deliberately submerged their boats as a defense against the elements and their 
enemies.68 If left exposed too long, wind and sunshine dried wooden canoes, causing 
them to crack. Eventually these fissures jeopardized a craft’s integrity, putting both 
crew and cargo in danger. Immersing pirogues, when not in use, delayed this process 
and prolonged their service.69 In addition, the water’s surface hid them from preying 
eyes. 
 Europeans observed Native customs in these regards and, as with so many other 
conventions, adopted some themselves. While exploring the mouth of the Mississippi 
River in 1699, Pierre Le Moyne Sieur d’Iberville witnessed the precautions of one local 
band around Dauphin Island. Although they had feasted and exchanged goods with the 
Frenchman, he returned the following day to find “All of their canoes and baggage had 
been removed, indicating that they distrusted me.”70 Several decades later his 
countryman, Antoine-Simon Le Page du Pratz, took similar precautions while exploring 
along the Mississippi River. Upon arriving at the Chickasaw Bluffs he, “landed, and 
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concealed, after unlading it, the pettyaugre in the water.” Without taking this precaution 
his beached pirogue would have advertised his entry into Chickasaw Country. Having 
completed his objective Du Pratz and his Indian escorts returned to Lower Louisiana, at 
which point “the Indians hid the pettyaugre and went to their village.” 71 With 
transportation limited, pirogues were simply too valuable to be left exposed and 
unattended.72  
 If one knew where to look, caches of hidden canoes could be found lining the 
Mississippi River System. A similar system linked the Lower Great Lakes to the Ohio 
River in the mid-eighteenth century and probably well before that. Bands of Indians 
passed between Lake Erie and the Ohio’s tributaries at short “carrying places” where 
they could lug their canoes overland. According to Robert Hasenstab, “These sites 
could be expected to occur at break points in the water transport network, such as at 
falls along rivers or portages between drainages.” Here Native Americans would bury 
their canoes for the winter, protecting them from the elements, and retrieve them in the 
spring when needed.73 A similar arrangement occurred throughout the Southeast as 
well. Native peoples stored dugout canoes underwater in select spots around lakes and 
along rivers.74  
                                                          
71 Antoine Simon Le Page du Pratz, The History of Louisiana, or the Western Parts of Virginia and 
Carolina (London: T. Becket & P.A. De Hondt, 1774), 148-149. 
72 While treating with some Chickasaws at the Chickasaw Bluffs in 1795, the Spanish governor of 
Natchez, Manuel Gayoso, also sunk a rented pirogue for safekeeping. See Corbitt and Corbitt, “Papers 
from the Spanish Archives,” 48 (1976), 136.  
73 Robert J. Hasenstab, “Canoes, Caches and Carrying Places: Territorial Boundaries and Tribalization in 
Late Woodland Western New York State,” The Bulletin: Journal of the New York State Archaeological 
Association vol. 95 (1987), 39-49.  
74 Christopher B. Rodning, “Water Travel and Mississippian Settlement at Bottle Creek” In Bottle Creek: 
A Pensacola Culture Site in South Alabama, ed. Ian W. Brown and Penelope B. Drooker (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2003), 197. 
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 Here too, knowledge of the natural environment facilitated water travel. 
Navigable backwaters off the Mississippi or its tributaries proved ideal locations for 
secreting pirogues. The relativity constant water pressure prevented drying and 
cracking, while a lack of current reduced the risk of canoes being swept downstream. 
Finding storage spaces, therefore, required scouting accessible places with a certain 
degree of water depth and stillness. Though canoes could be stashed anyplace 
conditions allowed, fixed caches were most likely to be found where established 
overland trails met navigable waterways.  
 Chickasaws probably frequented three such locations where, evidence suggests, 
they warehoused pirogues. It is highly likely Chickasaw boatmen stowed canoes on the 
Tennessee, Wolf, and Yazoo rivers during the eighteenth century.75 The former, 
according to Spanish officials, proved “navigable for 200 leagues during high water,” 
although “in low water it [was] impractical because of some 30 miles of shallows called 
Muscle Shoals.”76 This created natural break points, one of which John Stuart called 
“the Chickasaw Landing,” and seems a logical storage place for canoes given 
Chickasaws and Cherokees routinely traversed the Tennessee River.77 The Wolf River, 
which passed the north end of the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff, is another apt candidate as a 
storage site. Several trails from their villages converged in the area, and Chickasaws 
                                                          
75 Archeological discoveries have been limited throughout the Southeast since wooden pirogues decay 
over time. Written documents, on the other hand, only reveal so much, but they consistently report 
Chickasaw activities in these areas. See Theodore Calvin Peace and Ernestine Jenison, eds., Illinois on 
the Eve of the Seven Years War, 1747-1755 French Series, vol. III (Springfield, IL: Collections of the 
Illinois State Historical Society, 1740), 766-767. 
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frequented the waterway.78 They may have cached supplies nearby according to the 
testimony of two Spanish-aligned hunters who uncovered “a large quantity of powder, 
ball, merchandise, dried meat, flour, maize, and other provisions and goods.” “In the 
neighborhood” they also found “two pirogues full of bear’s fat and tallow.”79 Finally, 
the Yazoo River offered the most direct access to the Mississippi River, though at times 
during the eighteenth century this meant passing through enemy territory.80 
Nevertheless, Chickasaw war parties were known to stash pirogues there, and one 
headman sent messengers to Natchez “by water from the [Walnut] Hills” and he wished 
they would “return that far the same way.”81  
 Wherever Chickasaw canoes ended up, navigating them safely required a keen 
sense of the river and a pragmatic assessment of one’s own skills. “Reading” water 
levels and current patterns kept travelers safe, while also allowing them to control their 
pace and direction. Men and women assessed these factors against their own abilities to 
maneuver about the river. Hard-earned experience and the capacity to swim mitigated 
their peril to a degree. Caching pirogues upon arrival did the same. Travelers 
maintained the integrity of their crafts and helped to conceal their own presence. None 
of this would have been possible without the Chickasaws’ familiarity with the 
                                                          
78 James Adair claimed after Pierre d’Artaguette and his army were routed by the Chickasaws, the 
survivors returned to their basecamp on the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff at “the Chikkasah landing place, 
N.W. on the Missisippi…where they took boat, and delivered their unexpected message.” See Adair, The 
History of the American Indians, 355; Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 43-47; Malone, The 
Chickasaw Nation, 149; Stanley Faye, “The Arkansas Post of Louisiana: French Domination,” The 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly vol. 26, no. 3 (July, 1943), 676.   
79 Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., “Spain in the Mississippi Valley,” Annual Report for the American Historical 
Association for 1945, vol. III (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 23. 
80 Kinnaird, “Spain in the Mississippi Valley,” III: 211 and John D. Stubbs Jr., “The Chickasaw Contact 
with the La Salle Expedition in 1682” in La Salle and His Legacy: Frenchmen and Indians in the Lower 
Mississippi Valley, ed. Patricia Galloway (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1982), 46-48.  
81 MPA:FD V, 34; Corbitt and Corbitt, “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” 43 (1971), 106.  
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Mississippi River System. According to The Complete Canoeist’s Guide this may have 
been their greatest asset. “Proper advance knowledge of the river to be paddled,” it 
declares, “is the most absolute of all safety rules.”82 
 
Mapping the River 
  
 Accumulated wisdom made it possible for Chickasaws to navigate the 
Mississippi confident of where they would end up. Collectively they formulated a 
mental record of its course and extensive tributaries. Maps drawn in 1723 and 1737 
underscore their comprehensive knowledge of the river system and the geopolitical 
landscape around it. If rivers served as North America’s first highways, as they are 
often characterized, Chickasaw Country sat at a major interchange. The importance of 
waterways is made clear by the fact that rivers—not mountains, lakes, or valleys—
constitute the sole topographical feature on both maps. Surrounding the Chickasaw 
Nation on three sides, the Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee rivers merged on its 
northern border. By distinguishing between navigable rivers, like these, and non-
navigable waterways Chickasaws communicated about river conditions and 
accessibility. Throughout the colonial period, the Chickasaws’ central location and 
familiarity with the entire river system made them valuable allies and formidable 
enemies.    
                                                          
82 Bridge, The Complete Canoeist’s Guide, 179.  
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 During a meeting in September of 1723, South Carolina Governor Francis 
Nicholson received a map from a party of Chickasaw diplomats. Hoping to publicize 
their circumstances, they presented a deerskin diagram consisting of circles and lines 
for the governor’s review. Spheres of various sizes representing Indian nations and 
European colonies filled the space. Lines connected some of these circles but fell short 
of others to display the region’s alliance network.83 Because Chickasaw mapmakers 
intentionally emphasized their connections with South Carolina, overland paths 
highlight their ties to the east and the Native American allies who helped sustain them. 
Despite this land-centric focus the mapmakers reveal a great deal about how 
Chickasaws approached the Mississippi, other rivers in the region, and the land between 
them and the Chickasaw Nation. Western Muskogean terms and the English rendering 
“Massasippe” identified twelve distinct waterways, which otherwise are 
indistinguishable from the land-based paths drawn across the hide.84 Roughly 13,000 
miles of navigable rivers appeared passing every which way through approximately 
850,000 miles of mapped territory.85 These lines were not a traveler’s itinerary but the 
shared socio-geographic knowledge of the Chickasaw Nation.   
                                                          
83 St. Jean, “Trading Paths,” 18-20.  





Figure 7: Chickasaw Map, ca. 1723. Anonymous [Chickasaw?] [SEM 192] [ca. 1723:] A Map 
Describing the Situation of the several Nations of Indians between South Carolina and the 
Massisipi River; was Copyed from a Draught Drawn & Painted upon a Deer Skin by an Indian 
Cacique: and Presented to Francis Nicholson Esqr. Governour of Carolina. 
 
 
 The onset of large scale European colonialism had reshaped intra-Indian 
relationships throughout the Southeast by the early eighteenth century. Competition 
between France and Britain for land and Indian slaves intensified longstanding Native 
rivalries and sparked new conflicts. Violence accompanied weaponry and slaves along 
trade routes, but so too did utilitarian merchandise. Such goods made daily life easier 
even as it became more dangerous. For their part, France and Britain demanded 
exclusive trade relationships. Convenience and self-preservation required Native 
polities to pick a side—or at least appear to. Beginning in the late seventeenth century 
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Chickasaw headmen used military service, flattery, and even “mapping as diplomatic 
propaganda” to maintain access to British merchandise.86  
 Every inch of the diagram presented to Governor Nicholson serves this purpose, 
sketching both the political and physical landscape in order to secure arms and supplies 
from South Carolina.   With that project in mind, the Chickasaw mapmakers 
emphasized their connections to the British and minimized their contact with the 
French. In this way, they mapped social and political distance between polities by 
distorting physical space.87 Despite the Chickasaws’ relatively small population and 
remoteness from Charles Town, the entire drawing centers on a large circle representing 
the Chickasaw Nation. The circumference of each polity’s circle demonstrates its 
importance, rather than the polity’s actual size. As such the Cherokees, Creeks, and 
British all appear as large spheres. The Choctaws were the only French affiliated nation 
to receive a similar treatment, but their ties to the Chickasaws are clearly less 
significant. Whereas bold double lines unite the Chickasaws, Cherokees, Creeks, and 
British, only a pencil thin stripe links the Choctaws to the Chickasaw Nation. All of this 
elevates the importance of the British-backed network dominating the deerskin trade.  
 Conversely, the entire French alliance system was belittled by the tiny orbs and 
slim strokes. The Indian nations within this network appear petit, and their European 
patron is completely absent. As the Chickasaws were well aware, France had 
settlements in Illinois, Louisiana, and Alabama of which the Chickasaws. These 
outposts furnished supplies necessary to maintain the expansive coalition along the 
                                                          
86 St. Jean, “Trade Paths,” 765.  
87 Waselkov, “Indian Maps of the Colonial Southeast,” 443.  
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Mississippi River System. If Governor Nicholson recognized the symbolism of this 
slight, he must have appreciated the gesture. The Tennessee and Mississippi rivers 
“were the most important arteries of southeastern Indian exchange” yet they appear 
emaciated compared to paths within the Chickasaws’ own network.88 This 
topographical distortion obscures the relative ease of water travel compared to energy 
expended humping overland.89 In addition, the mileage separating the Mississippi 
River, the Chickasaw Nation, and the British is devalued. The Chickasaw appear nearly 
equidistance between the Mississippi and Charles Town, although in reality the 
waterway is much closer.90 As drawn, the Chickasaw Nation looks completely excluded 
from the Mississippi, its tributaries, and the Indian nations residing in those river 
valleys.   
 Nevertheless, the Chickasaws retained a wealth of knowledge about these river 
courses. Down the deerskin’s left side the Chickasaw cartographers mapped the 
Mississippi River from approximately modern-day St. Louis, Missouri, to Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana. Encompassing the whole MMR and most of the LMR, this route extends 
nearly 1,000 miles. The drawing also incorporates the main components of the entire 
river system. Although clearly not intended as a navigational chart, the mapmakers 
precisely located tributaries from east and west. The Chickasaws accurately depicted the 
Ohio River merging with the Mississippi, followed by the Arkansas, Yazoo, and Red 
rivers.91 Like the Mississippi, the Ohio extends across the diagram covering hundreds of 
                                                          
88 St. Jean, “Trade Paths,” 759.   
89 Hartmann, “The Development of Watercraft,” 41.  
90 Gibson, The Chickasaws, 45-46. 
91 The Arkansas River and Red River share the designation “Ucau Humer Oakhinnau,” though they are 
clearly separate entities on the map. 
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riverine miles. Along this route, the Tennessee River splits off towards the southeast, 
while the Wabash River radiates northeastward. Though unlabeled, paths denoting the 
location of the Peoria, Cahokia, and Kaskaskia suggest the artists included the Illinois 
River, just north of the Ohio, as an extension of the Mississippi.92 In this depiction of 
the MMR and LMR, the Missouri River is the only major tributary left uncharted. 
Given the Chickasaws’ extensive geographic knowledge and their inclusion of the 
Missouria, this absence is probably an omission rather than a blind spot. Either way, the 
deerskin drawing is an impressive representation of the mid-continent’s waterways.  
 Nestled beneath the Tallahatchie River, a Yazoo tributary, the Chickasaw Nation 
is shown near the Mississippi River System but seemingly not a part of it. “Rivers and 
trails” on Southeastern Indian maps “merge to form communication networks that 
define the limits of mapped space, which is otherwise unbounded. Rivers arise and flow 
to their outlets within the confines of the maps, and paths end at the most distant 
villages or tribal domains. These are self-contained worlds,” Gregory Waselkov 
argues.93 According to this reasoning, the Chickasaws’ world is clearly mapped with an 
eastward slant. The aptly named Cherokee Path and the Creek and British Paths bind 
the Chickasaw to the British in Charles Town through their Cherokee and Creek allies 
respectively. Meanwhile, the Tombigbee and Tuscaloosa rivers connect them to French-
allied nations around Mobile. An unnamed path unites the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and 
more French-allied peoples in that same direction. Not a single path springs north from 
                                                          
92 Waselkov, “Indian Maps of the Colonial Southeast,” 480. If John Robertson is correct that Native 
Americans (he does not specify who) understood the lower Ohio and lower Mississippi as a single river, 
then this might explain the absence of the UMR on the map. Refer back to page 7 footnote 9 for more on 
this.  
93 Waselkov, “Indian Maps of the Colonial Southeast,” 444.  
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the Chickasaw Nation, and only the “Chockchumau Path” proceeds to the west. 
Mirroring the Tallahatchie River, this trail angles southwest where it ends at a series of 
three unidentified Indian nations. Here the Chickasaws’ communication network stops 
without intersecting the Yazoo River or the Mississippi River System at large.   
 Although the rivers depicted on the map appear inaccessible for the Chickasaw 
people, the names of those same rivers indicate otherwise. In the Chickasaw language, 
okhina’ (spelled “oakhinnau” on the map) once denoted a waterway “whose volume and 
depth were sufficient for travel by dugout canoe.”94 Therefore when they spoke of Sakti 
Lhafa’ Okhina’ they evoked a sense of place, at the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff, but also 
commented on its capacity as a water route. An Anglicized version of the Mississippi’s 
Algonquian name appears on the 1723 map, but its tributaries are clearly labeled 
“oakhinnau,” showing that they were fit for travel. These rivers received similarly 
descriptive or destination-based designations. “Tascanuck Oakhinnau,” for example, 
spoke to the availability of flint on the Tennessee River, as well as to its ability to 
propel a pirogue. The Ohio River, or “Senottova Oakhinnau,” begins in western New 
York near the Iroquois Confederacy, which earned it the designation “Seneca River.”95 
Other identified tributaries include the Wabash, Arkansas, Yazoo, and Red rivers, all of 
which are regarded as “oakhinnau.” The image on the map suggests Chickasaw 
canoeists could not reach these rivers, but the Chickasaw names for those waterways 
tell a different story.  
                                                          
94 In Chickasaw oka’ is water and hina’ is road, so these were literally water-roads. See Dyson, The Early 
Chickasaw Homeland, 170; Munro and Willmond, Chickasaw, 532, 492.  
95 Dyson, The Early Chickasaw Homeland, 179.  
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 Although visible trails do not connect the Chickasaw Nation to the Mississippi 
River System several warpaths do cross Mississippi tributaries. From the Wabash River, 
Wea and Kickapoo routes ominously descend over the Ohio from the northeast. To the 
northwest, three more trails hang like suspended daggers threatening to fall. Originating 
near the Illinois River, these paths brought French-allied warriors south into Chickasaw 
Country. Only these warpaths occupy open space between the Ohio River and the 
Chickasaw homeland. Combined with a lack of warpaths heading in the opposite 
direction, the Chickasaws appear to be vulnerable and on the defensive. This is a good 
piece of “propaganda” considering Chickasaw diplomats presented this map to the 
British in hopes of receiving armaments.  
 The space north of the Chickasaw Nation on the map, perhaps inadvertently, 
also reveals more about Chickasaw river usage. The direction of the warpaths clearly 
paint French-backed nations as the aggressors, but paths were not unidirectional. If their 
enemies could travel over the Tennessee and Ohio rivers so could Chickasaws. The only 
human depicted within the diagram is a warrior holding a bow and leading a horse north 
on the Kaskaskia Path over the Ohio River. The man may symbolize the return of some 
Kaskaskia warriors following a raid, but why would the Chickasaw artists give the 
impression they could repel their enemies without British firearms? This figure is more 
than likely a Chickasaw warrior. Facing north on the warpath he remains on the 
defensive, yet his bow advertises the Chickasaws’ need for guns. However, his presence 
at the Ohio River means Chickasaws were not isolated from the river system after all. 
He has already crossed over, yet his horse remains south of the waterway. The man 
holds its bridle, which spans the Ohio, indicating he is bringing the horse with him. 
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Therefore, he either cut across a ford or intends to swim his horse to the other side.96 
Either way the image demonstrates Chickasaws crossed the Ohio River with their 
horses. Warpaths directed at the Chickasaw Nation might just as easily lead them to 
various locations on the Ohio and Tennessee rivers as well.  
 Furthermore, the circle signifying the Chickasaw Nation does not replicate the 
full geographical extent of its territory. A void exists between the Chickasaws and the 
Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee rivers that actually marked the limits of their domain. 
A delegation of Chickasaw headman insisted on these exact boundaries when they met 
President George Washington in 1794. Washington, in response, affirmed their nation’s 
borders on the Ohio, Tennessee, and Tombigbee rivers, before concluding in the west 
where their boundary ran “up the Missisipi to the mouth of the Ohio.”97 Thus the mental 
geography of their migration legend matches the description Washington provided. The 
physical map reproduces these same borders although the artists depict their nation 
within a much smaller area. There are no paths leading to these rivers, but there is 
nothing to obstruct Chickasaw access either.    
 In fact, some Chickasaws had visited the Mississippi and Yazoo rivers just prior 
to the map’s presentation. Two Frenchmen “were taken by surprise in broad midday” 
along the Mississippi and cut down in “a hail of gunshots which killed them both” in 
April of 1722.98 Four others fell victim that October near the Chickasaw Bluffs, where 
                                                          
96 Swimming horses across waterways was a common practice, although current strength and distance 
influenced where and when this might be done. See Adair, History of the American Indians, 272-273.     
97 Kinnaird, “Spain in the Mississippi Valley,” IV: 326 and Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 
164-165. Chief Ugulayacabé similarly claimed an American fort on the Ohio River rested, “on the Very 
Borders of My land.” See Corbitt and Corbitt, “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” 41 (1969), 104.     
98 MPA:FD III, 277.  
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they were captured and carried off. The following year, the crew of two French pirogues 
encountered still more Chickasaws in that vicinity. Then, just months before Governor 
Nicholson received his map, a Canadian voyageur reported that a delegation of forty-
odd Chickasaws on the Yazoo River attempted to coordinate a peace with France. 99 All 
of the Chickasaws’ routes to and from these rivers, be they warpaths or diplomatic ones, 
are conspicuously missing from the governor’s diagram. The map’s lack of paths 
created the fiction of a political, economic, and physical gap between the Chickasaws 
and French allies lining the Mississippi and its tributaries. The absence of paths may 
have been another visual display of Chickasaw fidelity. 
 The open space wrapping counter-clockwise around the Chickasaw Nation from 
the northeast also suggested an opportunity. Traveling down the Tennessee and Ohio 
rivers at the turn of the seventeenth century, British traders reached the Mississippi 
where they opened relations with the Natchez and other nearby nations. Having lost 
these ties during the Yamasee War (1715-1717), British agents saw the Chickasaws as 
their best chance to return to the river.100 Edmond Atkin, for one, certainly did not miss 
the significance of their position in the region. In his oft cited mid-century report, he 
wrote Chickasaw Country “lies in a central place about the middle of the Missisippi, 
and commands all the water Passages between New Orleans and Canada, and from that 
River to the backs of our Colonies; And is Supportable or accessible [by water] from 
most of them.”101 The space on the map divorcing Chickasaws from the Mississippi, 
                                                          
99 Diron D’Artaguiette, “Journal of Diron D’Artaguiette, 1722-1723.” In Travels in the American 
Colonies, ed. Newton D. Mereness (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 31, 33, 62-63, 85.  
100 Crane, “The Tennessee River as the Road to Carolina,” 3-18.  
101 Edmond Atkin, Indians of the Southern Colonial Frontier: The Edmond Atkin Report and Plan of 
1755, ed. Wilbur R. Jacobs (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1954), 67.  
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Ohio, and Tennessee rivers demonstrates the Chickasaw Nation’s detachment from the 
French. Chickasaw cartographers might have designed the diagram in this way to entice 
the governor. The gap subtly invited the extension of the British trade network onto the 
rivers via the Chickasaw Nation. Of course, expansion would require British firearms 
and other goods the envoys sought.  
 The 1723 map was designed to minimize French influence and maximize British 
potential along the Mississippi, but Chickasaw artists altered this scene according to 
their audience. In July of 1737 the Captain of Pacana, a pro-French Alabama chief, 
visited the Chickasaw Nation. Knowing he would report his visit to colonial officials in 
Louisiana, a Chickasaw headman presented the Captain with a map detailing the 
Chickasaws’ sociopolitical relationships.102 This diagram is quite different from the one 
received by Governor Nicholson. Geographic depictions of waterways are entirely 
omitted, though the familiar circles and paths remain. In addition, the French alliance 
network appears more robust while the British are diminished. Most importantly, paths 
radiate from the Chickasaw Nation toward French-backed nations throughout the 
Mississippi River System.  
 Just a year before the Captain’s visit, Chickasaw warriors scored two lopsided 
victories over the French and some of their Indian allies. Following the Natchez 
Rebellion (1729), pro-British Chickasaws sheltered Natchez refugees fleeing French 
reprisals. As a result, Louisiana officials instigated a proxy war against the Chickasaws. 
French spokesmen induced bands of Iroquois and Hurons, in addition to Wea and 
                                                          
102 The only surviving copy of this map comes from a reproduction drafted by Alexandre de Batz and 




Miami warriors, to attack them from the north. Meanwhile, parties of Choctaws were 
encouraged to strike from the south. These assaults climaxed in 1736 as two French-led 
armies failed spectacularly in their attempts to invade Chickasaw Country.103 
Nonetheless sporadic raids continued, and many Chickasaw headmen looked to the 
Captain of Pacana for help stemming the bloodshed.104  
  Given the recent state of affairs it is understandable why some details within the 
1737 map changed. For starters the Captain need not see regional waterways on the 
deerskin canvas to know where they were, and Louisiana’s bureaucrats had some 
familiarity with them as well. The artists focused on the Chickasaw alliance network 
which certainly interested their audience more. Initially this French version appears 
nothing like its British counterpart, but if rotated to the right 135° their main 
components are strikingly similar. The Chickasaw Nation sits within a central circle and 
its trade network extends east from it. Chickasaws are bound to the Cherokees and 
Creeks by two separate paths and connect to the British through those nations. French-
affiliated nations combine to form a backwards “J” partially surrounding the 
Chickasaws as before. The fundamental structure of the region’s alliance network had 
not changed much since 1723. This is largely where the maps’ similarities end.  
 
                                                          
103 For more on the French-Chickasaw War of 1736 see Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 36-
61; Gibson, The Chickasaws, 50-53; Patricia Galloway, “Ougoula Tchetoka, Ackia, and Bienville’s First 
Chickasaw War: Whose Strategy and Tactics?” Journal of Chickasaw History 2 (1): 3-10; Joseph L. 
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Figure 8: Chickasaw Map, ca. 1737. By rotating the map 
approximately 135° the geopolitical layout matches the physical landscape. Alexandre de Batz 
[cf. SEM 236B] 1737d: Nations amies et Ennemies des Tchicachas. Septembre 1737. [Archives 







 Whereas the Chickasaws’ own alliance network commanded the eye in 1723, 
several Indian nations backing France matched the Chickasaws’ significance on the 
1737 map. Every polity to the east has been diminished in stature while the Arkansas, 
Tamarois, and a joint circle representing the Huron and Iroquois have all been greatly 
expanded.105 Proportionally the Choctaws continue to equal the Chickasaws, though the 
                                                          
105 The Creek Nation is subdivided between Coweta, Kasihta, and Okfuskee which partially explains their 
smaller dimensions. The Tamaroas do not appear on the 1723 map, but the Kaskaskia do and these 
peoples lived together at the mouth of the Kaskaskia River in Illinois during this time. The Huron and 
Iroquois received separate treatments in 1723, but their shared circle on the 1737 map is more than twice 
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Cherokees are the only nation in the other alliance of comparable size. Given the map’s 
viewership and the withering attacks sprung by these peoples, it is little wonder 
France’s allies appear so large. The addition of Mobile marks the first appearance of a 
French outpost, although others in Louisiana and Illinois are still ignored. Nonetheless, 
the French alliance network no longer looks scattershot across the page. French-backed 
nations are neatly bound by paths replicating the Mississippi River System. The Ohio 
River connects the Huron and Iroquois to the Tamaroi in Illinois, and from there the 
Mississippi links them to the Arkansas, Chakchiuma, and Choctaw in succession.106 
Without the topographical realism of the 1723 edition, the mapmakers depict this 
scheme as seamless as the Chickasaws’ own pathways to the British.        
 New trails also fill the void that had existed between the Chickasaws and 
polities opposite the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. Five paths arise from the Chickasaw 
Nation extending towards each French ally. Routes to the Choctaws and Chakchiuma 
exist on the older map, as do warpaths originating from the Huron and Illinois nations. 
The mapmakers flipped the script in 1737, however, portraying these and another path 
toward the Arkansas as Chickasaw corridors. Unlike the warpaths (T) and trade paths 
(S) found elsewhere on this map, they do not connect to their destinations. These 
passageways (Q) “are warpaths that do not go as far as the villages, because they hope 
that they will become white when they [the Chickasaws] make peace with those toward 
whom they lead.”107 France’s willingness to negotiate an accord after the Captain of 
                                                          
the size of these. See Jon D. May, "Tamaroa," Encyclopedia of Oklahoma History and Culture, 
www.okhistory.org (accessed August 13, 2015).     
106 The Chakchiuma may have been among the unidentified nations on the “Chockchumau Path” in 1723, 
but are included within the French alliance in 1737. See Dyson, The Early Chickasaw Homeland, 173.  
107 Waselkov, “Indian Maps of the Colonial Southeast,” 483.  
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Pacana’s visit would ultimately determine the outcome. Peace with the Chickasaws 
would transform these paths into trade avenues while rejecting their overtures meant 
war.  
 Either way, Chickasaws intended to utilize the Mississippi River System. 
Travelling on four of the five paths towards French-backed nations required traversing a 
Mississippi tributary or crossing the muddy Mississippi itself. For example, reaching 
the Iroquois Confederacy meant traveling up the Ohio River which Chickasaws called 
Sinitowa’ Okhina’. As noted, this designation stemmed from the Seneca’s location and 
the waterway’s suitability for pirogue traffic. Turning off the Ohio to the northeast, 
Chickasaw canoeists could take Wiyatino’ Okhina’, or the Wabash River, to the Huron. 
Accessing the Tamaroi or Kaskaskia by land required passing over the Ohio. Otherwise 
Chickasaw warriors could paddle up the Mississippi to their villages around the mouth 
of the Kaskaskia River. To be sure, rowing up these rivers was a daunting chore, but not 
an impossibility. Being downstream on the Mississippi made the Arkansas far more 
accessible. Chickasaws might launch their canoes from the north or simply ferry across 
from the east. Both options meant traversing the mighty river. The Chakchiumas were 
also reachable by water, although the overland “Chockchumau Path” shown on the 
1723 map seems the most likely route. However, the upper reaches of the Yazoo River 
supported pirogues and could be ridden south. All of these rivers might function as 
white peace paths or red warpaths.  
      Both maps demonstrate the Chickasaws’ command of the physical and 
political landscape along the river system. Central waterways, excepting the Missouri 
River, sprawl across the 1723 rendition representing the Chickasaws’ vast geographic 
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knowledge. In the French copy, topographical realism gives way to sociopolitical 
considerations, yet the riverine landscape continues to play a large role in the path 
network. Chickasaws recognized where these rivers led and which friends or enemies 
they could expect to find along the way. The cartographers sought to define the riverine 
landscape and in the process made Chickasaw claims about the Mississippi River. In the 
1723 version nothing and no one separate the Chickasaws from the mighty Mississippi. 
Conversely, paths pave the way for them in the French version. Whereas a lack of trails 
ensured their loyalty and spelled potential for the British, the presence of paths offered 
an opportunity and warning for the French. When Chickasaws puts their pirogues on 
rivers they became trade highways, but in times of conflict they ushered in violence 
instead. These were not idle choices for the Chickasaws nor were they inconsequential 
for their neighbors and the colonial objectives of France and Britain.  
 The Chickasaws’ station near the middle of their maps put them in a 
commanding position. Yet Southeastern mapping conventions conditioned Native 
cartographers to place their people in the center. Chickasaw ability to chart the 
Mississippi River System, while undeniably impressive, did not make them unique 
either. Governor James Glen of South Carolina, for instance, marveled over the 
Cherokees’ ability to “trace the Rivers on the Floor with Chalk, and also on Paper.”108 It 
was not the Chickasaws’ spot on the diagram or the rivers across it, but their proximity 
to these waterways which elevated their standing. Yet, by itself, this meant little. After 
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all, it is the interaction between the environment, technology, and people that has 
shaped history along the Mississippi River for thousands of years.109  
 By observing seasonal patterns, Chickasaws learned to make use of its variable 
water levels and forecast floods. This maximized the available resources while reducing 
the risk to human life. Two distinct topographical features, the Chickasaw Bluffs and 
the Delta, determined the Mississippi’s path along Chickasaw Country. The river, in 
turn, remade these landforms, producing sheer cliffs and an expansive floodplain 
offering distinct environments. Within these ecological zones, cypress and pine trees 
grew to massive proportions, providing the raw material necessary for pirogue 
construction.  
 Since before Mississippian culture arose, Native Americans had been crafting 
dugout canoes to pilot the Mississippi. The Chickasaws followed in this tradition, 
shaping large straight tree trunks with fire before sculpting them with steel tools. Once 
on the water, men and women worked their paddles to position themselves within the 
current. River mechanics and machine carried Chickasaws far afield. However, nature 
also took a toll. If left to dry, pirogues began to crack, but here again the environment 
offered up an answer. Submersion protected dugout canoes and camouflaged them from 
one’s enemies along the river. Navigating the Mississippi required reading twists and 
turns, commanding a pirogue, and grasping the nuances of regional politics.  
 These factors, combined with the Chickasaws’ location near the Mississippi, 
made their maps noteworthy. As a group, Chickasaws had extensive knowledge of the 
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river’s channel, its tributaries, and those environments. Furthermore, they understood 
how to use them in the pursuit of trade and warfare. This forced their neighbors to 
consider the Chickasaws’ geopolitical position. Situated along the Mississippi and its 
major tributaries, Chickasaws had the capacity to facilitate long-distance commerce. 
Much to the chagrin of their enemies, they could also curtail river traffic. As evidenced 
by their maps, the Mississippi River System brought them into contact with a wide 
variety of people. These peoples, Native and non-Native, had to consider their 
relationships with the Chickasaws before traversing these rivers. Throughout the 
eighteenth century, Chickasaw headmen attempted to use this to their advantage, on 










“We Shall Paddle our Canoes on the Mississippi”  
1735-1745 
 
Since 1699 French officials had recognized the Chickasaws’ importance in the 
Lower Mississippi Valley. The first governor of Louisiana, Pierre le Moyne d’Iberville, 
immediately began politicking to win them over. Given their British trade ties and 
continuous slave raids on the French-affiliated Choctaws, allying with them seemed to 
be a potential economic and logistical boon. Mollifying the Chickasaws might blunt 
British entry into the region and safeguard the small French populace. D’Iberville and 
each successive governor, including his brother Jean Baptist le Moyne Bienville, 
adopted this position to varying degrees. However, an accord proved elusive as time 
after time regional tensions flared or trade goods failed to materialize. 
By the mid-1730s the Chickasaws’ relationship with France had sunk to an all-
time low after fallout from the Natchez Revolt. On November 28, 1729, Natchez 
warriors rose up in a surprise attack, devastating French settlers at Fort Rosalie, near 
present-day Natchez, Mississippi. This event, which Chickasaw tribal historian Richard 
Green calls a “turning point in Chickasaw history,” marked a definitive shift in 
Chickasaw-Franco relations.1 The Chickasaw Nation drew the ire of French officials 
who accused it of planning the attack. Believing they had “led the conspiracy,” 
Louisiana governor Étienne Périer articulated a new policy.2 Determined to “complete 
the destruction of the Natchez”, Périer proposed the same fate for the Chickasaws 
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2 MPA:FD IV, 37. 
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would be “no less necessary at the proper time.”3  At the very “least”, he argued, France 
ought to “drive” the Natchez nation from the region “where it is established too near the 
[Mississippi] river.”4 For their part, the Chickasaws were “too closely bound to the 
English” and “situated in the midst” of French allied Indian nations, making it necessary 
to “destroy them without fail.”5 His assessment is revealing in its vindictiveness and 
rationale. In the aftermath of the Natchez Revolt, Périer coupled allegations of 
Chickasaw collusion with geopolitics along the Mississippi River to justify their 
eradication. 
In order to safeguard the Mississippi Valley French officials believed they had 
to control the river running through it. The Mississippi served as the lifeline between 
their fledgling settlements in the Illinois country and Lower Louisiana. Known as 
“Upper Louisiana” after its annexation in 1717, Illinois became the breadbasket for all 
of French Louisiana. There, settlers grew grains that fed the small urban population and 
many of the burgeoning plantations downriver. In return, colonial officials and 
merchants sent manufactured goods and weaponry upstream to resupply the isolated 
outposts.6 Should the waterway ever be “cut off,” this vital exchange and most 
communication between Lower and Upper Louisiana would cease.7 In Périer’s 
estimation the Illinois post proved “most necessary for this colony as much to furnish it 
                                                          
3 MPA:FD IV, 41. 
4 MPA:FD IV, 37. 
5 MPA:FD IV, 41. 
6 Carl J. Ekberg, “The Flour Trade in French Colonial Louisiana,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the 
Louisiana Historical Association, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), 261-282; d’Artaguette, “Journal of 
Diron d’Artaguette,” 70-71. For more on agriculture in the region see Carl J. Ekberg, French Roots in the 
Illinois Country: The Mississippi Frontier in Colonial Times (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000); 
Margaret Kimball Brown, History as They Lived It: A Social History of Prairie du Rocher, Illinois 
(Tucson: The Patrice Press, 2005), 6, 78-87.    
7 MPA:FD I, 120; Jacob Piatt Dunn, “The Mission to the Ouabache,” Indiana Historical Society 
Publications vol. 3, no. 4 (1902), 257.  
123 
 
with the things it needs as for the security of the [Mississippi] river, which must be the 
bulwark of this province.”8 A large portion of the wares annually transported upriver 
went to France’s Indian allies as gifts in order to provide this security. As part and 
parcel of Indian diplomacy, presents sustained friendly relations, making gifts 
indispensable. Settlers in Upper and Lower Louisiana came to depend on Mississippi 
River shipments for their sustenance, commerce, and safety.  
The Mississippi was no less important to Chickasaws, and they began making 
attacks on the French supply line. Chickasaw warriors targeted individual French boats 
and entire convoys plying the river. Some riverine attacks occurred as outbursts of 
spontaneous violence, while others served specific geopolitical purposes. Deliberately 
inhibiting water travel forced French colonists to recognize the Mississippi River as part 
of Chickasaw Country, even if the imperial project required officially denying it. 
Furthermore, French travelers captured on the river could be ritually redeemed and 
employed as mediators conveying Chickasaw intentions. Testimony from these captives 
taught colonial officials to recognize indigenous geographic boundaries and better 
understand Native modes of diplomacy.  
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Figure 9:  Course of the Mississippi River 
Map, ca. 1796. Georges-Henri-Victor Collot, 
Map of the Course of the Mississippi from the 
Missouri and the Country of the Illinois to the 











































Chickasaws actively sought river hostages in order to transform enemies into 
allies. The Chickasaw Nation shared its claim to the Mississippi River with foreign 
nations, but reciprocal relations had to be established. Chickasaws attempted to 
jumpstart this process with France by detaining Frenchmen along the Mississippi. With 
captives in hand, Chickasaw diplomats then set about ending hostilities and 
coordinating trade. Repatriating river captives not only opened lines of communication, 
it built goodwill and understanding. As Louisiana bureaucrats gradually recognized, 
peace and mutual exchange with the Chickasaw Nation could safeguard French passage 
along the Mississippi.  
Coordinated river raids and the return of captives also functioned to unite 
factions within the Chickasaw Nation. Red and white moieties traditionally served 
complimentary roles in Chickasaw society, as they did for other Southeastern Native 
American peoples. By the 1730s, this division also shaded internal disagreements over 
trade relations and foreign policy dividing, tribal leaders and the general population 
alike. A core group of white moiety chiefs consistently pursued a cooperative 
agreement with French Louisiana, while their counterparts in the red moiety maintained 
a close-knit alliance with British Carolina. The white moiety sought to leverage the 
river and its peoples to reconcile with France. Meanwhile, red chiefs led war parties 
obstructing travel and taking captives. These actions could be a source of internal 
animosity but also proved diplomatically useful.  
For the Chickasaw Nation colonial competition between France and Britain, the 
fate of the Natchez refugees, and security along the Mississippi River became 
interrelated points of contention. Yet, evidence suggests headmen from the red and 
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white moieties proved willing to collaborate when trying to broker a peaceful, and 
economically beneficial, relationship with France. Seeking to avoid alienating 
Louisiana officials outright, members of the red moiety at times cooperated in taking 
and repatriating French river captives. Members of both moieties joined together to 
project military and diplomatic power onto the river and claim its waters along 
Chickasaw Country.  
Chickasaw actions on the Mississippi River varied considerably as France 
attempted to colonize Upper and Lower Louisiana. A paucity of correspondence from 
commanders based along the waterway at the Illinois and Arkansas posts complicates 
our understanding of this history. The vast majority of information comes from French 
governors and other high-ranking officials who wrote reports based on others’ accounts 
or their own limited experiences. More often than not their concerns fixated on 
diplomatic or military affairs.10 Therefore, these issues have come to dominate 
historians’ interpretations of the era. It is impossible and ultimately unwise to eschew 
such topics, but critically evaluating Chickasaw activities on the Mississippi reveals 
much about their internal politics and how the river affected the Chickasaw Nation’s 
international relations.  
Two events, one in 1735 and the other in 1743, warranted the concern of French 
colonial administrators who unintentionally exposed Chickasaw objectives on the 
Mississippi River. In the first instance a large band of Chickasaws captured three 
French soldiers and a pirogue brimming with gunpowder as they ascended the 
                                                          
10 Patricia Galloway, Practicing Ethnohistory: Mining Archives, Hearing Testimony, Constructing 
Narrative (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 33-36.  
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waterway. Eight years later the Chickasaws apprehended merchant Guillaume 
[William] Bienvenu’s convoy, his wife, and several hired hands on the river. Like 
driftwood swept up in the current, these events indicate the direction and intensity of 
Chickasaw activities along the Mississippi. Though these affairs do not fit neatly into a 
master narrative, it is possible to understand the complexity of Chickasaw actions—the 
rationale, boundaries, patterns, and sociopolitical implications—by examining these two 
specific events.  
The Mississippi River physically linked French settlements, but in so doing it 
passed by Chickasaw Country. Using this natural feature to their advantage the 
Chickasaws used the river as a cultural mediator, imagining a landscape capable of 
accommodating cohabitation, trade, and French shipping. The Chickasaws were not 
Anglophiles, nor were they crippled by factionalism. Knowing the Mississippi’s 
significance in the Chickasaws’ world helps us see the untapped potential of 
Chickasaw-Franco relations and the unity the Chickasaw Nation maintained. The 
French envisioned the Mississippi as a liquid linchpin between Canada and Louisiana in 
a North American empire, but Chickasaws coped with the far-reaching effects of 
colonialism by aggressively using the river to enhance their regional significance and 
instruct the uninitiated in the ways of their Native world.  
 




In April of 1735, French boatmen moved a shipment of merchandise upriver on 
an important delivery. In preparation for an upcoming campaign against the 
Chickasaws, Governor Bienville had ordered supplies to be transported north to the 
Illinois post.  Pirogues regularly departed from New Orleans traveling upstream to 
Illinois most generally arriving in a few months’ time.11 Making its way against spring 
flood waters, this small “convoy” consisted of four boats carrying “goods for the 
support of the post.”12 Three of them had been “filled with merchandise,” but the other 
“was filled with powder for the garrison.”13 A portion of the gunpowder had already 
been earmarked for northerly Indians “in order to carry on the war with the 
Chickfaws.”14 Sieur de Coulange and La Loere Flaucourt “were together in charge of 
the supervision of the boats” as they had been appointed by King Louis XIV “to 
perform the duties of commissary at the Illinois.”15 Despite rumors of a potential Indian 
attack, the party completed the first leg of their journey, arriving at the Arkansas post, 
near the mouth of the Arkansas River, without incident. Making it to the fort “without 
having found so much as a cat to whip along the way (as the saying goes)” no doubt 
relieved the weary travelers as they found sanctuary away from the Mississippi’s open 
                                                          
11 Norman W. Caldwell, “The Chickasaw Threat to French Control of the Mississippi in the 1740’s.” 
Chronicles of Oklahoma 16, No. 4 (Dec., 1938): 465-466; Brown, History as They Lived It, 18.  
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13 Dumont, The Memoir of Lieutenant Dumont, 254.  
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waters.16 Upon arriving, Coulange and La Loere Flaucourt made a fateful error. Rather 
than proceed with their whole cargo they chose to store the powder at the fort and 
continue without it.  
The episode that resulted from this decision illustrates the multifaceted ways the 
Chickasaws used the Mississippi River to advance their objectives in the continental 
interior. When a French envoy attempted to retrieve the gunpowder and complete the 
delivery a large party of predominately Chickasaw warriors denied their passage 
upriver. In the process the warriors captured several Frenchmen and the entire payload. 
This action, in addition to other river raids, buttressed Chickasaw authority on regional 
waterways. Doing so was often a matter of national security and intercepting the 
explosive cargo reduced the military capacity of their rivals. Meanwhile captured 
gunpowder augmented Chickasaw stockpiles reserved for self-defense. In addition, the 
Chickasaw Nation attempted to utilize the river hostages to turn French enemies into 
allies. Eventually diplomatic negotiations produced a promise of friendship and peace in 
exchange for the “assured navigation on the [Mississippi] River for the French.”17  
It is unclear why exactly Coulange and La Loere Flaucourt proceeded upriver 
minus the gunpowder. In his record of the incident, Jean-François-Benjamin Dumont de 
Montigny, a French soldier and Louisiana farmer, claimed the decision resulted from 
fears of a possible Indian attack.18 Given the proclivity of Chickasaw and Natchez 
warriors along the waterway, many French travelers shared this concern, but Governor 
Bienville’s investigation revealed an ulterior motive. According to his inquiry, the 
                                                          
16 Dumont, The Memoir of Lieutenant Dumont, 254. 
17 MPA:FD IV, 147. 
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caravan’s leaders entered into a partnership with Sieur de Grandpré, commander of the 
Arkansas post, forming a “trading company” each with a “one-third interest.” As such, 
the men determined to offload the powder “in order to load with their goods the boat” 
that hauled the gunpowder.19 French officials often sought to supplement their meager 
imperial paychecks, so this explanation is also plausible.20 Motivated by fear or 
finances, or perhaps by both, the powder remained at the Arkansas post when the 
convoy shoved off on the final leg of their journey.  
Ascending the river with four boats crammed with merchandise did not attract 
much attention from the region’s Native inhabitants. In fact, the trip ended “without 
making any encounters or seeing any signs of Indians during the entire three-hundred-
league journey.”21 Upon learning of the missing freight, however, Pierre d’Artaguette, 
the commandant of the outpost, became notably alarmed.22 Already short on powder, 
the absence of the anticipated supplies further jeopardized his command. In response, 
d’Artaguette hastily organized a small contingent to retrieve the volatile cargo. He 
tabbed Pierre-Laurent Ducoder, an experienced soldier, to lead the critical mission with 
the sole objective of recovering the gunpowder.23 Having served in Louisiana since 
1729, Ducoder knew the importance of the cargo, particularly since d’Artaguette “sent 
off the same day a boat to fetch it up.”24 The station sorely “lacked ammunition” and 
counted on Ducoder and ten other soldiers to execute their vital assignment.25 Propelled 
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by the same currents that had just slowed Coulange and Falucourt, Ducoder and his men 
descended the Mississippi quickly, loaded the black payload, and prepared for the return 
trip.  
For over a decade, Chickasaw river raids had made travel hazardous for French 
boatmen. Some Natchez warriors joined with their Chickasaw neighbors following the 
Natchez Uprising and these aquatic assaults intensified. In April of 1731 several 
Natchez struck a “convoy of four pirogues” on the Mississippi near “a place called the 
Arkansas,” killing two Frenchmen and wounding two others.27 Another “convoy that 
was ascending to the Illinois” suffered an attack “with arrows” from a displaced party of 
Natchez in 1732. To the north, a party of Chickasaws attacked “six Frenchmen on the 
Ouabache” in the fall of 1732. Upon returning from a raid on the Illinois that December, 
some Chickasaws “found a pirogue on the [Wabash] river,” killing a few Frenchmen 
and capturing three others.28 By the spring of 1733 Jesuit missionaries stationed in 
Upper Louisiana feared the Chickasaw would make the Mississippi and Ohio rivers 
impassable. Should “they begin to frequent this region” one warned, “it will be difficult 
to travel.”29 Another complained that without “a large convoy” to induce the local 
Kaskaskia population against the Chickasaws “The roads will always be difficult and 
dangerous.”30 Violent acts intensified French paranoia on the Mississippi since it served 
as the only “road” connecting the Illinois Country to French strongholds further south.  
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Conscious of their vulnerability, Ducoder and his crew alertly proceeded back 
upriver for Fort Charter. Directing his crew upstream Ducoder intentionally “kept to the 
other side of the river,” hugging the west bank as they rowed against the spring flood 
waters. This had become a common tactic for French boat parties desperately seeking to 
distance themselves from Chickasaw lands on the opposite shoreline. British trader 
James Adair reported, “the warlike Chikkasah were so dreadful to the French, that even 
their fleet of large trading boats avoided the eastern side of the Missisippi [sic], or near 
this shore under a high point of land, for the space of two hundred leagues.”31 For his 
part, Ducoder believed that had he “continued to observe this precaution,” which he 
deemed “quite natural,” his party might have avoided what came next. At a point “half-
way between the Arkansas and the Illinois,” Ducoder inexplicably ordered the boat 
ashore on the east side of the waterway “to rest and refresh his crew” while he scouted 
to “discover any tracks.” Having ventured some distance from the impromptu camp 
Ducoder heard “more than two hundred gunshots” rip through the air. Fearing the 
worst, he “ran at once toward his boat” only to discover most of his crew had been 
killed by a party of two hundred and forty Chickasaw and Natchez men now occupying 
the site.32    
Mingo Ouma may have been just as surprised by the turn of events as Ducoder. 
According to the Chickasaw war chief, he “had no plan to kill anyone” when he led a 
large contingent of warriors towards the camp.33 His party had actually been seeking 
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some Illinois Indians when they came across the Frenchmen.  Nevertheless, by the time 
Ducoder stumbled upon the scene, eight of his party lay dead, a sergeant and another 
soldier had been imprisoned, and he quickly found himself among them. For the 
warriors backing Mingo Ouma this must have been a tremendous coup. In one fell 
swoop, they seized three French captives and nearly a ton of cargo. Taking stock of the 
situation, Ducoder reported 1,700 pounds of gunpowder, once intended for Chickasaw 
enemies, became “divided among themselves.” The Chickasaws wholly “abandoned” 
their original mission and marched their captives into the heart of Chickasaw Country.34  
Despite this skirmish on the riverbank, a faction of Chickasaw headmen had 
actually been working towards a truce with France. A chief, known to the French as 
Ymahatabe,35 travelled to Fort Toulouse in 1733 to make “proposals of peace.” With 
the aid of “one of three voyageurs who were captured…on the Wabash River by a 
Chickasaw party” the year before, he and two other headmen delivered a letter 
disclosing their request. Upon reviewing the document Governor Bienville concluded 
“these three chiefs ardently desire peace” and asked “that we cease having them 
harassed by the Choctaws and the Weas.” In return, the headmen indicated they “would 
not be opposed” to surrendering the Natchez. Through an emissary Bienville agreed to 
meet with the headmen, hoping they might send him “the heads of the Natchez” to 
expedite the peace process. In the meantime, he secretly endeavored to “continue to 
have [the Chickasaws] harassed more vigorously until they are weakened…or at least 
obliged to abandon the lands that they are occupying.” If the Chickasaws fled east, he 
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reasoned, “they would be far enough from the Mississippi and the Wabash for our 
voyageurs to have nothing more to fear from them.”36  
Although the governor hoped to exile the Chickasaws from regional waterways, 
Ymahatabe and other peace-seeking headmen employed the rivers to signal their 
diplomatic intentions. Just the year before a couple of French voyageurs “captured by a 
party of that nation” had been “ransomed.”37 That summer a “young Canadian” also 
gained his release “on the river Ouabache.”38 In keeping with Native protocol, these 
captives received their freedom as a sign of good faith. Native peoples throughout the 
Mississippi Valley released enemy prisoners when they intended to end reciprocal 
violence.39 Headman Ymahatabe and several other chiefs then travelled to visit 
Bienville in Mobile hoping to reach an accord. “Deputized for this negotiation,” 
Ymahatabe’s envoy entered into talks “in good faith”, according to Bienville.40 In all 
likelihood, Ymahatabe and the others sincerely intended to resolve the ongoing conflict 
with France. However, one major impasse blocked a reconciliation: the fate of the 
Natchez.  
French officials consistently demanded the Chickasaws forfeit the Natchez in 
exchange for peace, but this precondition divided the Chickasaw Nation. The refugees 
had not entered a unified Chickasaw society. Scholars have shown moiety designations 
split Chickasaw villages geographically as “the Large Prairie towns were war towns, 
with leadership drawn from the red moiety, and the Small Prairie towns were peace 
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towns, with leadership drawn from the white moiety.”41 Hence the Large Prairie 
villages located north of the Natchez Trace literally and figuratively sat apart from the 
Small Prairie villages situated south of the thoroughfare. Although these organizational 
principals dated back to the Mississippian period, the social and political responsibilities 
of each moiety had changed dramatically by 1735.  
The development of a commercialized Indian slave trade had fundamentally 
altered the relationship between the red and white moieties in Chickasaw society. 
Historian Robbie Ethridge argues, as an act of war, slave raids elevated the standing of 
the red moiety in the early eighteenth century. Access to European goods and weaponry 
hinged on the exchange of Native slaves; therefore as warfare and commerce merged, 
red towns gained greater commercial influence. This in turn elevated the standing of 
war chiefs, both internally and externally, as trade literally became a matter of life or 
death. Conversely, the white moiety leadership lost influence as their major formal bond 
to foreign polities occurred by way of the fanimingo. Through the ritual adoption of 
foreign men, known as fanimingos, peace chiefs forged alliances with outside groups.  
A fanimingo acted as an ambassador between the Chickasaws and his people, but this 
institution did not generate tangible wealth like commercial slaving or the deerskin 
trade. As a result, the white moiety sought French commercial opportunities outside of 
the British trade network dominated by war chiefs.42  
White Small Prairie towns entertained prospects of closer relations with France, 
but this necessitated the execution of the Natchez survivors. Since their flight to 
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Chickasaw territory, the refugees had lived in a liminal position as guests in a foreign 
land. Large Prairie towns, generally allied with the British, welcomed and protected the 
Natchez. The red moiety tried to further expand its influence, challenging the institution 
of the fanimingo by allowing the exiles to settle near their villages over the objections 
of white moiety leaders.43 Therefore, by 1735, red/white designations divided the 
Chickasaw Nation into moieties, shaped Chickasaw opinions about the future of the 
Natchez, denoted Chickasaw village locations, and approximated Chickasaw 
associations with European countries.   
Within this context, Ymahatabe’s meeting with Bienville takes on added 
significance. Hailing from the town of Ackia, Ymahatabe was the Chickasaws’ 
principal white chief, a position he inherited through his mother’s clan. As the highest 
ranking “great chief,” he had a social responsibility to coordinate peace if he could. 
Lacking the far-reaching trade ties of red chiefs, he must have considered economic 
factors as well. These issues shaded Ymahatabe’s response to Bienville’s demands. 
Bienville continued to insist on the destruction of the Natchez which Ymahatabe 
remained amenable to. Confident of the Chickasaws’ acquiescence, Bienville declared 
he “had no ground to doubt that to obtain peace they would sacrifice the Natchez as 
they had promised.”44 For Ymahatabe and his envoy, assuring Bienville of their 
intentions was one thing, but convincing a majority of the red moiety to consent to this 
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act was another. However, as they reached home, the dynamics of their objective shifted 
as word of Mingo Ouma’s victory spread throughout Chickasaw Country.45 
The explosive news must have shocked members of the red and white moieties 
alike. Mingo Ouma had already achieved a highly respected status due to his previous 
military exploits. In the process, he earned the title mingo ouma, literally meaning “red 
chief,” for his accomplishments and capacity to acquire British weaponry.46 Mingo 
Ouma used this standing to help settle Natchez refugees near his village of Ougoula 
Tchetoka. He also held deep reservations about the French, due in part to his British 
trade ties.47 Yet his party did not intend to target Frenchmen when they ventured from 
their homes. Upon Ducoder’s capture the Chickasaws “urged” him to write Bienville 
“at different places” explaining what transpired. Ducoder reported the Chickasaws went 
“on the march to go and carry away the women that the Illinois had taken from them a 
short time before” or at least “get vengeance for this act.” Only upon discovering 
Ducoder’s pirogue on the Mississippi did they secretly began “following him for several 
days to take him by surprise.”48 The Chickasaws may have considered this a judicious 
military ploy because the French supplied ammunition to their Indian enemies in the 
Illinois country.  Even so, Mingo Ouma explained his party had “no plan to kill anyone, 
only to pillage the munitions.” “We warned the French not to fire,” he recounted, “but 
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not wanting to listen to us they fired their volley. It was then that we defended 
ourselves.”49 In that instant when shots rang out along the river, any plans to peacefully 
apprehend the detachment vanished and the struggle immediately became one of self-
preservation.   
 Surprisingly, Bienville accepted the Chickasaws’ explanation of events. Writing 
to his superior Jean-Fréderic Phélypeaux, count de Maurepas, Bienville related that 
“when the boat was at the land the Indians running to it cried to them not to shoot, that 
they did not wish to hurt them; and in fact they did not fire until after they had sustained 
the discharge of the French which killed one of them and wounded several.”50 Thus, he 
placed the impetuous for the riverbank confrontation on the French soldiers. Rather than 
denounce the Chickasaws, whom he considered “enemies,” Bienville defended their 
actions.51 He learned of the loss of the gunpowder and the death of the French soldiers 
from Ducoder, who only heard of the Chickasaws’ order not to shoot secondhand.52 
Nonetheless, this account aligns with Mingo Ouma’s version of the confrontation. As a 
student of Indian affairs, Bienville’s inclination to accept the Chickasaw description of 
events provides an additional window onto their mindset. Given the fruitfulness of his 
earlier meeting with the white Chickasaw chiefs, Bienville understood the “purpose” of 
the warriors trailing Ducoder’s detachment “was not to fire upon it, but to capture it to 
serve as a hostage.”53 Native Americans traditionally used captives as diplomats to 
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usher in more peaceful relations, as the Chickasaws attempted to do in 1733 and 1734.54 
Bienville astutely understood Mingo Ouma and his men wanted to incarcerate the 
French crew in order to enhance Chickasaw bargaining power and coordinate a peace. 
Their actions had not been driven solely by antagonism. The discovery of Ducoder’s 
troupe offered an opportunity to force Bienville’s hand at the negotiating table.  
From this perspective, Mingo Ouma’s plan to take the crew hostage and abscond 
with the gunpowder represents a middle course. Preserving the unity of his war party 
and nation required appeasing multiple interests. Endeavoring to impede the convoy 
placated warriors hostile to the French without alienating those more amenable towards 
them. This scheme also avoided upsetting one European power in favor of the other. 
International intrigues merged in the Mississippi like the waters from its many 
tributaries. These crosscutting currents could have divided the Chickasaws, but they did 
not. The Chickasaw warriors in Mingo Ouma’s war party, and their nation as a whole, 
remained united as they sought to secure the Mississippi River.  
 Although violence erupted when the soldiers fired a volley, the sheer number of 
Chickasaw warriors on the scene demonstrates widespread support for Mingo Ouma’s 
strategy. Given Ducoder’s estimate that Mingo Ouma’s party consisted of 240 
Chickasaw and Natchez men, it is likely warriors from the white moiety joined with 
those from the red moiety to defend the Chickasaw Nation. Although members of the 
red moiety led in matters of war and those of the white directed peace overtures, men 
from each moiety participated in both endeavors. A man’s social standing directly 
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correlated with his success in warfare and politics.55 Therefore, men from the white 
moiety joined military excursions just as those of the red voiced their opinion on 
political issues. Upon visiting the Chickasaw Nation on a peace mission in July of 1737, 
the Captain of Pacana, a pro-French Alabama chief, estimated the Chickasaws had 
“about three hundred men including forty Natchez and ten Coroas.”56 Historian Peter 
Wood estimates the Chickasaw population to have been about 3,100 in 1730, with 27-
35% of the populace being men capable of engaging in warfare. Accordingly, the 
Chickasaws fielded approximately 835 to 1,085 warriors at that time. Their population 
declined after 1730, so by the date of Ducoder’s capture in 1735 these figures were on 
the decline. The Natchez living among the Chickasaw consisted of just a “few hundred” 
which means they might have had 50 to 80 warriors.57 As a combined force they may 
have boasted between 885 and 1,165 warriors around 1731.  
The number of Chickasaw warriors involved in apprehending Ducoder indicates 
that men from both the red and the white moieties participated. If Ducoder’s assessment 
is accurate, then according to the figures produced by the Alabama chief 80% of all 
Chickasaw warriors partook in Mingo Ouma’s expedition. By contrast, Wood’s 
population figures suggest roughly 25% of Chickasaw and Natchez warriors assisted in 
the raid. While this could point toward a single moiety war party, other information 
indicates the two moieties collaborated in this case. Offensive war parties rarely 
surpassed fifty men and were usually comprised of warriors from certain clans.  Even if 
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Ducoder greatly overestimated the party’s size, the contingent still exceeded the norm.58 
Mingo Ouma undoubtedly generated the greatest support from warriors of his own clan 
and others within the red moiety. Yet it is unlikely only men of red and Natchez villages 
joined him. With the number of warriors involved, the ceremonies surrounding their 
preparations could not have been secretive. Ritual fasting and public dances always 
preceded such forays to mentally and spiritually prepare men for battle. Inhabitants of 
white towns would have been privy to the goings on in Mingo Ouma’s village. Given 
the high rate of warrior participation, its likely men from white clans joined in.  
The timing of Ducoder’s capture also suggests Mingo Ouma led a mixed red-
white war party.  As noted, the Chickasaws had just suffered an attack by a party of 
Illinois Indians who abducted some of their women, which is why Mingo Ouma 
mounted a counter assault.59 War leaders could not force young men to follow them, 
relying instead on verbal persuasion and social pressure to build support for their cause. 
Warriors had the liberty to participate in war parties originating in other towns if they 
chose. Peace chiefs could not compel others to heed their advice either. Ymahatabe’s 
adherents most certainly knew he objected to warring with France and Indian nations 
from the Illinois country, but he was visiting Bienville in Mobile when the war party 
originated.60 With Ymahatabe’s absence diminishing his influence, warriors had fewer 
restraints.  
Leading a contingent of warriors from red and white clans might also explain 
Mingo Ouma’s plan to seize Ducoder’s detachment. Just as war chiefs could not order 
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warriors to accompany them on the war path, neither could they dictate strategy during 
a campaign. According to naturalist Bernard Romans, a war leader was “so far from 
having command that an attempt to do more than proposing whether such or such an 
undertaking would not be most advisable, or at most persuading them to it, would at 
least be followed by a total desertion.”61 Therefore, upon discovering Frenchmen 
rowing a massive cargo of gunpowder up the Mississippi, the war party had a decision 
to make. Warriors of the red moiety, generally antagonistic towards the French, would 
have opposed letting them pass, particularly since they hauled ammunition in the 
direction of the Chickasaws’ northern enemies. The Natchez warriors accompanying the 
Chickasaws probably agreed with this assessment. Men inclined towards Ymahatabe’s 
peace initiative, but seeking revenge on the Illinois, may have balked at the notion of 
attacking French soldiers. After all, Ymahatabe had been working towards a deal with 
Bienville for months and hoped his efforts would produce an accord during their 
conference.  
While the white chiefs visited Bienville, Mingo Ouma had no intention of 
sinking the proposed armistice. He attempted to ensnare the Frenchmen, thus 
maintaining the applicability of Ymahatabe’s diplomacy. Bienville believed that when 
Mingo Ouma’s party “set out there was yet no news in the nation from the chiefs who 
had come to see me at Mobile.” In his understanding, had news regarding the 
productiveness of their talks reached the Chickasaw homeland in time, the war party 
would have let Ducoder pass. Upon discovering the French detachment, and with no 
updates from Mobile, Mingo Ouma’s contingent attempted to capture them “to serve as 
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a hostage.”62 Sparing the lives of Ducoder and his two surviving companions also points 
to this stratagem.  
The three soldiers not only escaped the riverbank alive; they received new life 
upon reaching the Chickasaw villages. Like other Southeastern Indian nations, the 
Chickasaws practiced ritual adoption as well as torture. Traditionally prisoners resided 
under the control of their captor until arriving at their warden’s village where women 
decided the captive’s fate.63 The lives of those imprisoned hinged upon their reception. 
As matrilineal societies clan affiliation derived from the mother; adoption, like birth, 
depended on women. Females possessed the power to accept a captive as a means of 
replacing a deceased relative within their family unit. This also proved an effective 
means to offset the death toll associated with famine, warfare, or disease. Acceptance 
symbolically granted the captive new life as a clan member, since to be clan-less was 
akin to social death.64 Moreover, adoption literally saved the detainee’s life as women 
tortured less fortunate prisoners to avenge the spirits of lost relatives.65 Luckily for 
Ducoder and his companions they avoided the agony of a slow death.  
Upon reaching Chickasaw Country, the French hostages experienced a mild fate. 
One of the soldiers with Ducoder reported the Chickasaws forced them to “pass through 
all the villages with a white stick in their hands” before being “washed” in order “to 
signify that they were giving them their lives.”66 White being the color of peace, the 
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baton served as a symbol of goodwill, while ritual bathing cleansed the men of their 
past life.67 The soldier claimed “the Chickasaws did not doubt” the French “would give 
them peace” in exchange for the “prisoners.”68 This rebirth marked the beginning of a 
shared future as allies. Their lot differed significantly from what others experienced. 
Only a year later Pierre d’Artaguette and eighteen Frenchmen would be tortured and 
burned to death after their failed assault on the Chickasaw village of Ogoula Tchetoka.69 
Even captives tabbed to live usually experienced some form of mild abuse before being 
received into a clan or enslaved. Ducoder and his men were not meant for torture, 
however, but rather as pawns in the struggle for spatial and sociopolitical dominance 
along the Mississippi River. Although their exact status in Chickasaw society remains 
ambiguous, Ducoder and the two surviving crewmen came to no harm and lived in 
“complete liberty” among the Indians.70  
Ransoming Mississippi River captives in exchange for reconciliation did not 
constitute a new strategy for the Chickasaws. Having already served three terms as 
governor, Bienville recognized their intentions. According to the journal of Diron 
d’Artaguette, the Inspector General of Louisiana, a pair of Canadian voyageurs were 
abducted “on the Mississipy” in 1722 by some Chickasaws who “carried them off to 
their village.” The Langevins, a father and son tandem, along with their two French 
servants and an Indian slave had been ascending the river to Illinois when they were 
captured. D’Artaguette noted the French and Illini were currently “at war” with the 
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Chickasaws, and yet the captives “had been very well treated by the Indians.” One 
might imagine a darker fate for the river party under such conditions. Yet, upon 
reaching a Chickasaw village “these Frenchmen had written to M. Bienville that they 
were being well treated by the Indians, that the latter only asked for peace, and that they 
had told them that they would not give them up unless peace was made.”71 The 
Chickasaws seized the Langevins and others in an attempt to buoy Chickasaw-Franco 
relations and not drown them.  
Given this experience Bienville understood the strategy behind captive taking 
and the diplomacy of repatriation. Thanks to Chickasaw overtures, Bienville came to 
recognize the motivations for Ducoder’s detention. Ymahatabe became “irritated” with 
Mingo Ouma for committing an “act of hostility” while he sat “in negotiations of 
peace.”72 He would have much preferred to be more accommodating, and may have 
been irked with the extensive support Mingo Ouma had received. Rather than accept the 
accord would come to not, however, the Chickasaws actively tried to use the event to 
their advantage. “In order to give evidence of the sincerity of their intentions,” 
Ymahatabe and the other pro-French chiefs “saved the lives of [the] three French 
prisoners,” according to Ducoder. Having been ceremoniously granted their lives the 
Frenchmen became diplomatic agents. Chickasaw headmen quickly told Ducoder to 
inform Bienville of his internment. Fearing the messages “might not be delivered,” they 
also “sent back the soldier whom they had captured” as an emissary and token of 
goodwill. Upon learning of the raid from Ducoder’s own hand and hearing about their 
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treatment from the soldier, Bienville recognized the Chickasaws’ amicable intentions. 
Four months after the raid he concluded, “It seems the measures that the Chickasaws 
have taken that the advantages that they have obtained over us on this occasion have not 
made them lose at all the desire to obtain peace.”73  
Despite the changing nature of Chickasaw leadership, headmen of the white 
moiety still had a traditional responsibility to seek non-violent resolutions. In relations 
with the French this often required them to act on behalf of river captives. Ducoder 
credited Ymahatabe with saving their lives, and other peace chiefs acted similarly. In 
August of 1753, for example, another French victim in a string of Chickasaw raids on 
the Mississippi River found safety with a headman of the white moiety. A “young girl” 
about “ten years old” resided in a Chickasaw village “under the protection of the Great 
Chief,” according to Louis Belcourt, Chevalier de Kerlérec.  Louisiana’s acting 
governor, Kerlérec reported she lived “with perhaps more decency than would be 
observed in our nation in a similar case.”74 The great chief and other white headmen had 
an obligation to safeguard French prisoners, if possible, to encourage improved 
relations, but they could not act alone.   
Lacking the power to command obedience, all chiefs relied on persuasion to 
generate support for their objectives. If a leader acted contrary to the will of the people 
he jeopardized his standing and potentially his health. In matters of war and peace a 
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dissenting headmen risked being punished as the enemy if he acted independently.75 
Though Ducoder credited Ymahatabe for their lives, the chief probably did not achieve 
the feat on his own. Headmen could not act unilaterally, and Chickasaw women 
customarily determined hostages’ destinies. In the case of Pierre d’Artaguette’s party, 
the warriors apparently acted of their own volition, instructing the women to burn the 
captives.76 According to Mingo Ouma, the warriors went “berserk and took all authority 
upon themselves” throwing the Frenchmen into the flames as the chiefs “had not had 
the authority to save their lives.”77 Unlike d’Artaguette’s cohort, Ducoder and company 
publically paraded through Chickasaw Country before having their lives ceremoniously 
spared. This almost certainly would not have been possible if Ymahatabe were the only 
one who desired they survive.  
Circumstances suggest the redemption of the river captives also required a 
collective effort. Matters of national significance necessitated patient deliberation and 
measured debate in order to reach a group consensus.  Among the Southeastern nations, 
James Adair observed that while meeting in council men generally “reason[ed] in a very 
orderly manner, with much coolness and good-natured language, though they may 
differ widely in their opinions.” Listeners sat in silence while speakers took turns 
standing to address the audience “till each of the head men hath given his opinion on the 
point in debate. Then they sit down together, and determine upon the affair.” 78 The fate 
of captives could have far-reaching political ramifications necessitating this kind of 
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careful consideration. Executing prisoners might provoke more extensive warfare while 
returning them signaled a desire for détente. Detainees might also be traded or gifted to 
an existing ally maintaining that relationship at the expense of the aggrieved party. 
When an Alabama leader confronted Chickasaw war chief Paya Mattaha about 
releasing some French captives in 1749, Paya Mattaha explained he lacked the authority 
to do so. “You have no right to demand of me those ugly French prisoners,” Paya 
Mattaha told him. “We took them in, at the risque of blood: and at home in our national 
council, we firmly agreed not to part with any of them, in a tame manner, until we got 
to Charles-town.”79 Paya Mattaha’s rebuke invoked a collaborative assessment by an 
intra-village congress reaffirming their commitment to a British alliance. The fortune of 
Ducoder and his fellow detainees had ramifications for the entire Chickasaw Nation, so 
it is likely a similar decision-making process occurred prior to their homecoming.   
 Governor Bienville welcomed the return of the first soldier but declined to end 
hostilities as requested. Though Chickasaw diplomacy signaled their desire for peace, 
Bienville’s rebuke arrived as a declaration of war. An Alabama man Bienville tasked 
with delivering his reply, murdered an unsuspecting Natchez outside a Chickasaw 
village and fastened the letter to an arrow planted in the victim’s stomach.80 The 
villagers might not have waited for the note’s translation to decipher the meaning. The 
death of the Natchez graphically demonstrated the cycle of violence would continue to 
escalate.  Bienville informed Ducoder he would not “sacrifice the honor and the 
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interests of the nation to the safety of two men.”81 Instead, he instructed the remaining 
Frenchmen to flee for their lives. Although Bienville had not yet committed French 
colonists to the cause, he determined to spur their Indian allies against the Chickasaws. 
With the currents of war swirling, Chickasaw peace chiefs remained committed 
to an accord. Ymahatabe even “supplied [Ducoder] with provisions and shoes” and 
arranged for him to be “escorted for one night until he was on the main road to the 
Choctaws.” Bienville later referred to this exodus as an “escape,” but Ducoder left 
much the same way as the soldier-turned peace envoy-had just months before.82 A 
Chickasaw delegation accompanied both men within two days march of the Choctaws, 
directing them on the path toward their destination. Ymahatabe also promised to return 
the only remaining member of the gunpowder convoy once the sergeant’s health 
permitted. Despite the Chickasaws’ devotion to the diplomatic process, prudence 
limited their concessions.  
Chickasaw headmen deemed it wise to return French river captives, but not to 
dispatch their Mississippi refugees. Upon his return, Ducoder told Bienville the defeat 
of his boat had “made them lose the hope of obtaining [peace] even though they should 
kill the Natchez, and this has prevented the execution of this project.”83 However, 
Ducoder’s statement directly contradicts Bienville’s assessment shortly after his 
capture. Based on the Chickasaws’ words and actions Bienville concluded, “the 
advantages that they have obtained over us on this occasion have not made them lose at 
all the desire to obtain peace.” At the time he even held out hope the Chickasaws might 
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still destroy the Natchez as the white chiefs’ intended.84 The evidence indicates he was 
correct. With their best prospects for peace dispelled in writing and the ominous signs 
of war buried in a Natchez’s stomach, the Chickasaws needed allies. Any debate over 
the fate of the Natchez people went unrecorded, yet results speak for themselves. The 
red moiety did not consent to their annihilation, and nor did the white moiety strike the 
Natchez on their own. Ducoder gives no indication he knew the extent of Chickasaw 
discourse on this matter, and his testimony leans heavily on accounts from peace chiefs. 
Rather than censuring Bienville, they discerningly blamed Mingo Ouma’s raid for 
Chickasaw inaction regarding the Natchez. This retained any slim chance an accord 
might be reached without acknowledging the utility of Natchez warriors in a war with 
France.  
The Chickasaw moieties not only collaborated on the fate of river peoples, they 
also used the Mississippi to safeguard the Chickasaw Nation. Treating with the Captain 
of Pacana, Ymahatabe, other Chickasaw chiefs, and some British traders in 1737, 
Mingo Ouma rehearsed the events of the gunpowder raid. “It is true that we overcame a 
pirogue that was going upriver to the Illinois,” he began, “but we had no plan to kill 
anyone, only to pillage the munitions because they were being carried to the men of the 
north, our enemies.” In seizing the black payload he and his men prevented Illinois, 
Miami, and other enemy warriors from receiving armaments at the Illinois outpost. 
Without powder for their guns, they would be more apt to remain at home and away 
from Chickasaw Country. With Chickasaw powder horns full, rather than their foes’, 
the raid on Ducoder’s pirogue turned a potential liability into a tribal asset. Mingo 
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Ouma continued, “We warned the French not to fire, but not wanting to listen to us they 
fired their volley. It was then that we defended ourselves and got the worst of it.”85 
Thus, his portrayal of the river raid presents the confrontation strictly as an act of self-
defense.86 In the process Mingo Ouma’s men also acquired a tremendous amount of 
gunpowder which served the interests of the entire Chickasaw Nation.  
In his account Mingo Ouma presented a Chickasaw perspective, yet shrewdly 
shaded events for a French audience. The war chief colored his speech with flattering 
portals of the Frenchmen while deflecting blame away from his own people. Always 
casting his actions as unprovocative, Mingo Ouma did his part in attempting to appease 
absentee French listeners, much to the dismay of the British traders actually hearing his 
words. Rebukes from these traders became so bitter that Ymahatabe tried to deflect their 
reproaches with a speech of his own. One hotheaded British observer responded with “a 
blow of the fist” striking Ymahatabe to force an end to his reprimand. Following this 
uncivil outburst Ymahatabe, Mingo Ouma, and the Captain of Pacana retired to the red 
village of Oyoula Tchitoka to confer amongst themselves. Away from the scorn of their 
British allies, Mingo Ouma told the Captain of Pacana he intended to kill the remaining 
Natchez “in a little while” and he “hope[d] that the French would become their 
friends.”87 Encouraged by Mingo Ouma and Ymahatabe’s diplomacy, the Captain 
sanctioned an agreement providing for the protection of French shipping along the 
Mississippi River. 
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Returning home, the Captain of Pacana triumphantly shared the news with his 
people and their French allies. As Diron d’Artaguette explained, the Captain of Pacana 
“entered his village in ceremony holding up a calumet that the Chickasaws had given 
him on receiving him as a great chief of their nation.”88 Ymahatabe and the white 
Chickasaw headmen, conceivably, conferred upon the Captain the title of fanimingo, 
making him an ambassador of peace.89 Just the year before, he ominously threatened the 
Chickasaws saying, “if they attacked the French along the [Tombigbee] river, he would 
declare war on them.” At that time the Chickasaws assured the Captain of their respect 
and replied “that they would leave the river free to the French; that it depended only on 
[the French] to have peace with them.”90 Using access to the region’s waterways as 
leverage for negotiating a truce, the Chickasaws politicized their prowess on the rivers 
to bolster their international bargaining power. It did not work in 1736, but Mingo 
Ouma and Ymahatabe must have reiterated the offer the following year. Having 
conferenced with both men the Captain of Pacana arrived home “delighted.” Upon his 
entrance the Captain proudly reported he had, “assured navigation on the [Mississippi] 
River for the French, and that no harm would be done to them throughout the 
country.”91    
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Despite the fanfare, the Captain’s announcement did not bring peace to the river. 
It effectively ended the ordeal of Ducoder and the gunpowder, but failed to produce a 
general Chickasaw-Franco armistice. This should not, however, diminish the historical 
significance of the processes that led to Ducoder’s capture, his repatriation, and the 
prospect of reconciliation. Chickasaw engagement with the Mississippi River and its 
peoples conditioned their internal and external affairs. These relationships, in turn, 
influenced their riverine activities. Mingo Ouma’s band of Chickasaw and Natchez 
warriors recognized the military necessity of intercepting Ducoder’s crew, but made a 
political calculation in trying to capture them. Meanwhile, Ymahatabe’s contingent 
sought to convince their nation to annihilate the Natchez and returned French river 
captives when advantageous. Though factionalized, Chickasaw prowess on regional 
waterways allowed them to employ people and rivers in calculated ways, even using 
passage along the Mississippi as a bargaining tool. These efforts led to the real 
possibility of peace with France and French-allied Indians, without altogether alienating 
their British ally or destroying their nation from within. 
 
 “We Shall no Longer Paddle our Canoes on the Mississippi,” 1740-1745 
 
France proved unable to defeat the Chickasaws or free the Mississippi from their 
influence during large military campaigns in both 1736 and 1739. The first expedition 
had cost well over the colony’s annual budget and ended in defeat. Meanwhile the latter 
stalled before producing a major battle. As the war fizzled, Ymahatabe and headmen 
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from each Chickasaw village met with Governor Bienville at Fort Assumption, near 
present-day Memphis, Tennessee, to discuss an armistice. Passage along the Mississippi 
had been a source of both conflicts and continued to be a point of contention in the 
latest negotiations.  Like many other meetings this one originated from a letter penned 
by a French captive, taken from the Mississippi, expressing Chickasaw sentiments to 
Bienville. During the conference the Chickasaws agreed to expel the Natchez and hunt 
down the rest of those Mississippi refugees. For his part Bienville promised to stop 
encouraging northern Indian attacks against the Chickasaws. As he explained to his 
superiors in France, “In order to assure the navigation of the [Mississippi] river we have 
promised them peace on behalf of the northern nations.”92 Implicit in the agreement, the 
Chickasaws and French would remain at peace even on the rivers. So when reports 
flooded in from throughout Louisiana that French convoys on the Mississippi and Ohio 
rivers had fallen under attack, Bienville’s heart surely sank.   
Not long after the final remnants of Bienville’s army pushed off into the 
Mississippi heading downstream from Fort Assumption, rumors began circulating the 
Chickasaws had struck on the water again. Given their recent history, a resurgence of 
violence on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers must have seemed ominous to French 
inhabitants. Just months after the 1740 agreement, news of these attacks kept colonists 
on edge.93 A pirogue conducted by merchant Louis Turpin came under assault near the 
mouth of the Ohio River, resulting in the loss of cargo and the capture of at least two 
party members. “We have heard no talk of anything on the river or elsewhere,” 
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exclaimed Henri Chevalier de Louboey the royal lieutenant at Mobile, after the defeat.94 
Then in autumn of 1740 the rout of six canoes near the mouth of the Tennessee River 
rattled French military officers in Upper Louisiana.95 In June of the following year, a 
pirogue full of Indians floated down the Mississippi past Pointe Coupée, a French 
settlement in Lower Louisiana, before absconding with an African woman and a few 
children.96 On each occasion early indications suggested Chickasaw involvement. 
Exasperated, Salmon wrote to Maurepas the Minister of Marine and Colonies 
definitively declaring, “Nothing more is needed to infer that there has never been any 
peace made with the Chickasaws.”97  
Governor Bienville meanwhile continued to believe in the peace he had agreed 
to. Lacking supporters in the imperial court after his less than glorious campaigns, 
Bienville clung to the delicate accord for political reasons. He needed amity with the 
Chickasaws to justify the expense to his superiors. “As for the solidity of the peace with 
the Chickasaws…it would be as good as it could be on the word of Indians,” Bienville 
protested to Maurepas, “but…it was not possible to count on it absolutely.”98 Yet he did 
not rely on blind faith to absolve the Chickasaws of accusations swirling around 
Louisiana. His sources indicated some Cherokees claimed responsibility for spoiling 
Turpin’s convoy. He had evidence they committed the other attack on the Ohio as well. 
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The Natchez, meanwhile, bore responsibility for the intrigues near Point Coupée, 
according to Bienville. The governor explained, “It was on the knowledge that [he] had 
of their situation rather than on their word that [he] was counting for the solidity of this 
peace.”99 While that might be so, Chickasaw actions and contentions reveal their 
commitment to the armistice and the production of shared space along the Mississippi. 
 
Figure 10: The Chickasaws and Louisiana, ca. 1764. 
Jacques Nicolas Bellin. La Louisiane et pays voisinsm. Paris, 1764.  
                                                          
99 MPA:FD III, 750-757, 771-779.  















Their dedication to this arrangement became fully evident in 1743 as France 
failed to meet its obligations in the reconfigured landscape. That year a large party of 
Chickasaws seized the merchant convoy of Guillaume [William] Bienvenu detaining his 
wife and a few crew members on the Mississippi. Denying passage and holding the 
river travelers captive reiterated Chickasaw authority along the water. Least French 
officials forget, Chickasaw spokesmen used the occasion to remind them of the 
importance of reciprocal responsibilities. If peace reigned and trade goods were 
delivered Chickasaw spokesmen assured them, “We shall no longer paddle our canoes 
on the Mississippi.” However, environmental expressions of power and social 
relationships hinged on proper action. “Otherwise,” the authors cautioned, “we shall 
paddle our canoes on the Mississippi and we shall attack all the French and the red 
men.”100    
Immediately following the parley with Bienville at Fort Assumption, the 
Chickasaw Nation took steps to uphold the agreement. Although some officials, and 
perhaps a majority of French inhabitants, accused them of aquatic wrongdoings the 
Chickasaws largely avoided making incursions on major waterways. After Illinois 
Indians spread news of Louis Turpin’s defeat, the commandant at the Arkansas post, 
Tisserand de Monchervaux, investigated the matter. He sent four parties to scour the 
entire region “as far as above the Prudhomme Bluffs and in the interior” searching for 
evidence of mischief. As the location of many Chickasaw river raids over the past two 
decades, the Bluffs seemed an obvious site of exploration.101 The multiple groups 
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dispatched to the area all returned to assure Monchervaux “they had not found any trace 
of the Chickasaws.” Furthermore their reconnaissance had not uncovered “any 
indication that they had come on the river for a year.”102 This must have been surprising 
given the regularity with which Chickasaw war parties previously travelled on the 
Mississippi in that region. A similar absence also proved noteworthy four years later. 
Having assumed the governorship in 1743, Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil observed at 
the end of 1744 that the Chickasaws had “not made any expedition upon the river this 
year.” In his mind this dearth proved “clearly enough the determination of the 
Chickasaws…to live on good terms with us.”103 Chickasaw war parties intentionally 
avoided the river, tactfully signaling their dedication to upholding the accord. As 
partners in peace, the waterway became a shared space allowing for French navigation. 
This same principle gave the Captain of Pacana confidence to guarantee French safety 
on the Mississippi back in 1737. In a sincere gesture of reconciliation, Chickasaw 
warriors deliberately avoided the waterway in 1740, just as they did in 1744, heralding 
their nation’s commitment to the truce.  
Eschewing conflict on the Mississippi River served Chickasaw objectives, as did 
denying themselves the benefits which accompanied forays onto regional waterways. 
Trade between Native American polities served dual purposes as the literal act--
swapping goods, captives, or food--brought physical benefits while also signaling a 
symbolic connection. Gift-giving served as a means to bolster influence and prestige as 
well as affirm alliances. By extension, refusal to participate in such initiatives were an 
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affront to one’s status and could be an expression of hostility.104 Following Bienville’s 
failed invasion of 1736, the Chickasaws and Overhill Cherokees developed deepening 
bonds based on such reciprocal exchanges. The flow of British goods along the Upper 
Trade Path bound the Chickasaws and Cherokees within a shared economic system. 
Chickasaws joined their Overhill Cherokee allies in swapping goods from plundered 
French boats and exchanging enemy captives. This cooperation eventually led to 
increased military cooperation and even the settlement of a joint community on the 
Lower Ohio River.105 The alliance also allowed these Cherokees to pass unmolested 
along the Mississippi River by the Chickasaw Bluffs, as they steered a course back and 
forth between the Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi rivers.106 Therefore, it would have 
been surprising if a Chickasaw village declined an invitation to share in the spoils of a 
Cherokee raid, but according to Bienville’s Alabama informants one Chickasaw town 
did just that.  
Having overcome the convoy of French merchant Louis Turpin, a party of 
Cherokee warriors invited the Chickasaws to share in their success. As they paddled up 
the Ohio and continued into the Tennessee River, the Cherokees paused on their way 
home for a potential rendezvous with their Chickasaw allies. For their part, the 
Alabamas had been “coming from the Chickasaw villages” when the Cherokee arrived. 
According to the Alabamas, the Tennessee lay “a day and a half” from the Chickasaw 
village but while passing “going back up their river” the Cherokee landed ashore and 
“sent to their [Chickasaw] village to invite them to come and drink their share of brandy 
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captured in the defeat of these pirogues.” Despite the Chickasaws cooperative 
relationship with the Cherokees, the villagers proved “unwilling” to go “because of the 
peace” with France.107  
Declining an invitation for free drinks is not, by itself, indicative of anything 
beyond what it is. The variables make it difficult to comprehend what actually occurred. 
Given their participation in the British exchange network, red Chickasaw villages 
tended to align more closely with the Overhill Cherokees. Perhaps the Cherokee party 
simply invited a white town as a way to expand their influence and got rejected. It is 
also possible that a British-aligned town in the Large Prairie declined the invitation 
since they genuinely intended to maintain the accord, as residents told some Choctaws 
in September of 1740.108 Chickasaw villagers might have declined knowing news of the 
affair would trickle back to French authorities via the Alabamans. Maybe the prospect 
of a nagging hangover simply felt too real. Without knowing the make-up of the 
Cherokee faction or which Chickasaw village received the offer, we may never know 
for certain why Turpin’s brandy did not pass the townspeople’s lips. However, when 
this incident is viewed within a larger historical context, it appears as part of a pattern. 
Through their deeds and declarations, the Chickasaws expressed their commitment to 
maintaining the settlement with France. In 1740 Chickasaw warriors collectively 
avoided the Mississippi River, and multiple sources reiterated the Chickasaws’ 
dedication to peaceful relations. In this light, the villagers’ refusal to celebrate the 
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demise of Turpin’s fleet is yet another indication of the Chickasaws’ efforts to avoid 
confrontation with the French. 
For their part French administrators were not united in their dedication to 
maintaining the peace. Without pause the governor of Canada, Marquis de Beauharnois, 
continued to inspire parties of Iroquois to harass the Chickasaws despite Bienville’s 
assurances otherwise.109 Already divided over the issue, Bienville’s failure to restrain 
his own countrymen further alienated a segment of the Chickasaw population. Natchez 
refugees fleeing Chickasaw Country in 1741 professed, “the Chickasaws were of 
different sentiments on the subject of peace which some wished to maintain at no matter 
what price and which others irritated by the losses that they were incurring every day 
did not wish to hear mentioned any longer.”110 With the Chickasaw Nation split on the 
interrelated issues of sheltering the Natchez and peace with France, some individuals 
lashed out on the region’s waterways.  
The Chickasaws remained divided on the steep French demands for peace after 
leaving Fort Assumption, and opposing factions within the Chickasaw Nation could not 
reach a consensus. Those seeking peace with France would not condone river raids, and 
those in favor of harboring the Natchez would not consent to their deaths. Nonetheless, 
the great chief Ymahatabe denied allegations that the entire nation should bear 
responsibility for the actions of a few. In answering accusations about an attack on the 
Ohio River in 1740, Ymahatabe admitted that since “the Chickasaws were in alliance 
with the Cherokees some of them might possibly have been met in the parties that 
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attacked the French,” but he asserted, “that attack ought not by any means to be imputed 
to the body of the nation which did not give its consent to it at all and had no part in 
it.”111 Holding the entire nation accountable for the independent actions of a few 
individuals amounted to political fiction in his estimation.  
Failure to resolve these complex issues left individuals to act on their own. 
Ymahatabe stated that although “the nation had not been able to agree to kill the 
Natchez,” they had “treated them so badly that they had obliged them to flee.”112  
Operating without the sanction of the nation, those opposed to harboring the Natchez 
took it upon themselves to compel the refugees to seek shelter elsewhere. A similar 
scenario played out on the Mississippi River. Although Bienville had exonerated the 
Chickasaws for abducting an African woman and some children from Pointe Coupee in 
1741, they admitted otherwise. Fifteen Chickasaws demanded to know “why the French 
did not give them peace” when they encountered Frenchmen Antoine Bonnefoy among 
the Alabamas in 1742. Denying Bonnefoy’s accusations they regularly attacked the 
French, the group “assured” him that “with the exception of a party of young people, 
which had acted contrary to the consent of the nation, the last year at Point Coupée, they 
were a people who had struck no blow.”113 Isolated incidents on the Mississippi and 
Ohio rivers did occur, but nothing of the magnitude of Mingo Ouma’s raid on 
Ducoder’s party. Split on the issues--life or death, raid or trade, war or peace--the 
Chickasaw Nation kept the Natchez and the Mississippi at arm’s length in hopes of 
achieving peace, even as individuals acted of their own volition.   
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Unable to neutralize the Chickasaws themselves, Louisiana officials continued 
using more sinister means. French authorities and traders encouraged their Indian allies 
against the Chickasaws, jeopardizing the safety of regional waterways. Choctaw and 
Quapaw forays, sprung from the south, waylaid hunting parties and ravaged fields while 
Illinois and Iroquois raids from the north continued to terrorize the Chickasaw 
people.114 The Choctaws had paid a heavy price when Chickasaw slavers attacked their 
villages and sold their friends and relatives to British traders. Desperate to stem the flow 
of captives, they had welcomed a French alliance and the weapons they could provide. 
French officials facilitated this intra-Indian conflict, paying for Chickasaw scalps as a 
means to counteract the Chickasaws while reducing the number of warriors the 
Choctaws could potentially wield against Louisiana. As victims of Chickasaw slave 
raids themselves, the Quapaw also forged a working relationship with the French 
predicated on exchange and mutual animosity for their common enemy.115 A similar 
scenario played out in the Upper Louisiana as well. Illinois Indians had allied with 
French traders to gain access to guns which they promptly aimed at the Chickasaws. 
These Indian adversaries, combined with the Iroquois, threatened the security of 
Chickasaw Country.  
 Unsurprisingly, three years of encouraging unrelenting Indian attacks 
eventually led to the capture of French voyageurs on the Mississippi. On May 7, 1743, 
about midway between the mouth of the Yazoo and Arkansas rivers, a convoy led by 
Guillaume Bienvenu capitulated to a joint war party of Chickasaw, Koroa, and Upper 
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Creek warriors after a short scrap.116 This event happened to coincide with the arrival of 
Marquis de Vaudreuil to Louisiana. Sent to replace the beleaguered Bienville as 
governor, Vaudreuil’s reputation as a peacemaker preceded him. Vaudreuil’s efforts 
earned him respect among the region’s inhabitants, including the Chickasaws, who 
welcomed his arrival and were optimistic that Vaudreuil might finally deliver on the 
promise of a ceasefire.117 With hostages obtained from Bienvenu’s failed trip upriver 
and newborn faith in Louisiana’s governor, Chickasaw spokesmen once again turned to 
the Mississippi River when leveraging an accord with France.  
Using their established pattern of river diplomacy the Chickasaws attempted to 
mitigate any negative fallout from their recent raid. Six headmen immediately sent word 
to the governor regarding Bienvenu’s defeat hoping to clarify their actions.118 The 
chiefs informed Vaudreuil they had “learned” how he “kept the peace” among the 
northern Indians by never “let[ting] them lack coats, blankets, powder and bullets, 
vermilion, or beads.” Their words explicitly linked Vaudreuil’s achievements in Canada 
with matters of peace and trade, an association the governor understood well.119 This 
premise established the letter’s tone and colored the Chickasaws’ vision of a productive 
relationship. Having asserted Chickasaw expectations, the chiefs addressed what they 
perceived to be France’s foremost concerns. “We do not wish to attack the French any 
longer. We hold out our hands to them when we find them,” proclaimed the headmen. 
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They continued, “There are no longer any Natchez in our villages. The Choctaws are 
madmen to attack us. We shall no longer paddle our canoes on the Mississippi.”120  
Chickasaw diplomats offered passage along the Mississippi River in exchange 
for harmony and commerce. The river’s continued importance as a transportation route 
made the offer appealing just as it had during negotiations with the Captain of Pacana. 
The headmen suggested other French stipulations had been met, at least partially, 
allowing negotiations to proceed. The Natchez had not been executed, but they had fled 
to the Cherokees. Bienvenu’s convoy had been overcome, but the Chickasaws promised 
to shun future violence on the Mississippi. They seized Bienvenu’s crew and his wife 
Marianne, although the headmen maintained they harbored no ill will. Their original 
goal actually differed markedly from the eventual outcome. “We were not seeking to 
make attacks upon the French” but rather “we were seeking red men on the 
Mississippi,” they insisted. The voyageurs would come to no harm since, as the 
headmen affirmed, “We captured them in order to make you listen to our word.”121   As 
with Ducoder’s apprehension, Chickasaw spokesmen denied any wrongdoing and yet 
defended their objective. Reconciliation required the exchange of captives, justifying 
the short-term internment of river travelers. 
Not only did the chiefs endorse this action, but they also implied that the nation 
supported their approach as well. The headmen declared, “We love your Frenchmen. 
We regard them as our brothers. All the Chickasaw chiefs ask you for peace.”122 Back in 
1740, Ymahatabe had dismissed Chickasaw involvement in river raids as the work of 
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“some” and not the “nation.”123  At the meeting with Bonnefoy, others downplayed the 
Point Coupée escapade belittling the mischief of a few “young people.”124 If the raid 
against Bienvenu occurred without national sanction, or if the Chickasaws remained 
divided over the issue of peace, the chiefs might have said as much. In this instance, 
however, the chiefs claimed full responsibility. Abandoning third-person pronouns the 
chiefs emphasized their unity writing a first-person narrative relying on the plural 
pronoun “we” to make their case.   
The Chickasaws rallied around the respected headman who led the expedition 
against Bienvenu. The unnamed leader garnered support among his fellow Chickasaws 
as well as with Koroa and Abeka warriors who accompanied him.125 Detained as part of 
her husband’s convoy, Marianne claimed “the chief” who captured them ranked 
“second of his nation” and sought “peace” along with the others.126 By tradition the 
leading headman of the red moiety, known by the title mingo ouma, ranked behind the 
principal white mingo in his authority and prestige. Ducoder’s captor may have fronted 
this river foray, as well, but given Marianne’s unfamiliarity with Chickasaw 
sociopolitical hierarchy, it is possible she misinterpreted the title. Perhaps the term 
“nation” actually referred to his moiety or even clan affiliation; regardless, he was not a 
disenfranchised individual acting on his own. The “chief” held a respected position 
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within Chickasaw society. Chickasaw warriors and other headmen supported his actions 
and he inspired warriors of other polities to join the raid.  
However, the multitribal outfit formed to seek common Indian and not to 
advance Chickasaw interests per se. Yet discovering the Bienvenu party on the 
Mississippi, the Chickasaws sprang into action. The headman and his Chickasaw 
warriors seized the opportunity to obtain hostages in order to facilitate the peace process 
with France. Although they acted over the objections of the Abekas among them, the 
Chickasaws had the endorsement of their own nation.127 As letters from both the 
Chickasaws and Marianne claim, the headmen widely accepted accountability for this 
river raid. While crosscutting factions sharply divided the Chickasaw Nation, this 
confirmation of unity speaks to its shared objectives along the waterway.   
Although they disagreed on critical issues, both red and white chiefs stood 
united in their desire to end hostilities with France in this instance. Each division had 
unique though interrelated reasons for doing so. Having been under immense pressure 
from Indian enemies to the north and south since the 1720s, they needed a reprieve. 
Reconciliation with France would remove the main impetus for these attacks, a 
development most Chickasaws assuredly wished for. As the governor well understood, 
they had grown tired of war and scouted the Mississippi River seizing French travelers 
as a means to end the conflict.128 White chiefs had the added motivation of forging a 
new trade path to help supply their people and elevate their own sociopolitical standing 
in the process. 
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Both moieties stood to benefit from reconciliation, as did the colonists of French 
Louisiana and their Indian allies. Friendly relations had the potential to build socio-
economic ties. “Send us powder, bullets, guns, and coats,” the chiefs demanded, “and 
we shall deliver Marianne and the Frenchmen who remain in our villages.” Vaudreuil’s 
Canadian peacekeeping efforts had depended on supplying a similar list of goods. In 
return, the Chickasaws were prepared to return the captives and allow the French to 
travel the Mississippi River uninhibited. Trade and friendship produced a common 
landscape, one which could not otherwise exist. Ominously the chiefs warned, “Send us 
everything that we ask of you and do not refuse us, otherwise we shall paddle our 
canoes on the Mississippi and we shall attack all the French and the red men.”129  
French voyageurs could expect to share the river, traveling freely, if Vaudreuil 
befriended the Chickasaws. Social relationships encompassed economic exchange and 
helped to define territoriality. This is the understanding which allowed the Overhill 
Cherokees and Chickasaws to navigate the Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi rivers in 
common. Shared usage and right-of-way defined specific landscapes for Southeastern 
Indian allies, but they did not willingly cede territory to one another.130 When the 
Chickasaws offered to “leave the [Tombigbee] river free to the French” in 1736, they 
made no mention of abandoning the river altogether.131 The following year, the Captain 
of Pacana did not claim possession of the Mississippi for France; he only “assured 
navigation on the [Mississippi] River for the French.”132 In 1740, Chickasaw war parties 
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largely absented themselves from the Mississippi River, but by Chickasaw admission 
they did not forsake its use. Therefore, Chickasaw headmen spoke figuratively in 1743 
when they wrote Vaudreuil saying, “We shall no longer paddle our canoes on the 
Mississippi.”133 This did not entail self-eviction, territorial transfer, or recognition of 
French claims upon the water. France would simply gain right-of-way on the 
Mississippi River after Marianne returned with the other captives and trade relations 
commenced. Having created a shared environment, predicated on exchange and 
friendship, French people and goods could pass freely along the border of Chickasaw 
Country. However, if an agreement could not be reached, the French could not expect to 
traverse the Mississippi unimpeded.    
 Before proverbially rocking the boat, however, the Chickasaws continued to 
pursue a more amicable alternative. In addition to their letters, they sent “a Frenchman 
named Carignan,” captured from Bienvenu’s convoy, to visit Vaudreuil in New 
Orleans. As an emissary, Carignan bore “witness” to the “sincerity” of the headmen, 
testifying that they proposed peace in exchange for “the assistance in munitions and 
merchandise that is necessary for them.” 134 Though it went unrecorded, Carignan 
undoubtedly reiterated Marianne’s sentiments about the Chickasaws’ hospitality. As 
with other French river captives, the party had avoided the rigors of torture. Impressed 
by “the most touching manner” in which the letters had been written and Carignan’s 
authentication, Vaudreuil proposed collaborating with the Choctaws on a negotiated 
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resolution. Unlike Bienville, he did not require Natchez blood but insisted the 
Chickasaws expel the British and receive only French traders.135  
Over the course of the following two years, discussions for a permanent 
settlement dragged on. Throughout this time, the Chickasaws strategically used their 
river captives and the Mississippi to advance the peace process. In February of 1744, 
Vaudreuil proudly wrote to Maurepas, “The Chickasaws have sent back to me at 
different times three Frenchmen, a Frenchwoman, and an Indian ally of ours whom they 
had captured on the seventh of last May on the bank of the Mississippi.”136 Sending 
Carignan to New Orleans had demonstrated the Chickasaw’s initial commitment, and 
the return of Marianne at a meeting with Vaudreuil in 1744 reiterated that pledge.137 
Chickasaw negotiators stayed open to sharing the waters of the Mississippi with France, 
but the governor remained adamantly opposed to splitting the Chickasaw trade with 
Britain. Nevertheless the accumulation of Chickasaw river diplomacy seemed to have a 
positive effect. At the end of 1744, Vaudreuil wrote, “The fact that they have not made 
any expedition upon the river this year proves clearly enough the determination of the 
Chickasaws to give up the commerce with the English and the desire that they had to 
live on good terms with us.”138 The concerted effort to halt river incursions proved they 
sincerely desired reconciliation. Chickasaw headmen gradually cultivated trust by 
releasing captives, allowing passage on the Mississippi River, and entertaining 
Vaudreuil’s demand for an exclusive trade.  
                                                          
135 MPA:FD IV, 218.  
136 MPA:FD IV, 217. 
137 Louboey to Maurepas, 6 February 1744, AC C13A, 28, fol. 325v.  
138 MPA:FD IV, 230.  
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Regrettably, Vaudreuil knew France could not supply the Chickasaws’ material 
demands and yet insisted on the expulsion of British traders as a precondition anyway. 
Discerning his mandate was impractical, he resigned himself to gaining possession of 
the Mississippi by force. Like Bienville before him, Vaudreuil determined that 
“destroying” the Chickasaws had to be done to free the river and limit British influence 
throughout the region. He feared that, even if the Chickasaws were forced east to the 
Cherokees or into Carolina, the distance would not safeguard the French “against the 
raids that they still might make on the Mississippi.”139 France could neither provide the 
goods necessary to cement a lasting peace nor force the Chickasaws to capitulate.  
A faction of Chickasaws remained committed to obtaining some resolution, 
nonetheless.  In the spring of 1745, they once again sent an envoy bearing a message of 
reconciliation. The sole messenger, a French go-between named Languedocq, had been 
a part of the Bienvenu party and chosen to remain with the Chickasaw Nation ever 
since.140 Among his supplies, Languedocq carried “a flag, a calumet, and a white fan,” 
all symbolizing the Chickasaws’ peaceful intentions. Having built Languedocq a “bark 
canoe,” they set him on a course down the Tombigbee River for Fort Toulouse. Like the 
tokens he carried and the captives before him, Languedocq himself served as an 
emblem of benevolence. Taken from the muddy waters and accepted by the 
Chickasaws, he bridged political boundaries. As the Mississippi did, Languedocq 
                                                          
139 MPA:FD IV, 244.  
140 Vaudreuil wrote to Maurepas May 10, 1744 stating that Languedocq had chosen to remain with the 
Chickasaw. However, Louboey claimed Languedocq had been “made a slave with Bienvenu” in a letter 
to Maurepas of November 6, 1745. Louboey’s mention of Bienvenu, who later escaped from the 
Chickasaw, implies the enslavement occurred initially. Marianne’s statement that the Chickasaw had 
treated them well and the reception of other French river captives, like Ducoder and company, supports 
the notion of Languedocq remaining with the Chickasaw of his own volition.  See Baron, The Vaudreuil 
Papers, p. 184; MPA:FD IV, 213, 253.  
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connected Chickasaw Country to French Louisiana. Unfortunately the hazards of river 
travel proved too much and he capsized, arriving downstream near the fort clinging to a 
tree. Still, he managed to he convey the “latest word” from the Chickasaws to 
Commandant Louboey.141   
And yet, as often happened, local expectations drowned in the undercurrent of 
imperial ambition. Vaudreuil remained insistent the British exit Chickasaw Country 
before peace could commence. Despite the pleas of some headmen, the Chickasaw 
Nation could not take the radical step to end the Chickasaw-Anglo alliance. Without a 
general consensus, they could not appease the French. Momentum for an armistice 
slowed as France continued encouraging its Indian allies against the Chickasaws. From 
1745 through the Seven Years’ War, Chickasaw warriors took to the rivers in recourse, 
wreaking havoc on French travelers plying the Mississippi, Ohio, and Wabash River. 
Although the Chickasaws continued to take captives, most were simply held for ransom 
and the prospect for a treaty sunk. 
Expressions of power played out along the waterfront as the Chickasaws 
asserted preeminence over the river as it passed their country. As such, the Mississippi 
became a meeting place where violent confrontation ensued and foreign diplomacy 
began. This approach often united the Chickasaw Nation, as opposing factions joined 
together in pursuit of shared objectives. Despite favoring rival European powers, the red 
and white moieties collaborated on the capture and repatriation of French river captives. 
Widespread communal participation continued when French hostages marched into 
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Chickasaw villages. Tradition stipulated the white moiety direct subsequent peace 
proposals, but this required consent from red chiefs. Headmen cooperated in sending 
go-betweens to French officials with carefully crafted messages. Without the ability to 
compel obedience chiefs relied on public support to maintain friendly relations, 
collectively curbing river raids and foregoing their benefits. In times of danger, 
however, red and white villages shared supplies captured from the Mississippi. Internal 
sociopolitical bonds underpinned Chickasaw actions as they sought to shape external 
affairs. In so doing the Mississippi River became a tool for instructing the French on 
social, political, and economic corollaries of cohabitation.   
 Over time, colonial officials grasped Chickasaw motivations along the river. 
Both Bienville and Vaudreuil understood, at least partially, the logic behind capturing 
boatmen and the pattern of diplomacy that followed. Although each bemoaned the 
carnage done to river traffic, they came to appreciate what motivated the attacks. Letters 
and personal testimonials buttressed Chickasaw messages concerning the exercise of 
Native space. Colonial officials came to realize that unabated access to the river 
required peace and trade or the complete obliteration of the Chickasaws.  
Assaults on French boats and negotiations for safe passage proved the river 
remained a Native waterway. Chickasaw expeditions conveyed their territorial 
sovereignty and resolution to maintain their geopolitical position. France made verbal 
claims to the Mississippi Valley and the river itself, but these words rang hollow. 
Chickasaw actions reinforced their rights along the waterway. Their repeated offers to 
allow passage on the Mississippi also demonstrates this reality. Although they were 
undeniably split over critical issues during this time, the Chickasaws worked together to 
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establish recognizable signs of self-possession across the riverine landscape. From their 
perspective, the river constituted part of their homeland that could be shared by allies 
and closed to enemies. This spatial configuration compelled the region’s newest 
inhabitants to avoid the east bank of the Mississippi as they attempted to shuttle across 
its waters. Instructing the French on the obligations of allies did not prove easy, nor did 
it produce a permanent accord.   
The ordeal of Ducoder, Bienvenu, and their compatriots expose broad dynamics 
playing out on the Mississippi. Hoping to stem years of incessant warfare, the 
Chickasaw people united to force a reprieve. The veil of history unfortunately masks the 
full extent of Chickasaw cooperation, but it is evident in their military campaigns, 
pronouncements, public ceremonies, and council meetings. While the river did not 
belong them, it certainly fell within their spatial and cultural purview. Through the 
duality of violence and diplomacy they communicated their territorial claims, political 
designs, and socio-economic desires. These messages were not lost on French colonists 
or distant Louisiana governors, who recognized Chickasaw dominance on the 










In his correspondence with the Governor of the District of Natchez, 
Ugulayacabé did not shy away from the importance of Sakti Lhafa’. It was, the 
Chickasaw headman told Manuel Gayoso, a “pretty convenient place the Bluffs.”1 After 
all the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff, or Ecores á Margot to the Spaniard, sat on the bank of 
the Mississippi River just a few days journey from most of the Chickasaw villages. 
They could easily make the trek to meet Spanish ships sent to deliver their annual 
presents. Much to the governor’s consternation, the bluff proved equally accessible for 
American vessels transporting gifts of their own. Yet the Chickasaws had other reasons 
to “love that place,” and so the governor could “depend on us not parting with it to any 
people,” Ugulayacabé informed him.2  
Part of the bluff’s appeal certainly rested on the physical landscape, the 
namesake of Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’, which enhanced Chickasaw authority on that river. 
Together the Chickasaw Bluffs and Mississippi River conspired against boat traffic. 
Islands littered the channel as it wove through the heights. As a result, shifting currents 
obliged pilots to steer their vessels from one side to another. The banks offered a degree 
of safety, but also exposed craft and crew to whoever happened to be in the hills above. 
This was particularly true at the foot of the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff, where whirling 
waters forced boats to the eastern shoreline. Here unwelcome travelers, particularly 
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those rowing upstream, were particularly vulnerable. This is where Chickasaw warriors 
often sought to curtail the movements of their enemies. Commanding the high ground 
gave them a distinct military advantage, while riverine topography created natural 
“checkpoints.” They need not patrol the Mississippi’s length nor span its width. By 
controlling the bluffs and the narrow river passes through them, the Chickasaw Nation 
gained outsized influence over the Mississippi. They knew this, and gradually the 
French, British, Spanish, and finally Americans came to realize it too.  
 After failing to make peace in the 1740s, Chickasaw warriors struck at French 
river travelers. These renewed assaults often occurred amid the bluffs in the 1750s and 
carried on throughout the Seven Years’ War. British agents spurred Chickasaw parties 
to this business, much to the chagrin of French administrators and Canadian voyageurs. 
To these European foes, it seemed the Chickasaws carried out the bidding of their 
imperial masters. But as historians have repeatedly shown, Native Americans 
collaborated with European interests so long as they deemed best.3 During this time 
Chickasaw aims dovetailed with British objectives in the Mississippi Valley. Both 
sought to limit French influence by impeding river traffic. Chickasaw success in doing 
so facilitated British claims to the Mississippi at the end of the war. Their “self-
subjection” gave Britain dominion over Chickasaw territory, at least according to 
European standards.4  
The Treaty of Paris in 1763 brought an official end to the Seven Years’ War. 
Having ceased hostilities, Great Britain, France, and Spain resolved many of their 
                                                          
3 James H. Merrell’s book on Catawba history, The Indians’ New World, is an excellent example.    
4 Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 105-127. 
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longstanding territorial disputes swapping claims to “countries, lands, islands, places, 
coasts, and their inhabitants.”5 Without consulting their Native American allies or 
considering the land claims and usage rights of Native peoples, vast regions “legally” 
transferred from one European country to another. “In order to reestablish peace on 
solid and durable foundations” the treaty also sought to define geographic spaces by 
establishing internationally recognizable borders. As such, Great Britain and France 
agreed “the confines between the dominions” would be “fixed irrevocably by a line 
drawn along the middle of the River Mississippi, from its source…to the sea.”6 So, with 
the stroke of a pen the river became a geographic landmark splitting the interior claims 
of competing imperial powers. Unbeknownst to Britain, France had transferred its title 
to Spain in the Treaty of Fontainebleau the year before, but nonetheless the river 
remained the borderline cordoning British claims from those of Spain.7 
Chickasaw warriors were not eager to enforce Britain’s “new” border. When the 
American Revolution commenced, Indian Superintendent John Stuart called upon them 
to patrol the Mississippi.8 After all, experience had proven their effectiveness in doing 
so. With the Crown’s soldiers concentrated in the east, Chickasaw warriors were 
essential for controlling the waterway and defending against an American invasion. If 
the Chickasaws cut off the river, Stuart hoped, loyalists in Natchez and West Florida 
would be spared the effects of war. Yet, few Chickasaws volunteered for the mission. 
Topography and experience gave them the capacity to impede river traffic, but they had 
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http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/paris763.asp, accessed 10/9/2014.  
6 Treaty of Paris 1763, article VII. 
7 Aron, American Confluence, 51.   
8 Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native 
American Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 222.  
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little to gain by doing so. Even when encouraged by gifts, Chickasaw attentiveness 
proved fleeting. British war aims simply did not match their nation’s objectives during 
the conflict.  
American actions eventually prompted the Chickasaw Nation to join the fight. 
Belligerent overtures and the construction of Fort Jefferson in 1780 provoked a 
response. Built on the east bank below the mouth of the Ohio River, the American 
outpost infringed on Chickasaw hunting grounds and threatened the Mississippi River. 
In rejoinder, warriors laid siege to the fort and took the waterway by storm. Though not 
on especially cordial terms with American rebels before this, most Chickasaws had 
skirted involvement in the civil war. However, realpolitik considerations dictated 
Chickasaw activities throughout the American Revolution, and the bluffs’ topography 
amplified their decisions.  
Chickasaw assaults on the Mississippi ceased before the war’s end, but James 
Colbert carried on the fight. Although a Scottish migrant, Colbert had lived with the 
Chickasaws for decades. He rallied Loyalist support along the river and coordinated 
surprise attacks on Spanish ships passing the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff. Though 
Chickasaw warriors did not join in these endeavors, the Chickasaw Nation did not 
entirely disallow them either. Several hundred villagers joined Colbert’s band of British 
Loyalists to share in their largesse. Even those outspokenly opposed to Colbert’s actions 
took the opportunity to build off his success. As Chickasaw diplomats had with the 
French, those seeking an alliance with Spain returned river captives to begin 
negotiations. In exchange for free passage along the Mississippi they requested peace 
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and commerce. Having been on the receiving end of Chickasaw raids and experienced 
Colbert’s effectiveness, Spanish administrators knew the value of this offer.   
After the American Revolution, the Chickasaws once again found themselves 
between non-native nations competing for land and influence. Both Spain and the 
United States courted their allegiance with hopes of acquiring Sakti Lhafa’ in the 
process. Spanish authorities, in particular, wanted to build a fort on the bluff and 
thereby command the Mississippi River. Chickasaw factions headed by Ugulayacabé 
and Piomingo, respectively, exploited this rivalry to receive annual presents and 
maintain trade relations with both powers. By the end of the eighteenth century, the 
Fourth Chickasaw Bluff no longer functioned as a military checkpoint but as a 
negotiating chip in foreign affairs. For a time, its topographical advantages and 
geographic importance continued to work to the benefit of the entire nation.  
However, by 1795 the Chickasaws found themselves in a difficult position. 
Piomingo’s relationship with the United States threatened to engulf them in war with 
the numerically superior Creeks. Furthermore, American advances had begun to close 
in on Chickasaw Country. The U.S. Army occupied Fort Massac, an old French outpost 
on the Ohio River, which sat ominously on their northern border. Pressure from 
Cherokee and American diplomats also forced the Chickasaws to cede land on the 
Tennessee River. Easy access to the Mississippi from these locations breathed new life 
into longstanding rumors of a pending American invasion and occupation of Sakti 
Lhafa’. Sensing the Chickasaws’ growing uneasiness, Spanish authorities once again 
requested permission to build a fort on the bluff. In return, they offered to assuage the 
Chickasaws growing conflict with the Creeks, safeguard the Chickasaw Nation from an 
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American land grab, and establish a trade post, in addition to providing immediate 
“gifts.” The short and, seemingly, long-term benefits overcame Ugulayacabé and the 
other chiefs’ reluctance to part with such a critical portion of their territory.   
Throughout the eighteenth century, Sakti Lhafa’ magnified Chickasaw influence 
along the Mississippi River. At the Fourth Bluff, the channel narrowed and waters 
churned hindering boat traffic. The heights extending skyward further advantaged 
warriors, scouts, and eventually forts seeking to block the way. Similar features 
throughout the entire string of Chickasaw Bluffs made travel through the region 
difficult and therefore more easily disrupted. Chickasaws took advantage of this setting 
in their military and diplomatic endeavors as the balance of power shifted. Sakti Lhafa’ 
transformed from a checkpoint, into a bargaining chip, and then a land cession during 
their struggle to resist the ravages of colonialism. Chickasaw “love [of] that place,” as 




The Chickasaw Bluffs, and the fourth bluff in particular, offered several distinct 
benefits. These unique landforms rose above the Mississippi, essentially dividing the 
great river in two. Boat traffic moving between the LMR and the MMR could not avoid 
traveling through them. Yet doing so required navigating harrowing passes where 
islands littered the channel and collected a menacing assortment of planters and 
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sawyers. Fueled by the Ohio and hemmed by the Bluffs, the Mississippi’s waters sped 
around such obstructions making it difficult for boatmen to steer their crafts. The river 
naturally funneled traffic into particular routes, occasionally forcing boats near the 
eastern shoreline. This was the case at the foot of Sakti Lhafa’.  
Though Chickasaws certainly understood the bluffs differently than European 
travelers, their eyes fell upon the same sights. Cultural perspectives aside, one’s view of 
the bluffs and the Mississippi hinged on several considerations. For instance, the picture 
presented from the water differed markedly from the spectacle at the top. Likewise, 
appearances transformed when proceeding upstream rather than down. Furthermore, 
impediments to river travel turned to assets when attempting to block traffic. 
Ugulayacabé’s European contemporaries marveled at such imposing challenges and the 
stunning scenery.  
Adventurer Thomas Ashe described his trip downriver through this section in 
1806. “The Chickasaw Bluffs are one hundred and fifty-one miles from the mouth of 
the Ohio,” he explained. “I should have found it a very lonesome stretch, had I not been 
incessantly employed in preserving the boat from danger; from rocks, sawyers, and 
snags; and from eddies, gulphs, bayaus, points, and bends in the river.” These obstacles 
proved only half the battle in his estimation. “The attention is also kept awake by the 
necessity of looking out for islands, in order to choose the proper channel, and to pull 
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for it in time, or before the boat falls into the race of a wrong one.”10 Failing to avoid 





Figure 11: Chickasaw Bluffs Map, ca. 1765. 
Lieut. Ross and Robert Sayer, Course of the river Mississippi from the Balise to Fort Chartres; 
taken on an expedition to the Illinois, in the latter end of the year 1765 (London: Printed for 
Robt. Sayer, 1775). 
 
 
Native Americans struggled with similar challenges and dealt with them 
accordingly. At a place north of the Ohio, a massive rock climbed from the Mississippi 
                                                          
10 Thomas Ashe, Travels in America performed in 1806, for the purpose of exploring the rivers 
Alleghany, Monongahela, Ohio, and Mississippi, and ascertaining the produce and condition of their 
banks and vicinity (London: R. Phillips, 1808), III: 139. 
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River to form an elevated island unto itself. According to a French missionary the stone 
outcropping “makes the river turn very short and narrows the channel, causing a 
whirlpool in which it is said canoes are lost during the high waters. On one occasion 
fourteen Miamis perished there. This has caused the spot to be dreaded by the savages, 
who are in the habit of offering sacrifices to that rock when they pass there.”11  When 
steering around of these places could not be avoided, appeals to spiritual forces and 
taboos were used to offset the risk. Potentially perilous areas of a river, known in 
Chickasaw as okishtahollo’, necessitated silent observation. Otherwise, this “witch 
water” would “bubble and rise toward” the person who “makes a noise.”12 Even with 
experience and proper precautions, river travel remained dangerous. In February 1753, a 
party of Cherokees arrived in the Chickasaw Nation “naked” after “the Falls or 
Breakers, [combined with] the Rapit running of the Water overset four of their Canoes.” 
In the aftermath “they lost all their Guns, Blankets, and Boots, and had two Men 
drownded.”13 Such hazards were particularly acute throughout the Chickasaw Bluffs.  
 The Mississippi adjusted its course for these heights, creating and destroying 
obstacles as it went. These impediments made the river difficult to navigate according 
to Christian Schultz. “The Upper Chickasaw Bluffs,” he wrote, border the sky for 
“about one mile along the river” and sat “eleven miles” apart from the second set, 
“which are of the same extent as the former.” From these, the river turned ragged and 
                                                          
11 This rock became known as Cap St. Cosme. See Louise Phelps Kellogg, ed., Early Narratives of the 
Northwest, 1634-1699 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1917), 356-357; Tracy Neal Leavelle, The 
Catholic Calumet: Colonial Conversions in French and Indian North America (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 58-59.   
12 Munro and Willmond, Chickasaw, 274.  
13 John Buckles did not make clear which river the Cherokees were traversing when this occurred. See 
DRIA I, 384. 
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far more threatening. “Sixteen miles below,” the water rumbled “very difficult and 
dangerous” as it tumbled through “the Devil’s Race Ground.” Here “the rapidity of the 
current, together with the obstruction of planters and sawyers,” earned the passage its 
nickname. Surviving that obstacle and moving “ten miles” further the third set of bluffs 
cast their shadow “nearly a mile along the river,” with “high” and “narrow commanding 
ridges.” A sharp left hook quickly followed, kinking the river in “one of the greatest 
bends” on the LMR. “Twenty-six miles below” the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff began to 
elevate above the water near a “small stream” known as Wolf River. From his vantage, 
these heights seemed to “tower sixty feet above the greatest rise of the river” and did so 
for “about ten miles on the river.” Given the bluff’s massive scale Schultz felt confident 
there was “no danger of its being washed away like the other parts of the bank.”14   
The Navigator, published a little over a decade after Schultz’s voyage, proves 
how much the river could change in time. Neither the channel nor the “Upper 
Chickasaw Bluff” warranted much concern, although the Mississippi reportedly met the 
Second Bluff abruptly. “The river bearing hard against the bluff,” the author explained, 
“subjects it to an almost constant caving down, hence the face of the bluff is kept fresh 
in its appearance.” Having passed a “very narrow” right turn and an eddy “close to the 
bluff,” the channel again widened to ease travel. In fact, the power of the New Madrid 
earthquakes in 1811-1812 realigned the river and redeemed the devil in the process. 
“The right channel is now the best and in fact the main one,” The Navigator reported, 
“though so bad a few years ago as to get the name of the Devil’s Race Ground.” Drastic 
                                                          
14 Christian Schultz, Travels on an inland voyage through the states of New-York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee: and through the territories of Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi and New-
Orleans; performed in the years 1807 and 1808; including a tour of nearly six thousand miles (New 
York: Printed by Isaac Riley, 1810), 109-111.  
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shifts like this did not occur often, but changes in navigational routes transpired 
regularly due to flooding. Without guidebooks like this one, Chickasaws relied on one 
another to stay abreast of such alterations. Knowing which ittifilammi, or branch, to take 
and which to avoid kept them safe on the water and helped them obstruct others.15  
Though most Chickasaw raids concluded before the publication of The 
Navigator, it describes the types of environmental features that made their success 
along the Mississippi possible. An oblong peninsula between the third and fourth bluff 
serves as an illustration for how this worked. Apparently the New Madrid earthquakes 
did not offer salvation for the entire river because boats still encountered the “Devil’s 
Elbow.” This landmass dominated the river jutting out and filling the channel with 
debris. As a remedy the guide advised: 
In approaching this chute, you must hug close round the left hand point until you come 
in sight of the sand bar, whose head has the appearance of an old field of trees; then pull 
over for the island to keep clear of the snags on your left, while you leave those along 
the head of the island on your right, taking care not to approach these last too near, for 
the current is so rapid, that the striking one might so shock the boat as to endanger the 
cargo. The channel to the right of No. 38 is now too dangerous to be run, it being 
chocked, and filled with snags and sawyers.16 
With limited options, boats had to veer near the east bank to avoid wrecking. 
Yet doing so brought them within range of musket fire or arrows loosed from 
the shore. With their hand upon their oars, boatmen could do little to defend 
themselves.  
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Figure 12: Mississippi River at Third 
Chickasaw Bluff Map, ca. 1811. Cramer, The 
Navigator, 155. Land formations like “Devil’s 
Elbow” (no. 38) created obstructions within 
the Mississippi’s channel that worked to funnel 
boat traffic near the eastern shore. Chickasaw 
warriors took advantage of places like this to 
limit the movement of their enemies.  
 
Those going upriver became particularly vulnerable when forced near the 
shoreline. Since the current generally moved fastest in the middle of the river, rowing 
upstream was easiest at the channel’s edges. French convoys, like Ducoder’s, tried to 
parallel the west bank, taking advantage of these slower waters while avoiding potential 
Chickasaw attacks. Voyageurs where “most at risk when they have to paddle up the 
river, since when holding their oars, they cannot defend themselves from a surprise 
attack, which is the strategy most favored and most often employed by the barbarous 
Indian nations,” Lieutenant Dumont explained.17 Sticking to the western portion of the 
river mitigated this risk until islands, planters and sawyers, river bends, swift currents, 
or even weather obliged them to switch sides.  
Yet nature was no partisan and did not pick sides in the struggles over its rivers. 
As John Stuart made clear to Lord George Germain in the midst of the American 
Revolution, Chickasaw patrols on the Ohio and Mississippi did not constitute 
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blockades. “As from the width and rapidity of their streams, more especially at the parts 
where these Indians must of course be stationed,” Stuart explained, “it may not be 
always in their power to succeed in intercepting such rebel expeditions.”18 Without 
large navies or long-range canons, Native nations could not establish foolproof cordons. 
Even where the river normally narrowed, floods might quickly advantage paddlers. 
With the banks inundated, warriors on land had to retreat while boatmen gained more 
surface area to maneuver. Accelerated currents also sped those heading downstream 
past anyone wishing them ill. Thus, impeding river traffic required assessing water 
levels, river patterns, and landforms. 
Where the environment allowed, Chickasaws struck. In one instance a young 
warrior “concealed himself under cover of a fallen pine tree, in view of the ford” 
opposite a Creek village on the Coosa River. “The enemy now and then passed the river 
in their light poplar canoes” so, according to James Adair, “he waited, with 
watchfulness and patience almost three days” before killing three passersby. The 
riverine landscape again proved advantageous in 1736. After blunting d’Artaguette’s 
invasion, Chickasaw war parties headed to the Chickasaw Bluffs intent on punishing the 
French. “Some went to the Missisippi, made a fleet of cypress-bark canoes, watched 
their trading boats, and cut off many of them without saving any of the people,” Adair 
reported.19      
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 From atop these heights, Chickasaw scouts could spy (hapompoyo’) watercraft 
passing in either direction. The Chickasaw Bluffs became a nannaa-apiisachi’, a 
lookout place or watchtower of sorts.20 Naturally lookouts intensified during times of 
conflict and perhaps in the summer when river levels dropped and travel increased. 
British trader John Buckles made frequent mention of such watch parties throughout 
much of 1752. “Thirty Chickersaws left this Nation with a Desgin to look for French 
Boats,” his journal entry from August 13th notes. These men returned from “out on the 
River Missisippia” in October “without doing any Mischief.” In fact, he told Governor 
James Glen of South Carolina, “several Parties of Chickasaws” had gone “to War 
against the French in order to meet with their Boats on Missisipia River.” More 
Chickasaws headed to the river that fall “to watch the Motions of the French to see if 
they can make any Discovery.” Come January, a party arrived back having been “out a 
scouting” when they captured “five French Men Prisoners” from “the other Side of the 
Missisipia River.”21 Buckles did not pinpoint the Chickasaw Bluffs as the locus for such 
watchfulness, but French reports do.22  
From the vantage of the fourth bluff, lookouts gained an especially impressive 
view. One early nineteenth century observer recorded, “The Chickasaw Bluff is a very 
high red bank on the eastern side of the river.” Near its summit, the Mississippi’s 
voluminous curves sprawled out before him. “Over the Louisiana shore the sight has no 
limit, but rushes unrestrained over an immense expanse of forest.” He continued 
gushing, “To the right it is arrested by a fantastic bend of the river…to the left it strays 
                                                          
20 Munro and Willmond, Chickasaw, 97, 251.  
21 DRIA I, 364-366 &382-384. 
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amidst a cluster of islands, through the channel of which the water meanders.”23 The 
nuances within the river certainly varied over time, but the general overview would 
have remained much the same throughout the eighteenth century. Boat traffic in either 
direction could be spied and tracked from high above the water. A station on the Fourth 
Chickasaw Bluff proved “commanding from its elevated situation,” according to 
another travel report.24 None of this was lost on the Chickasaws themselves. “Our 
forts,” Ugulayacabé explained, “[were] the woods” about those heights.  
The river also presented its own unique challenges as it passed this rocky 
outcropping. “The Mississippi frequently rises to a height of forty feet,” Christian 
Schultz noted, “and there the banks are of any extraordinary elevation, the difficulty of 
ascending their slippery sides, particularly when the water is low, is proportionably 
great; and this is the case with all the bluffs, or head lands.”25 Topography limited the 
number of landing spots available on the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff, as it did throughout 
the string of heights. Fewer places to beach also meant less waterfront for scouts to 
observe. Not only that, but the river’s movements directed boat traffic towards the 
fourth bluff. One Spanish official warned, “There is a whirlpool which forces boats to 
pass within pistol shot of the hill which dominates the river.”26 Forced near the shore, 
yet unable to land, boat travelers became vulnerable at the base of the Fourth 
Chickasaw Bluff.    
                                                          
23 Ashe, Travels in America, III: 141-142. 
24 Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, 1748-1846 (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark 
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Topography and geography gave Chickasaws enormous sway over much of the 
LMR. From the Fourth Bluff, a nation could influence the waterway upstream and 
down. Warriors from other nations utilized advantageous river sites to obstruct their 
enemies, but these did not match the Chickasaw Bluffs in importance.27 British 
diplomat Edmond Atkin recognized as much in his plan for gaining control of the 
colonial southeast. Three points within Chickasaw Country could derail the “free 
Navigation of the Missisippi, and Communication between New Orleans and Montreal, 
or the Illinois,” he asserted. The mouth of the Wolf River on the north end of the Fourth 
Chickasaw Bluff held great importance, as did the mouths of the Tennessee and Ohio 
rivers. From the Chickasaw Bluff, Atkin claimed, “The passage of the Missisippi may 
be commanded.”28 A generation later, the Spanish governor of Louisiana, Baron de 
Carondelet, wholeheartedly agreed.  Whoever possessed this spot, he explained, were in 
effect “masters of the navigation of the Mississippi through the advantages of being in a 
situation above Walnut Hills, Natchez, and New Orleans, to which by means of the 
rapid current they could arrive in a few days, while going up to the Bluffs would require 
months.” 29  
In times of conflict Chickasaws exploited this naturally occurring checkpoint to 
their advantage. Following the failed accord in 1745, warriors made good on their 
headmen’s promise to “attack all the French and the red men” on the Mississippi.30 
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From then on colonial administrators could not count on convoys or voyageurs passing 
the bluffs unmolested. “At the Prudhomme Bluffs on the [Mississippi] river” in the 
summer of 1751, Chickasaws “defeated the pirogue” of six hunters.31 Then in 1752 and 
1753 convoys descending from Illinois to New Orleans also came under fire. Of these 
attacks Jean-Bernard Bossu, a Captain in the French Marine, reported the Chickasaws 
“always choose some advantageous situation, to make an attack in, their most common 
post is at the rocks of the Prudhomme.” After all, nature granted both scouts and 
warriors the upper hand in those parts. “The river being narrow there, they can annoy 
the boats,” Bossu grumbled. When two officers failed to take proper precautions on 
account of “not knowing the topography of the country” they paid with their lives.32 
The parties Buckles witnessed going to the river undoubtedly played a role in their 
demise.  
Inexperienced Frenchmen may not have known the lay of the land, but 
Chickasaw spies and warriors did, and they used it to their advantage. John Pettycrew 
informed Governor Glen of these developments while trading amongst the Chickasaws 
in 1752. “The Chickesaws had cut off several Boats in the Missippi this Summer and 
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killed twenty French Men,” he reported, before noting, “It’s probable that there may be 
some French Prisoners taken by the Chickesaws.”33 By late summer of 1753, passing 
along the river had become nearly impossible. Chevalier de Kerlérec, then governor of 
Louisiana, warned the commanding officer at the Arkansas post to remain vigilant. He 
ordered Sieur de La Houssaye to monitor “the space of forty leagues above and below 
on both banks of the [Mississippi] river against the raids and attacks that some bands of 
Chickasaws, Cherokees, and Shawnees make from time to time on our boats.”34 Had 
Houssaye scouted this distance upriver, he would have found himself at the foot of the 
Fourth Chickasaw Bluff, but apparently not even avoiding the eastern shoreline would 
have assured his safety during such a mission.  
Potential warpaths drawn across the Chickasaw map in 1737 had come to 
fruition by the 1750s. With their offer of peace rebuffed, the Chickasaws put the 
riverine landscape and bluff’s topography to work. At points where the Mississippi 
narrowed and streamflow hindered enemy boatmen, warriors struck. From the vantage 
point atop the Chickasaw Bluffs, scouts could assess river conditions and anticipate the 
movements of traffic below. These advantages combined in spectacular fashion at Sakti 
Lhafa’. The tapered channel and swirling currents forced watercraft to its base. From 
the bird’s eye view above, Chickasaw warriors could spy unsuspecting boaters below. 
Then using the current to their advantage, these warriors disrupted French convoys 
which threatened the security of the Chickasaw Nation.  
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Sakti Lhafa’ had long defined the Mississippi River, which delineated the 
western reaches of the Chickasaw homeland. After the Treaty of Paris officially ended 
the Seven Years, War in 1763, the river also came to demarcate the extent of British and 
Spanish land claims in North America. Down the rivers’ twists, turns, and bends the 
treaty prescribed “a line drawn along the middle” in order that territories on either side 
might be “fixed irrevocably.”35 Native Americans, of course, recognized that certain 
rivers distinguished boundaries so this concept was not entirely foreign. After all, 
Chickasaws already used the river to divide time and space. However, their designations 
centered on socio-religious beliefs and Native political history, not European law or 
theories.36 Furthermore, currents and landforms, seasonality and flooding, trade and 
alliances, could not be ignored. 
During the American Revolution, British and Spanish authorities came to realize 
their line meant little when compared to these principles. Up until that time, Britain 
generally benefited from the enormous influence the Chickasaws accrued at Sakti 
Lhafa’. The Chickasaws’ well-earned reputation as fierce warriors and the physical 
geography both worked in their favor. British officials anticipated Chickasaw support 
would buttress their interests against the rebellious colonists, too. However, the 
Chickasaws were neither gatekeepers nor mercenaries. For their part, Spanish officials 
came to appreciate Sakti Lhafa’s importance on the Mississippi and the value of a 
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Chickasaw alliance. After suffering several river raids by Loyalist holdouts orchestrated 
by James Colbert, the governor of St. Louis sought Chickasaw assistance. Once again 
Chickasaw diplomats skillfully deployed captives and claims to the Mississippi when 
negotiating an accord. In each case the river enhanced the Chickasaws’ captivity to 
serve their own interests while appeasing their European partners.         
Immediately following the Seven Years’ War, the Chickasaws began 
facilitating, rather than hindering, river travel. In the summer of 1765, a party of 125 
Chickasaws, led by principal war chief Paya Mataha, met a British regiment led by 
Major Robert Farmar at the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff. To that point, navigation of the 
Mississippi had proven to be “extremely difficult and intricate” for his men who were 
unaccustomed to the waterway. Ordered upriver to seize former French posts in Illinois, 
Farmar found himself “but Five Days bad Provisions left” when the Chickasaws 
arrived. Besides being a critical stronghold, Sakti Lhafa’ was a favored Chickasaw 
hunting ground, and the party quickly “supplied” the regiment “plentifully with 
Buffalloe Bear and Venison.” A number of them then escorted the regiment to Fort de 
Chartres, sending out “Flanking parties to attend the 34th Regiment in its passage up the 
Mississippi.” Impressed with their service, Farmar concluded, “That Nation can be very 
Usefull in case of Disturbances amongst the Northern Indians, as would not only cut 
of[f] all Supplies, but would also Strike upon them with as many Men as we would 
Choose.”37 In his trip, Farmar discovered the simple lesson France had long since 
known: allies shared river-paths, while enemies did not. Native nations along the 
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Mississippi widely followed this principle, which is why Farmar required Chickasaw 
protection. 
Ten years later, during the American Revolution, the distinctions between 
enemies and allies frustrated British officials’ calls to suspend traffic on the Mississippi 
River. The Chickasaws had repeatedly served the Crown’s interests, and many 
bureaucrats assumed they would again. From West Florida, Governor Peter Chester 
assured his superiors that the Chickasaws “have always been very good friends of the 
English,” and he was confident “they will join us.”38 This time, Spanish ships engaging 
in clandestine trade with the Americans were to be targeted. Monitoring this activity 
reduced the chances that supplies might slip upstream from New Orleans to the 
American rebels above the Ohio River.39  Loyalist strongholds at Natchez and in West 
Florida would also be secured from American attacks generated upriver. John Stuart, 
the British Indian Superintendent, asked for Choctaw and Chickasaw “assistance” in 
this endeavor, which he considered “absolutely necessary for the effect.”40  
Whereas Chickasaw and British interests so often aligned against the French, a 
majority of Chickasaws did not see these new objectives adding to their own security. 
French outposts along the Mississippi had directly threatened their welfare. The upstart 
rebels had no such holdings, and they resided to the east. With its powerbase in New 
Orleans, France always had to contend with the Mississippi’s currents that worked to 
the Chickasaws’ advantage. The Ohio and Tennessee rivers, on the other hand, flowed 
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east to west, favoring the Americans. As evidenced in the Chickasaws’ map from 1723, 
they knew these rivers extended into the colonies and could support watercraft. An 
American army might well be propelled downstream into Chickasaw territory. In fact, 
such concerns severely limited Chickasaw participation at the Mobile conference hosted 
by John Stuart in 1777. The delegates who did attend explained that most of their 
people stayed behind believing it “prudent to remain at home to defend their country, 
which they were determined to do to the last extremity.”41 Despite this defensive 
measure, the Chickasaws were not at odds with the Americans as they had been with the 
French.  
Chickasaws had the ability to curtail river traffic; they simply did not deem it 
necessary for their security. France had secretly transferred Louisiana to Spain, at the 
Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762, to help pay its war debt. Even with the defeat of their 
chief European rival, the political divisions within the Chickasaw Nation remained. 
Afterwards Ymahatabe’s old faction looked to Spain as a possible trade partner and 
potential military counterweight. They had little interest in detaining Spanish vessels. 
Meanwhile pro-British headmen had begun competing with one another for 
manufactured goods and political influence.42 At the Mobile conference, Stuart 
attempted to leverage Great Britain’s trade advantage into more direct action. James 
Colbert, a staunch loyalist living amongst the Chickasaws, did manage to raise a few 
parties to patrol the Mississippi in the latter half of 1777. Occasionally Spanish boats 
encountered light Chickasaw firepower at the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff, warranting 
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protest from Governor Bernardo de Galvez at New Orleans, but the Chickasaws’ efforts 
were not sustained. In fact, James Willing led a small group of Patriots down the 
Mississippi in an armed vessel that winter. They encountered only “slight” resistance at 
the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff before continuing to Walnut Hills and Natchez.43 
Chickasaw history and the environmental advantages to be had at Sakti Lhafa’ 
demonstrate a concerted effort by some Chickasaws might have stopped Willing, but 
other priorities consumed their attention.44     
According to Stuart, the Chickasaws’ overall reluctance to engage stemmed 
from a lack of hostility. The head war chief Paya Mataha explained as much during a 
meeting at Pensacola in 1778. “I found that it was with the utmost difficulty he could 
place in the light of enemies those men whom from his earliest infancy he had been 
taught to consider as his dearest friends, whom he had assisted and defended upon many 
occasions at risk of his life,” Stuart wrote. “He could not bring himself to imbrue his 
hands in the blood of white people without the greatest reluctance,” fearing the 
repercussions “of committing some fatal blunder by killing the King’s friends instead of 
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his enemies.”45 Adversaries suffered the consequences of traversing the Mississippi, not 
allies, and Chickasaws had no interest in confusing the two.  
Only after American and Spanish agents threatened the security of the 
Chickasaw Nation in 1779 did they truly respond in force. Furious over Virginia’s 
ultimatum for war or peace, the principal red chiefs and all the warriors informed the 
Virginians “We desire no other friendship of you but only desire you will inform us 
when you are Coming and we will save you the trouble of Coming quite here for we 
will meet you half Way.”46 In New Orleans, the Spaniards received a similar message 
after news that they had encouraged Choctaw hostilities against the Chickasaws 
circulated about the region.47 Then in 1780, Thomas Jefferson, governor of Virginia, 
ordered George Rodgers Clark to erect a fort on the Mississippi’s east bank near the 
mouth of the Ohio. Like so many before him, Jefferson recognized the strategic value of 
the Ohio-Mississippi intersection, but ran afoul of the Chickasaws trying to control it.  
Chickasaw war parties immediately sprang into action, placing the river and the 
fort under siege. American and Spanish boats encountered resistance on the Tennessee, 
Ohio, and Mississippi rivers. By the fall of 178,0 John Stuart’s replacement, Alexander 
Cameron, could report, “The Chickasaws are constantly hunting the Mississippi and 
Cherokee [Tennessee] Rivers for Virginians, French and Spaniards and every now and 
then some of each are knocked in the Head.”48 More fortunate travelers were plucked 
from the water and sold for ransom.49 Residents of the newly established Fort Jefferson 
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faired much worse. Repeated attacks against crops, cattle, and settlers forced the fort’s 
abandonment in June 1781, just a year after its completion.50  
Spain had joined the American war effort two years earlier and quickly claimed 
West Florida in the process. Loyalists from Natchez fled north after a failed rebellion 
and sought shelter from James Colbert in the Chickasaw Nation. This native Scotsman 
had lived amongst the nation since his youth and established kinship ties through his 
three wives and eight children.51 He used this influence to harbor nearly three hundred 
British refugees near the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff for much of 1782. Refusing to accept 
Spanish victories along the Mississippi, Colbert employed the advantages of Sakti 
Lhafa’ as his adopted nation had so often done. From a basecamp on the Wolf River, his 
Loyalist holdouts launched assaults on Spanish ships near the bluffs. However, this put 
a growing number of Chickasaws in an awkward position. British supply lines had 
lagged and Britain’s defeat seemed imminent. Many Chickasaws actually began to 
favor an alliance with Spain. Never ones to miss an opportunity on the river, some 
individuals welcomed the booty Colbert snagged while Chickasaw diplomats bargained 
with Spanish officials.      
 On April 2, 1782 Colbert and his raiders captured a keel-boat out of New 
Orleans bound for the Spanish garrison at St. Louis. The boat, owned and operated by 
Silvestre l’Abadie, had been hugging the Mississippi’s west bank opposite the Fourth 
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Chickasaw Bluff when a voice rang out from the shore requesting an audience. Once 
l’Abadie landed to inquire about the matter, a party of Loyalists rushed from the woods, 
weapons drawn, and seized the vessel. Merchandise earmarked for Spain’s Indian allies 
and 4,900 pesos fell to the Loyalist holdouts. In addition, the young wife and four 
children of Lieutenant-Colonel Francisco Cruzat, governor of St. Louis, came under 
Colbert’s authority. Having assured Madam Cruzat of their safety, Colbert and crew 
rowed the keel-boat, prisoners and all, back to their camp.52 
Two of Colbert’s sons might well have been the only Chickasaws involved in 
the ploy, but that did not stop others from benefiting.53 According to Madam Cruzat’s 
testimony, the party moved further up the Wolf River the following day, though “the 
rapidity of the current” due to “the narrowness and slope of the river” made it slow 
going, as did “the trees that were in that river.” Nevertheless, they made close to four 
leagues and “commenced to unload the boat.” Over four days, the loot slowly 
accumulated on the ground: “tableware of silver” in one pile, “clothes” in another, 
“guns” here, and “other merchandise” there. While these items were collected in the 
open, Colbert’s Loyalists carefully covered the powder “with oilcloths or oilskins” for 
safekeeping. Having finished their task and divided “about six thousand pesos” amongst 
themselves, they put some slaves and the silver up for auction. All the other goods 
“were evenly distributed,” except the “powder, bullets, and brandy” which remained in 
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reserve. Then, a few days later, “two hundred Chicachas more or less” joined the British 
party at which time the brandy and powder were “divided among all, including the 
Indians.”54 
 Madam Cruzat’s statement is telling in a number of ways. First, almost no 
Chickasaws joined Colbert’s efforts to disrupt Spanish boats. Second, Colbert piloted 
the Wolf River despite all of its challenges. The river cut across the north end of Sakti 
Lhafa,’ and Colbert knew its capacities after living nearly forty years with the 
Chickasaws. Finally, the fact that the Loyalists did not divvy up the powder and brandy, 
like the other goods, indicates they planned to rendezvous with the Chickasaws. These 
British holdouts continued to pursue the war effort and most “were continually drunk,” 
so both the powder and the brandy would have been highly prized.55  
The Loyalists’ restraint indicates that a scheme to split these two valued goods 
was prearranged. Colbert may have wanted to gift the munitions to his Chickasaw 
relatives in order to curry favor, but Colbert only had nominal influence over the British 
holdouts he led. A Choctaw chief even claimed the outfit had “no ball nor cloth” and 
“did not wish to sell goods to the Chickasaws because they were keeping them for their 
own urgent requirements.”56 Nonetheless, Madam Cruzat saw them set aside “powder” 
and “bullets” which they divvyed up among their Chickasaw guests. Colbert’s 
Chickasaw kin may have granted his Loyalists temporary access to the Fourth 
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Chickasaw Bluff in return for these supplies. After all, sharing space on the Mississippi 
necessitated personal relationships and mutual exchange. Colbert had the obligatory 
familial ties, and the munitions helped procured safe haven.      
 The speed at which a large group of Chickasaws met Colbert also gives the 
impression their meeting was prearranged. It took between two and eight days to reach 
Chickasaw villages from the Loyalist enclave. And yet, according to Madam Cruzat, 
“eight or nine days after the capture of the boat,” the Chickasaws arrived.57 To keep 
with this timeline they must have left their homes shortly after word of Colbert’s 
success reached them. Group decisions were communal, and often deliberative affairs, 
so consensus was either reached quickly or determined in advance. A couple hundred 
people made the trek to meet the British party, which indicates this was not an 
impromptu affair.58 Most Chickasaws in attendance probably favored Britain and were 
willing to profit from Spain’s misfortune. Although these Chickasaws would not join in 
Colbert’s river raids, they would grant his refugees asylum. With gunpowder and lead 
running low in Chickasaw Country, the good plundered by Colbert must have been 
worth the trip.   
 What is less clear is the degree to which the Chickasaw Nation as a whole 
endorsed these actions. Some villages had received British refugees, although 
competing interests divided the Chickasaw people. Much like Mingo Ouma’s raid back 
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in 1735, Colbert’s attack occurred in the midst of efforts to coordinate peace. Delegates 
had visited St. Louis just the month before requesting an accord with Spain, and Colbert 
repeatedly made clear to Spanish authorities that he did not fight on the Chickasaws’ 
behalf.59 In fact, a Spanish officer sent to investigate Madam Cruzat’s capture 
determined, “the Chickasaw nation had had absolutely nothing to do with the affair and 
found itself undecided and not knowing what course to take.”60 Despite competing 
interests within the Chickasaw Nation, the long-term risk of alienating a European trade 
partner simply outweighed the short-term benefits. Though not overtly hostile to Spain, 
those “friends of the English” did accept the largess and even returned to their nation in 
custody of some thirty-odd prisoners.61 Still, these actions did not entirely undermine 
those seeking peace. In early June, a messenger assured Paya Mataha that Miró was 
“convinced” the Chickasaws had “played no part in the attack lately perpetrated on the 
Mississippi River.”62 Building towards a partnership with Spain, Paya Mataha and other 
chiefs then used some of Colbert’s captives to initiate a round of river diplomacy. Like 
their ancestors a generation earlier, they pursued a new partnership using the 
Mississippi and Sakti Lhafa’ as leverage.  
 From his headquarters in St. Louis, Governor Cruzat grasped the role of the 
Mississippi River in Native American relations. Alliances begat transportation and 
trade, and so the interruption of either could be construed as an act of war. The governor 
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operated according to these principals upon learning the fate of his family. “I adopted 
the most efficacious means…in order to have the Chickasaw nation on my side,” he 
wrote Miró that August. Knowing they had “carried on war” with nations “who live on 
the Mississippi River, and on the bank of Illinois,” he sought to rekindle the animosity. 
Though he held Colbert responsible, Cruzat informed the Kickapoos and Mascoutens 
that the Chickasaw Nation “had captured the boat” with their presents “and that it was 
necessary that they avenge a theft which was against themselves.” This party may not 
have cared about Cruzat’s family, but tampering with Spanish supply lines could not be 
tolerated. “Without the slightest delay they set out to attack the Chickasaws and the 
rebels,” Cruzat informed Miró.63  
 Even before the war party returned, Cruzat reveled in his apparent success. 
Some Chickasaws repatriated six of Colbert’s captives and presented themselves at St. 
Louis “to reiterate their desire for peace.” He reasoned they had been “filled with fear” 
once they discovered the northern Indians in their homeland and came to him to “put an 
end to a war which seemed directed anew.”64 Besides overstating his own influence, 
patterns in Chickasaw history and the timing of these actions run counter to his 
assessment. Chickasaws did not scare easily nor depend on foreign officials to resolve 
their conflicts. They did, however, layer social geography upon Sakti Lhafa’ and its 
river, which could divide as well as unite disparate peoples. Although Cruzat 
understood the Mississippi’s economic importance, his “success” stemmed, in part, 
from the triumph of these relationships.  
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 Personal affiliations and the river’s connections led to the captives’ return and 
helped restore peace. James Colbert did not operate free of restraint within the 
Chickasaw Nation. Despite familial connections, the Loyalists’ sanctuary at the 
Chickasaw Bluff was dependent on the goodwill of others. Because a growing majority 
of Chickasaws favored opening trade with Spain, Colbert found himself in a precarious 
position. Particulars remain murky but the sources suggest Colbert gifted six of his 
prisoners to chiefs in favor of a Spanish alliance to atone for his actions. Although 
captured and subsequently held by Colbert, several Spanish soldiers and a corporal were 
repatriated by pro-Spanish headmen. Cruzat explained these six “were the only ones in 
their power, for all others were held by the rebels.”65 Colbert retained control over the 
remaining captives, which implies he had consented to returning those six. Agreeing to 
part with a half dozen captives reaffirmed his bonds with opposing Chickasaw factions 
and allowed them to pursue their own objectives relative to Spain. Divisions within the 
Chickasaw Nation had not precluded internal cooperation in foreign relations with 
France, and this pattern continued with the Spanish.  
 Furthermore, these men returned via Indian emissaries. The chiefs delivered 
them up to a group of Loups, Peorias, and Kaskaskias, who ultimately brought them to 
Cruzat. Like the Kickapoos and Mascoutens they were among the many nations on the 
Mississippi that had a tumultuous history with the Chickasaws. These peoples were also 
allied to and traded with Spain, meaning their gifts had been stolen by Colbert. Yet, 
Cruzat does not seem to have “fired their spirits” in quite the same way. Instead, they 
returned the captives and assured the governor of Paya Mataha’s commitment to protect 
                                                          
65 Kinnaird, “Spain in the Mississippi Valley,” III: 53.  
206 
 
and forward others who might “escape” Colbert or his rebels. As go-betweens, and not 
combatants, the Loups, Peorias, Kaskaskias, and Chickasaws built sociopolitical bonds 
pursuant to their own objectives. This established mode of Native American politics set 
the stage for the commencement of trade and peace along the Mississippi River.  
 Afterwards Paya Mataha and ten other Chickasaw delegates travelled to meet 
Cruzat in St. Louis and “reiterate their desire for peace.” They “begged me publicly,” 
Cruzat crowed, to “pacify the nations of the Mississippi and the banks of the Illinois.”66 
Yet this was certainly not the sole motivating factor for their visit. According to a 
Choctaw chief, the Chickasaws were “poor” and “no other white people except the 
Spaniards” could “supply their necessities.”67 Wanting peace but needing trade goods, 
Paya Mataha leveraged Colbert’s raids to his advantage. Spanish ships had to make the 
difficult pass at Saki Lhafa’ where Colbert lurked, so Paya Mataha used this as his 
primary bargaining chip. The Chickasaw delegation “assured” the governor “they 
would render no aid whatever to the rebels and pirates.” In addition, “they would do 
everything within their power to expel the bandits from their nation and…make efforts 
to clear the banks of this [Mississippi] river of all the evil doers who infest it.” Citing 
such “great evidence of sincerity,” Cruzat claimed victory in his “objective” to 
“intimidate the Chickasaws” and promised to appease the Kickapoo and Macouten 
nations.68 
 While the governor marveled at his accomplishment, Paya Mataha and the other 
Chickasaw left St. Louis as the true winners. They needed to ally with Spain to avoid a 
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conflict, offset American influence, and gain steady access to the trade goods being 
shipped up and down the Mississippi River. Yet, the envoys gave up almost nothing, 
and were assured that Spain’s “friendship would be reciprocal and generous.” For 
returning the six prisoners, who they had not captured, the Chickasaw delegation 
received “a gift suitable to what the present circumstances called for” as did the Loup, 
Peoria, and Kaskaskia Indians. Meanwhile the Chickasaws’ other promises bound them 
to do little more. Few, if any, Chickasaws outwardly aided Colbert, so this “concession” 
amounted to naught. Expelling the Loyalists and clearing the Mississippi around Sakti 
Lhafa’ would take some doing, but how this might be accomplished or a timetable for 
such activities went unmentioned.69 These nonbinding agreements actually served to 
enhance Chickasaw authority. By claiming the power to accomplish these tasks, Paya 
Mataha and his envoys bolstered Chickasaw command over the river. Cruzat’s reliance 
on them, conversely, acknowledged Spain’s vulnerability. In Cruzat’s mind, these 
factors made their “good will” an “indispensable necessity” worthy of “presents” so as 
to win their allegiance “by all means possible.”70     
Whether Paya Mataha and the others acted in concert with Colbert or not, their 
combined efforts underscored the value of the Chickasaw Bluffs and their cooperation. 
Colbert proved to colonial officials the vulnerability of Spanish supply lines at the 
bluffs. Fears of “outrages” or of the Chickasaws “preventing of navigation on the 
Mississippi” continued to shape Cruzat’s thinking and Spanish policy for years to 
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come.71 In the meantime hundreds of Chickasaws shared the bounty of his success.72 
Even those who publically condemned his actions profited from them. The transfer of 
Colbert’s captives to pro-Spanish Chickasaws, then to the delegation of Illinois Indians, 
and finally to Cruzat in St. Louis facilitated Chickasaw, intertribal, and international 
reconciliation. In accordance with established Native American protocols the return of 
prisoners initiated the peace process via which travel and trade on the Mississippi might 
commence.73  
Paya Mataha built on these factors in pursuit of commerce with Spain. Few 
Chickasaw warriors ever joined Colbert, but he could not, or would not, put an end to 
his raids. Only when word of the war’s conclusion reached Colbert in the summer of 
1783 did he completely suspend hostilities.74 Meanwhile, after the Chickasaws’ visit to 
St. Louis, Paya Mataha did not wait on Cruzat to orchestrate a peace. He hosted “seven 
different nations” including the Kaskaskia and Kickapoo that September. They too 
needed Chickasaw cooperation at the bluffs to facilitate Spanish commerce and urged a 
resolution.75 Paya Mataha remained open to this idea and continued to send emissaries 
to meet with Spanish officials throughout the rest of 1782 and 1783. However, he only 
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committed to an official Spanish alliance in 1784 once it became clear the United States 
could not supply Chickasaw needs.76    
As their British alliance had been, this was a match made of necessity. For 
Spanish authorities, the appeal of Chickasaw cooperation rested on their capacity to 
block American advances towards the Mississippi and control river traffic. With 
Chickasaw support Spain could supply St. Louis and their Indian allies while preventing 
American incursions downriver. From Paya Mataha’s perspective and that of a majority 
of Chickasaws, Spain proved the best alternative to replace British commerce after the 
war.77 They needed manufactured goods, plus a relationship with Spain might blunt 
American expansionism.78 Much of this hinged on Chickasaw control of Sakti Lhafa’ 
and the availability of Spanish merchandise. In recognition of this fact Paya Mataha 
travelled to the bluff and welcomed their traders in the spring of 1784. Unfortunately, 
the elderly headman fell ill while he was there. From his deathbed Paya Mataha 
recounted the past and laid out his vision for the future: 
Since the time when I gave my word to make peace with the Spaniards I have not 
broken it. I have directed all my labors toward counselling my young men to keep on 
good terms with that nation. I have convinced them that they could hope to get from no 
other nation the goods that they need. Already I have had the satisfaction of seeing 
subside little by little the enmity that my people used to hold toward the French and the 
Spaniards. I myself wish to die a Spaniard. I have ordered that when I am dead my 
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people shall set my body upon the bank of the Mississippi with my Spanish flag, and 
with my body it shall be burned.79 
 
In accordance with his final wish, Paya Mataha’s body was placed on the bank 
of the Mississippi, draped with a Spanish flag, and reportedly set alight.80 This dramatic 
ceremony at Sakti Lhafa’ was meant to bond Chickasaws and Spaniards in space. The 
physical geography remained unchanged, but Paya Mataha attempted to alter how 
people perceived that environment. The bluff and its river had always been essential to 
Chickasaw identity and independence. They split west from east and divided ancient 
history from the modern era, and now Paya Mataha intended to add another layer of 
meaning. He foresaw his people and the Spaniards as codependent along the Mississippi 
River. Expressed ceremonially at his death, each party merged with the other at Sakti 
Lhafa’. Based on the necessity of peace and trade, Paya Mataha adopted the Spanish 
into the region’s sociopolitical geography. In doing so they joined the Chickasaws’ past, 
present, and future. Thereafter Sakti Lhafa’ would endure as a testament to their 
relationship, or so he hoped.81 
British and Spanish expectations of the Chickasaws did not match their own 
outlook on these relationships. Colonial officials issued orders and demanded 
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obedience. Chickasaws sought to maintain reciprocal bonds beneficial to all parties. 
When called to act upon the Mississippi they did so if it fit with their objectives. In 
return, Chickasaws expected to be provided with manufactured goods. Having 
demonstrated their capacity to curtail river traffic, Chickasaws could demand, and their 
allies paid, greater gifts. The unique combination of river and earth at Sakti Lhafa’ 
allowed them to manipulate Britain’s imperial ambitions and Spain’s dependence on the 
Mississippi River. Paya Mataha wanted material support from his Spanish allies and 
was willing to integrate them into the Chickasaw’s place-world to secure it. But, his 
final act took place where Spain had proven vulnerable and Chickasaw power was 




Just two months after Paya Mataha’s passing, representatives from every 
Chickasaw village travelled to Mobile where they signed a treaty with Spain. All parties 
pledged their allegiance and forged an exclusive trade agreement. Despite this show of 
unity and Paya Mataha’s sentiments, American overtures for a similar arrangement 
persisted, as did Chickasaw factions. In January 1786, famed war leader Piomingo 
headed a much smaller delegation which signed the Treaty of Hopewell, on comparable 
terms, with the United States. The Chickasaws’ geopolitical position once again put 
them at the center of the contest for the Lower Mississippi Valley. By signing 
competing commitments, the Chickasaw Nation ensured Spain and the United States 
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would continue to vie for its allegiance. Agents from both nations delivered annual gifts 
and lavished special attention on Chickasaw headmen. Chickasaws weighed the benefits 
of these alliances against the prospect of maintaining their place along the Mississippi 
River.82    
Although relatively unknown to Spanish officials at the time, one of the 
cosigners at Mobile, a young man named Ugulayacabé, would eventually sway his 
people in their favor.83 Unlike Piomingo, Ugulayacabé descended from the white 
moiety.84 As a civil leader he came to front the pro-Spanish faction and often played the 
role of peacemaker. In so doing, he and Piomingo became rivals, but their contest 
always remained political. Much like Ymahatabe and Mingo Ouma before them, both 
men pursued their people’s wellbeing, and at times personal interests, while avoiding 
civil violence. Along with the Chickasaw “King,” Taski Etoka, they often met with 
Spanish or American delegates collectively. They knew and understood the position of 
the other, as well as those of their non-Native suitors. Therefore, national politics 
shaped international affairs, and international rivalries bleed into domestic matters. In 
this context, the Fourth Bluff played the role of bargaining chip, until sharing the river 
eventually required conceding a portion of Sakti Lhafa’.  
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Spaniards and Americans familiar with the region understood the strategic value 
of the Chickasaw Bluffs. Chickasaw success against French convoys and James 
Colbert’s efforts at the end of the American Revolution dramatically emphasized the 
importance of Sakti Lhafa along the Mississippi. Having replaced Miró as governor of 
Louisiana at the end of 1791, Baron de Carondelet made the bluffs the centerpiece of 
his strategy to secure the colony. He believed that a fort on the Fourth Bluff could 
command the entire Mississippi River. When combined with a fleet of war vessels and a 
buffer of Indian allies, he was confident the east bank would “remain” Spanish territory. 
While Carondelet set his plan in motion, American agents continued to court the 
Chickasaws. Hostilities with some Creeks, stemming from Piomingo’s relationship with 
the United States, threatened to engulf the Chickasaws in war during the spring of 1793. 
In response, the U.S. War Department shipped munitions and other supplies down the 
Mississippi to Piomingo, who gladly received them at the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff. 
Some Americans hoped, and Carondelet feared, a Creek-Chickasaw war would serve as 
a pretext for the United States to destroy the Creeks and establish a military installation 
on the bluff. In recognition of this, Carondelet redoubled his efforts to gain the bluffs 
for Spain.85      
Despite immense pressures Ugulayacabé, Piomingo, and other Chickasaw 
leaders refused to allow a foreign presence on the Mississippi’s namesake. Carondelet, 
however, hoped the enticement of a trade post might sway them and provide an excuse 
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to build a fort as well.86 Juan Villebeuvre, the Spanish agent to the Choctaws, informed 
Carondelet otherwise. The Chickasaws “consented” to a trade post, but “not exactly on 
Chickasaw Bluffs.” Instead, they proposed “the flat ground” on the Yazoo River thirty 
leagues to the south. “Our horses are all dead” they lamely explained, so the bluffs 
“dont Suit us.”87 This might have been a plausible excuse except, a few months later, in 
the fall of 1793, they signed the Treaty of Nogales in which they requested “the bank of 
the Mississippi River” at Sakti Lhafa’ serve as the delivery site for their annual 
presents.88  
Although Ugulayacabé and Piomingo pursued different alliances, both opposed 
land cessions and shared the objective of Chickasaw independence. When rumors 
circulated Piomingo had consented to an American settlement on the Fourth Chickasaw 
Bluff, Governor Gayoso put Carondelet’s nerves at ease. 89 “Many Chickasaws” had 
“assured” him that “while they are given support they will not permit the Americans 
there.” In fact, none other than the Chickasaw King and “his three principal warriors” 
had boasted “they would either die or drive the Americans from Chickasaw Bluffs” if 
necessary.90 These sentiments made it pointless for Spain to insist on acquiring land for 
a fort while treating at Nogales that October. “Under no circumstance will the 
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Chickasaws permit a white settlement at Chickasaw Bluffs: which, since it excludes the 
Americans, makes it unnecessary for us to insist upon it at least for now,” Gayoso 
theorized.91 Yet Carondelet persisted. “The Chicachá tribe, more jealous than any other 
in the possession of the lands, know the importance of the Ecores á Margot,” he 
concluded, but “a good present, made with finesse and in time might surprise their 
consent.”92    
The advantages of Sakti Lhafa only served Chickasaw interests so long as they 
retained possession. As Ugulayacabé said, it was a “pretty convenient place the 
Bluffs.”93 Its environmental features and geographic location made it one of a kind. 
Beyond that, it defined the Mississippi River and the river, in turn, demarcated 
Chickasaw territory, defined their history, and was an intimate part of who they were. 
“As for the Bluffs,” Ugulayacabé told Gayoso, “it is not a loan my talk to love that 
place…so you May depend on us not parting with it to any people.”94  
Supplies could be dropped off there, but neither Spaniards nor Americans could 
stay. In 1782 Piomingo and several other headman declared “the Road and water 
courses [to] be open” between themselves and the Americans. 95 In their minds, this 
declaration included the Mississippi River, although Spain officially denied the United 
States navigation rights. Piomingo recognized their ability and willingness to ship goods 
down the Mississippi. The Americans delivered supplies to him at the Fourth 
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Chickasaw Bluff several times after that. Just as Ugulayacabé requested Spain deliver 
annual presents at Sakti Lhafa’, Piomingo directed the U.S. to “send a boat with 
provisions to the Bluffs” in 1795. “The provisions can be packed in from the Bluffs” to 
Chickasaw villages he explained.96 He too recognized the strategic value of Sakti Lhafa’ 
and understood the significance of their homelands to his people. The year before 
Piomingo scolded Benjamin Fooy, a Spanish agent living with the nation, for meddling 
in their lands. He asserted, “The white people is yet at some Distance from us facing of 
Each other therefore I am Resolved as we are yet people to our Selves.”97  
Ugulayacabé personally preferred Spanish naval power on the Mississippi over a 
land cession for a fort next to it.  As part of his plan to defend Louisiana, Carondelet 
had created a squadron of war ships which began cruising the river in January 1792. If 
Spain feared an American takeover of the Fourth Bluff, as they often said, Ugulayacabé 
recommended he “Send about ten of them Boats” so that they would “have the pleasure 
of Seeing them Come.”98 Consisting of five light galleys, two galliots, and one smaller 
gunboat, Spain’s navy had quickly become the dominant force on the water. 
Navigational challenges had forced France’s largest gunboats to remain south of New 
Orleans, but Carondelet exercised his lighter war galleys throughout the LMR and 
beyond to St. Louis. Though petite by European standards, they dwarfed the pirogues 
and flatboats commonly used by the French and Americans. Spain’s long slender 
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warships must have been some spectacle for anyone unaccustomed to oceangoing 
vessels. The mobile battleships were each equipped with oars, a mast and sails, up to 
eight swivel guns, and the galleys even had cannons. The squadron’s unique stature 
certainly impressed Ugulayacabé. 
As 1795 dawned, the naval strength of his Spanish ally gave Ugulayacabé some 
comfort in an otherwise dire situation. The Americans had occupied and rebuilt Fort 
Massac, on the Ohio River, that summer. This stronghold deeply concerned 
Ugulayacabé, and most Chickasaws, since it sat “on the Very Borders” of their land and 
gave newfound credence to rumors of a pending American occupation of Sakti Lhafa’.99 
“In spite of all my endeavours to preserve my land from the white people,” he reported, 
the Cherokees and Americans had also coerced the Chickasaws’ into allowing a fort on 
the Tennessee River near Muscle Shoals.100 Taski Etoka, the king of the Chickasaws, 
died that fall as well, prompting a change in leadership.101 Furthermore, the Creeks had 
killed his nephew the year before, and now hostilities threatened to consume the 
Chickasaw Nation again.102 The pressure to concede land had made Ugulayacabé “crazy 
like the rest,” and unless Spain sent munitions to fight the Creeks he spoke as a man 
“going to die.” In February 1795, Ugulayacabé had to admit, “My land is at present full 
of trouble.”103   
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Facing American calls for land and war with the Creeks, Ugulayacabé and his 
fellow Chickasaws began to consider allowing a Spanish fort on Sakti Lhafa’.104 
Ugulayacabé had foreseen the end of the play-off system and knew a time would come 
for Native Americans to pick one side over the other. To continue defending Chickasaw 
space on the Mississippi, Ugulayacabé believed his nation had to cede a portion of Sakti 
Lhafa’ to their Spanish ally. As national and international affairs changed, so did 
Chickasaw expectations of their allies.105 This shift was the opening Carondelet had 
been waiting for. Captain Pedro Rousseau, squadron commander of the Mississippi 
galleys, set sail for the bluffs in the spring of 1795, bearing presents and orders to 
defend the heights against an American invasion. The threat never materialized, but 
several parties of Chickasaws, including Ugulayacabé and twenty-five warriors, joined 
him there shortly after his arrival. While awaiting Gayoso, so they might “come to an 
agreement,” Ugulayacabé probed Rousseau about the fleet’s capabilities. “The people 
of his Nation would be happy to see the squadron under full sail” Ugulayacabé told him, 
and asked “several times” if the Spanish could hold the bluffs against the Americans. 
Hearing that Spain would defend Sakti Lhafa’, Ugulayacabé seemed pleased and “said 
that he had told all his Nation that the Spaniards had many men and cannon as well as 
money.”106  
Two days later, on April 25, 1795, Ugulayacabé and the assembled Chickasaws 
witnessed Spain’s fleet in action. Having distributed the presents and with a “steady 
wind” blowing, Rousseau “signaled the squadron to prepare to put on all sails.” He 
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informed the Chickasaws camping on the Bluffs of the spectacle about to begin, and 
invited Ugulayacabé to join him aboard his flagship, la Venganza.  This galley was an 
imposing specimen bobbing on the river with its sails puffed up and guns gleaming in 
the sunlight.107 With everyone in place the squadron set sail promptly at 2:45, forming 
“a line of battle” directly “in front of the Bluffs” at which point the cannons fired in 
succession. “When the squadron had finished the Indians on the Bluffs replied with 
rapid volleys, which,” Rousseau admitted, “had a charming effect.” He thanked them 
with one final blast from the cannons before anchoring the fleet. Ugulayacabé “saw all 
of this with great satisfaction” and the Chickasaws celebrated this show of force well 
into the night. Convinced that Spanish firepower would safeguard the Chickasaw 
Nation along the Mississippi, Ugulayacabé returned to his village “to get its consent” 
for a trade post and fort.108  
By the time Gayoso finally arrived at the Bluffs near the end of May, 
Ugulayacabé had returned and negotiations began. The Creeks were at fault in the 
current conflict, Ugulayacabé claimed, and he wanted Spanish aid to end it. In private 
he also spoke in favor of a fort although he maintained that he alone could not authorize 
it. Furthermore, “recompense” would be necessary to “satisfy his people” if “their land 
was cut up.” Since the Spanish envoy had remained across the Mississippi, on the west bank, 
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Gayoso understood these issues would need to be discussed in Ugulayacabé’s “own country” 
with other “chiefs and headmen” of the Chickasaw Nation.109  
Gayoso and his officers made their way across the Mississippi and met the 
assembled Chickasaws. Taking the floor, Gayoso assured those gathered that Spain 
would promote peace with the Creeks as they desired. In addition, he argued that a fort 
was necessary to defend Chickasaw lands and commerce from the Americans. Despite 
generally backing these proposals, Ugulayacabé and the others still wavered “in view of 
the fact that it was necessary to consult with the other [pro-American] chiefs of the 
nation” before ceding land. To this Gayoso consented, promising “the greater part” of 
Spain’s gifts for those in attendance, but assured them “means were not lacking” for 
Piomingo and his faction too.110 Pleased with what Gayoso said, Ugulayacabé and the 
others allowed land to be cleared for a fort. Having gone home and gained the support 
they needed, two Chickasaw chiefs, William Glover and Payehuma, returned a month 
later to sign a formal treaty relinquishing a portion of Sakti Lhafa’.111  
This decision had not come easy, nor was it unanimous. Piomingo balked at this 
concession. He claimed to speak for the entire Chickasaw Nation when he demanded 
Gayoso “leave the Chickasaw Bluffs as you found it, and return home to your own land 
immediately.”112 When the Chickasaw King and his envoy visited Gayoso at San 
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Fernando de las Barrancas, the new Spanish fort, they made clear the causes of their 
hesitation. The King’s spokesman explained, “it had never been believed that any white 
man would dare to settle” in that place given “their ancestors had always been opposed 
to it with all their power.” However, now seeing “the face of the earth so altered,” they 
believed “the determined will of the Great Spirit” made it possible, and “they would not 
dare oppose.” The Chickasaw people had defended Sakti Lhafa’ ever since it had been 
given to them during their epic migration. The cleared woodlands indicated the Bluff 
was now meant for the Spaniards. “The Great Spirit was doing what he had wanted,” 
the spokesman announced. Even so, he repeatedly emphasized that Gayoso must 
restrain his soldiers and any Choctaws from hunting in the area. A warrior “of much 
boldness and verbosity” made it known that this “was their favorite hunting land” which 
they had “sustained even at the cost of blood” since ancient times. He and the other 
warriors were not happy about ceding any part of Sakti Lhafa’. They would not, 
however, oppose the decision of their chiefs, although “the loss of the most precious 
part of their lands cost them great pain.” Even if a fort stood on site, he declared, the 
Chickasaws “were the true owners of this place.”113  
Given Sakti Lhafa’s cultural and geopolitical significance, only dire 
circumstances could have brought this cession about. The Chickasaws agreed to forego 
“any future claim” to a portion of the Bluff because Ugulayacabé and his fellow 
headmen prioritized Chickasaw independence over Chickasaw land.114 In return Gayoso 
agreed to work towards a diplomatic resolution of the Creek conflict, which even 
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Piomingo appreciated.115 Should these efforts fail, however, “gifts” for relinquishing 
their land equaled supplies necessary to withstand a war. No less pressing, a Spanish 
fort on Sakti Lhafa’ countered U.S. garrisons springing up on the Ohio and Tennessee 
rivers. The Americans, Ugulayacabé knew, wore “hard shoes” and would tread on 
Chickasaw soil.116 By utilizing Spain’s powerful navy and the topographical advantages 
of the Bluffs, the threat of an invasion down the Mississippi would be eliminated. 
Furthermore, the establishment of a Spanish trade post would assure an outlet for 
Chickasaw hunters who sought to trade furs for manufactured goods. Freed from all 
these interrelated concerns, the Chickasaw Nation would be less susceptible to 
American pressure for land cessions going forward. In parting with a piece of their 
history, Ugulayacabé and the others hoped to secure their short and long-term future. 
As they had so many times before, the Chickasaws turned to the Mississippi to 
help define their place along it. Surrendering a portion of the Fourth Bluff represented a 
new iteration in this established pattern. Allies entered into reciprocal relationships in 
which they shared the river, and often the land around it, for their mutual benefit. 
Adversaries did not have this luxury, and their entry into these spaces was contested. 
Gayoso had come to understand this and framed his message accordingly. For his part, 
Ugulayacabé recognized Europeans and Americans dealt in land. Gayoso insured that 
Sakti Lhafa’ would continue to be a checkpoint and bargaining chip in Chickasaw-U.S. 
relations, but Ugulayacabé knew that these benefits required ceding part of the Fourth 
Chickasaw Bluff to Spain. Together Ugulayacabé and Gayoso forged an agreement 
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within the “cultural premises” of the other.117 Chickasaws yielded a small well-defined 
portion of the heights, but retained the majority of Sakti Lhafa’ for themselves.118 In 
consenting to this treaty, the Chickasaws took a calculated risk. They bet they could 
solidify their Spanish alliance and stave off greater threats to their security.   
Regrettably, Spain abandoned Fort San Fernando and the entire region shortly 
afterwards. Concerns in Europe prompted Spanish officials to accept American 
assertions that the thirty-first parallel should constitute the border between land claims 
made by Spain and the United States in West Florida. The Treaty of San Lorenzo, 
signed October 27, 1795, resolved what had been a tense territorial dispute between the 
two countries and also opened the Mississippi River to American shipping. According 
to the treaty’s terms, Fort San Fernando was to be abandoned and the Chickasaws’ 
beloved Bluffs transferred to the United States. Rather than a bulwark against American 
advances, Spain facilitated them. Then, in 1800, the Spanish Crown secretly ceded 
Louisiana back to France; Napoleon Bonaparte sold it to the United States when his 
short-lived dream of an American empire crashed three years later. With few other 
options Ugulayacabé, and a majority of Chickasaws, gambled on their Spanish alliance 
and lost.       
When word of the Treaty of San Lorenzo reached the Chickasaws in springtime 
1796 they were furious. That December, Ugulayacabé led a delegation to meet with 
Spanish officials at Fort San Fernando, and he expressed the Chickasaws’ displeasure. 
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They had placed great confidence in the Spaniards over the “seduction” of the 
Americans. As proof, Ugulayacabé exclaimed, “we gave you land that we had promised 
to preserve in the same state as it had been given to us by the great master so that you 
could establish a fort there.” The Chickasaws had entrusted Spain with an important 
piece of the Chickasaw Nation. Sakti Lhafa’ was the Mississippi’s namesake, and 
according to legend marked the start of Chickasaw history, the place where they became 
Chickasaws. The Bluff’s topographical features and geographic location made it unique 
to the Mississippi River as well. The whirlpool in the narrow channel and the rocky 
cliffs overlooking it had given them military power over the river. Now, Ugulayacabé 
explained “the land we gave and that you have now abandoned cannot be defended by 
us. Our forts [were] the woods that you converted into meadows.” The place that had 
always helped to define them, could no longer secure their place along the Mississippi. 
In this state, Ugulayacabé asserted, they were “like small animals to the claws of tigers 
and the jaws of wolves.”119   
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In late 1837, John E. Parsons told about another river crossing. He wrote to his 
mother, “I shall never forget the singular picture the whole party presented when all 
were got across the Miss--& in one dense mass covered the whole open ground on the 
bank. It was a scene to paint, not described with words--civilized society is so uniform 
& tame in the dress & manner & equipage that a crowd has no life in it.” In the midst of 
the removal policies of President Andrew Jackson and the United States government, 
Parsons bore witness to the tragic Chickasaw exodus. Yet, he could only lament his 
inability to sketch the scene “as they stood each above the other from the water’s edge 
to the top of the ascending ground. They seemed grouped there, to present one grand 
display of barbaric pomp.”1 Many Euro-Americans would have agreed with Parsons and 
believed Native Americans were unfit for “civilized society” which, conveniently, 
necessitated their removal so Euro-American settlers could possess their lands.  
 The beginnings of Chickasaw removal actually dated back to January 1803, just 
before the Louisiana Purchase. The territory “between the Ohio and Yazoo [rivers],” 
President Thomas Jefferson wrote, “all belongs to the Chickasaws, the most friendly 
tribe within our limits, but the most decided against the alienation of lands.” However, 
this could not be allowed to slow the movement of yeoman farmers westward or the 
expansion of the agrarian empire he envisioned. “The portion of their country most 
important for us is exactly that which they do not inhabit,” Jefferson informed 
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Congress. “They have lately shown a desire to become agricultural; and this leads to the 
desire of buying implements and comforts. In the strengthening and gratifying of these 
wants, I see the only prospect of planting on the Mississippi itself, the means of its own 
safety.”2 Over Ugulayacabé’s strenuous objections, Piomingo and James Colbert’s son, 
William, had backed the construction of an American fort on Sakti Lhafa’ to replace the 
abandoned Spanish outpost.3 But that was not enough. Jefferson encouraged 
Chickasaws to amass personal debts with the hope of forcing the Chickasaw Nation to 
sign away more land in repayment.4  
Despite this scheme, the majority of Chickasaws strenuously opposed ceding 
their homeland and moving west of the Mississippi River. After the election of Andrew 
Jackson in 1828, however, the new president’s backing intensified efforts to have them 
exiled. Jackson argued the Chickasaws would be better off in the West as squatters 
invaded their lands, the states of Mississippi and Alabama legislated against their 
existence, and federal officials coerced their “cooperation.” Chickasaw representatives 
eventually relented to these pressures and signed the Treaty of Pontotoc Creek on 
October 20, 1832, ceding all their land east of the Mississippi. Even then, most 
continued to linger in their homelands until 1837, after the Treaty of Doaksville, when 
the Choctaw Nation sold the Chickasaws part of its landholdings in Indian Territory.5 
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That summer, as Parsons looked on, they began the painful migration to present-day 
Oklahoma. Crossing the Mississippi River once again marked a critical moment in 
Chickasaw history. 
Since becoming a people the Chickasaws had laid claim to the Mississippi. They 
did this conventionally: traveling the waterway by pirogue, utilizing its resources, and 
denying passage to their enemies. Yet the stories they told, their names for the river, and 
its otherworldly characteristics were no less important. These created shared 
perceptions that worked simultaneously to create and define Chickasaw sovereignty and 
to demarcate the western limits of their dominion. Environmental factors also 
determined when, where, and how Chickasaws interacted with the Mississippi River. 
Seasonal variation and weather conditions affected water levels, which in turn altered 
resource availability and travel patterns. More generally, waterways constituted a 
central place in the worldviews of Southeastern Native Americans. Their perception of 
rivers influenced how they related to the landscape and other peoples. 
As imperial designs reshaped Native worlds Chickasaws demonstrated their 
independence along the Mississippi River, and displayed a willingness to utilize it to 
advance their alliances with Europeans and Euro-Americans. Organized river raids, like 
those against the French, challenged royal dreams and paper claims. Other countries, 
too, discovered the influence Chickasaws could have on the Mississippi River. 
Nevertheless, Chickasaw diplomats proved willing to negotiate passage and share the 
riverine landscape. At times Britain, Spain, the United States, and even France gained 
easy passage along the banks of Chickasaw Country. Personal relationships and 
mutually beneficial exchanges were all that was required.   
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The “great river” proved critical in defining Chickasaw history and the course of 
colonialism. No other overland or waterway path was as geographically imposing or as 
central to the meetings of peoples and empires in North America. Though their villages 
were more than one hundred miles from the Mississippi River, individual Chickasaws 
were never far from the water. The river lived in their minds, supported their lifeways, 
and influenced the political course they charted. Only a holistic view of the 
Mississippi’s status in the Chickasaw place-world can begin to explain these 
interrelationships.     
Each telling of their migration legend underscored the importance of the 
Mississippi River. Recounting this journey created a shared sense of place and time 
relative to the river. As the narrative unfolded, an unnamed people moved laterally, 
west to east, through a nondescript land. The indefinite nature of the story added a sense 
of homelessness and uncertainty. However, in most cases their arrival at the Mississippi 
River provided the sole physical landmark that defined West and East as locations. The 
sacred long pole continued to direct them towards the rising sun, but now sunrise and 
sunset occurred on either side of the waterway. Remembering when they first crossed 
the Mississippi also produced a sense of chronology. This act manifest itself as a 
transformative moment in time, separating what came before from that which occurred 
afterwards. According to their migration legends, at the Mississippi River, Chickasaw 
ancestors passed into a modern era.      
The collective memory of this event perpetuated ideas about Chickasaw 
sovereignty and identity. These, in turn, reinforced social and political bonds within the 
nation. When the sacred pole stood straight they found their homeland, and thereafter 
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the muddy Mississippi delimited its western bounds. Only then were the migrants 
identified as Chickasaws. In recognition of this occasion, clan and house groups 
adopted new names. The river’s stature as a boundary may have even denoted one such 
association and influenced the structure of Chickasaw society. In due course, the 
Mississippi also received labels. Where it passed their lands Chickasaws knew the river 
as Sakti Lhafa Okhina’, but when it wound south into foreign territory it became 
Balbásha’. These social constructs further embedded the Mississippi within Chickasaw 
history, cultural, and geography.  
The river most certainly took on supernatural dimensions as well. Waterways 
were important components of the Under World for Southeastern Native Americans. As 
the descendants of Mississippian peoples, they inherited beliefs about the cosmos and 
the interworking of the Under World, This World, and the Upper World. Taboos related 
to river travel were meant to neutralize the “Great Serpent” who ruled the lower realm. 
This horned serpent could produce strong currents or drowned naysayers, and so proper 
ritual precautions had to be observed. The white dog of Chickasaw legend may have 
represented the first Chickasaw sacrifice on the Mississippi River. Meanwhile, in the 
Upper World, the Great Serpent took shape in the stars as a constellation. There, too, 
the white dog may have been waiting to guide the deceased into the afterlife. Even far 
removed from the Mississippi’s channel, Chickasaws were reminded of the river and its 
influence.  
Seasonal variations dictated the Great Serpent’s position in the night sky and 
altered water levels in the Mississippi. With the rise and fall of the river, physical 
landscapes transformed, as did the ecosystems they supported. Experience and careful 
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observation enabled Chickasaws to navigate these changes. In doing so, the Mississippi 
became part of their lived environment. Chickasaw craftsmen made hunting and 
gathering foodstuffs on the Mississippi River easier. Pirogue construction expanded the 
Chickasaws’ resource base, trade ties, and alliance networks.  
Intimate knowledge of the Mississippi’s undulations kept Chickasaw canoeists 
safe as they pursued these ends. Men and women harnessed the water’s power to propel 
themselves downstream and exploited its weak spots when paddling upriver. The 
LMR’s meandering nature required that they constantly reposition their pirogues. 
Strong central currents rushed through straightaways only to collide with the interior 
banks of the Mississippi’s many curves. Chickasaws “read” the waterway and adjusted 
their boats accordingly. In addition, those aboard remained vigilant for planters, 
sawyers, or any other obstructions. When disaster did strike and the Under World 
threatened to pull them below the water, Chickasaws were trained to swim for their 
lives. River travel, and even river crossings, entailed risks. To help offset some of these, 
Native Americans kept their pirogues in good condition by storing them underwater. 
“Navigating” the Mississippi successfully required Chickasaws to be familiar with the 
river’s natural features and the peoples surrounding it.  
Chickasaw cartographers mapped the geopolitical landscape in 1723 and 1737. 
Both maps demonstrate the Chickasaw Nation understood its place within the British 
trade network and the course of regional waterways. Like the Chickasaw migration 
legend, these documents point to the importance of the Mississippi River for the 
Chickasaw people. In addition to Chickasaw pronouncements, blank space between the 
Chickasaw Nation and the Mississippi, on the map in 1723, demonstrate the river 
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served as the western limit of Chickasaw Country. Paths drawn from the Chickasaw 
Nation toward the Mississippi act similarly on the 1737 version. Furthermore, 
thousands of river miles take shape in the older diagram. The names of a dozen rivers 
express the characteristics Chickasaws associated with them, as well as the navigability 
of each. In both maps, rivers are the only natural features present on otherwise political 
documents. By the mid-eighteenth century Chickasaws inherited, interpreted, and 
manipulated space along the Mississippi River to create cultural and political 
geography. Like the Mississippi’s channel, there was an unseen depth to Chickasaw 
actions. Their maps give a sense of these dimensions and how they influenced the 
Chickasaw Nation’s relationships with other polities.  
The dynamics of the relationship Chickasaws maintained with the Mississippi 
become more evident when reevaluating Chickasaw interactions with Europeans on the 
river. Colonialism brought Chickasaw conceptions of the Mississippi landscape to the 
fore. They claimed use rights and cultural authority on the river, but only where it 
passed their lands. Even so, others were not barred. Native Americans did not conceive 
of land or rivers as exclusive spaces. Passage through these places, and use of resources 
within them, might be negotiated or shared depending on kinship ties and formal 
alliances. People outside of such categories did not belong to the Mississippi landscape 
as Chickasaws envisioned it. However, peoples once thought to be foreign could 
become relatives, friends, or allies. Through ceremony and ritual exchange, Chickasaws 
transformed the river from a boundary into a path. The Chickasaw Nation’s influence 
on the Mississippi River shaped the colonial process in North American throughout the 
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eighteenth century, even as the balance of power shifted and Chickasaws adjusted their 
expectations of non-Native allies.  
 The capture of Pierre-Laurent Ducoder, with his men and gunpowder, illustrates 
how the Mississippi united Chickasaws and held the potential to create new relations. 
Both red and white moieties shared common beliefs about the river. Under Mingo 
Ouma’s leadership warriors from both divisions joined together to protect their people 
and uphold those values. Discovering Ducoder became a way to safeguard the 
Chickasaw Nation and instruct French officials about how France might gain access to 
the Mississippi River along Chickasaw Country. Warriors seized the gunpowder 
Ducoder and his men transported in order to prevent Chickasaw enemies from using it. 
In addition, three French soldiers were captured and escorted to Chickasaw villages. 
Chickasaws witnessed these men’s ritual redemption, and headmen from both moieties 
collaborated to have them repatriated. Despite political divisions within the Chickasaw 
Nation, the Chickasaw people well-understood the value of both actions. Taking goods 
and captives from the Mississippi enforced their boundaries. Returning the detainees 
initiated a process by which peace and trade with France could be established. Only 
then would Chickasaws assure French navigation of the Mississippi River.   
By 1735, when Ducoder fell into Chickasaw hands, French officials had come to 
recognize the vulnerability of their river traffic and the methods of Native diplomacy. 
As a precaution, they instructed convoys and independent voyagers to avoid the 
Mississippi’s east bank near Chickasaw territory. Furthermore, French authorities 
understood the return of captives was meant to initiate reconciliation. Even the 
Chickasaws’ fractious relationship with France was not beyond repair, and many 
233 
 
Chickasaws remained open to the possibility of sharing the Mississippi. To this end, 
Chickasaw war parties largely avoided the river in 1740 and a Chickasaw village 
rejected a Cherokee offer to share spoils from defeated French pirogues. When these 
efforts failed to produce the desired results, a body of Chickasaws captured Guillaume 
Bienvenu’s convoy, and the peace process began anew.  
Sharing physical space on the Mississippi required Europeans to respect the 
social, economic, and political relationships Chickasaws built upon the river. French 
diplomats understood these concepts but could not come to terms with the Chickasaw 
Nation. Failure to do so might not have mattered had it not been for Sakti Lhafa’. The 
Fourth Chickasaw Bluff was an intricate component of the Chickasaw’s connection to 
the Mississippi and those who plied it. Sakti Lhafa’ personified Sakti Lhafa’ Okhina’. 
Evoking one was to speak of the other, and traveling between the LMR and the MMR 
required managing the twisted course they set. Europeans struggled to navigate their 
boats in this section of the river, and the task became even more harrowing when 
Chickasaw warriors obstructed the way. Chickasaw braves could hide in the woods and 
shoot down upon their enemies or sit in wait at one of the few landing spots. Traveling 
the Mississippi between Louisiana and Illinois meant neither Sakti Lhafa’ nor the 
Chickasaws could be avoided.           
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Chickasaw Nation exercised its 
power at the Chickasaw Bluffs to maximize its influence on the Mississippi River. 
When efforts to reconcile with France failed and the Seven Years’ War swamped the 
region, Chickasaw warriors made them a military checkpoint. Consequently, 
Frenchmen struggled to maneuver their boats past the Bluffs unmolested. The 
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Chickasaws’ British allies cheered this development, but could not inspire Chickasaws 
to impede Spanish and American traffic on the Mississippi during the American 
Revolution. British officials paid a small fortune to retain the Chickasaw Nation’s 
allegiance, yet Spanish and American vessels generally went unhindered, that is until 
they became a direct threat. Inspired by his adopted nation’s successes at Sakti Lhafa’, 
James Colbert orchestrated his resistance movement from its safety. Few Chickasaws 
actually joined him, but many reaped the rewards.  
After the American Revolution, with Chickasaw strength at the Bluffs 
unquestioned, Chickasaw diplomats set about affirming relations with Spain and the 
United States. Both countries recognized Sakti Lhafa’s geopolitical importance, 
although neither perceived its cultural significance to the Chickasaw people. Competing 
factions within the Chickasaw Nation entertained the prospect of an American or 
Spanish fort on site, but neither Chickasaw bloc would consent. As part of the 
“confluence region,” people and trade goods had come together there for thousands of 
years, and Chickasaw headmen ensured this would continue. While pursing alliances 
with Spain and the United States, Chickasaw diplomats requested that both nations 
utilize the Mississippi River and deliver manufactured wares to the Chickasaw people at 
the Fourth Bluff. Chickasaws had a long history with Saki Lhafa’, so it remained in the 
Chickasaws’ possession, a tantalizing bargaining chip. 
Not until 1795, when events threatened to drown the entire Chickasaw Nation, 
was a part of Sakti Lhafa’ dealt away. Chickasaws had faced dire prospects before, but 
this time was different. Forecasts of a Creek war had intensified, trade opportunities 
stagnated, and American pioneers seemed poised to flood the land. Ugulayacabé and 
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many other Chickasaws looked to the high grounds of Sakti Lhafa’ for safety. 
Ugulayacabé had built a personal relationship with Manuel Gayoso, the governor of 
Louisiana, and believed Spain would help defend the Chickasaw Nation while 
supplying its need for trade goods. However, in order to seal this alliance Chickasaws 
had to cede a portion of the Fourth Bluff to Spain as Gayoso requested. On the 
Mississippi River history, topography, hydrology, and geopolitics merged at Sakti 
Lhafa’. Though the manner in which Chickasaws navigated this space changed 
throughout the eighteenth century, the bluff and its river remained important to the 
Chickasaw Nation. The bonds that drew Chickasaws to the Mississippi also influenced 
the course of colonialism in the Mississippi Valley.  
Without a counterweight to offset American expansionism in the nineteenth 
century, the Chickasaws were forced west. Nevertheless, they did not forget their 
history on the other side of the Mississippi River. On March 4, 1856 the Chickasaw 
people adopted their constitution and the Great Seal of the Chickasaw Nation. When 
you view the Seal today, you will see “a likeness of Chief Tishomingo holding a shield 
and bow, with four (4) swan feathers in his headband and swan mantle across his chest 
and a quiver of arrows at this side, standing in front of the Mississippi River.”6 The Seal 
is a permanent reminder of the Mississippi’s importance to the people and their 
homeland. More recently, the Chickasaw Nation has begun to celebrate its heritage on 
the water too. In 2011 the Chickasaw RIVERSPORT Canoe/Kayak program began to 
teach Chickasaw youth “the art of kayaking and canoeing,” and a yearlong exhibit 
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showcasing dugout canoes just concluded at the Chickasaw Cultural Center.7 On my 
trip down I-35 to visit this display, billboards featuring the white dog guided the way. If 
you should also make the journey to Ada, OK, you’ll find “The Arrival Sculpture” near 
the Exhibit Center commemorating the people’s first Mississippi River crossing. Sakti 
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